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Foreword 
by 
J. PAUL HILLIS 
Fisheries Research Centre, Abbotstown, Dublin 15. Ireland 
The European Association of Fisheries Economists (EAFE) was founded following a meeting of 
interested European fisheries economists at Esbjerg in August 1988. Its first Annual Conference was 
a modest one held at Brussels in January 1990, while the second was held at Lisbon in March 1990. 
At Lisbon, the Bureau accepted an invitation to meet in Dublin in the spring of 1991, so the Third 
Annual Conference of EAFE was duly held in Dublin, at the Headquarters of the Geological Survey 
of Ireland, during the 10th to 12th April, 1991. 
Three themes were selected for the Conference, (1) The Single European Market, (2) Capacity, and 
(3) Coastal Management. In the event, the second theme attracted the most interest, reflecting the 
widespread preoccupation with overfishing and the problems inherent in trying to rectify it; papers 
accepted included two in Section 1, thirteen in Section 2 and five in Section 3, although one (No. 
16), originally submitted in Section 3, was by reason of the nature of its contents finally transferred 
to Section 2. 
In keeping with the tradition which has arisen, the Annual Conference of EAFE was preceded by its 
Annual General Meeting. During the Conference, delegates were welcomed by the Minister of State 
at the Department of the Marine, Mr. Michael Noonan, T.D. and entertained by the Minster of the 
Marine, Mr. John Wilson, T.D. and the Lord Mayor of Dublin, The Right Honourable Michael 
Donnelly, P.C. 
Thanks are due to the many colleagues in Dublin who helped to make the meeting a success, 
including Mr. James Carroll, Ms. Anne McDaid and Ms. Noirin O'Neill. Thanks are also due to those 
who have helped in production of these proceedings, notably the Series Editor, Dr. Christopher 
Moriarty, the anonymous referees and the typists and graphic artist who helped to render the papers 
in more or less uniform style. 
It is hoped that these Proceedings will to some degree form a landmark in recording thought and 
work in fisheries economics at a critical pepoint in the evolution of European fisheries management, 
when recognition of the economic significance of overfishing, possible mechanisms of remedial 
action and the problems of implementing them were becoming more widely recognised and 
attracting interest on a previously unparalleled scale. Since the Conference, interest has continued 
to grow and show increasing signs of offering new means of managing fisheries, using economics 
in addition to the traditional biology to achieve results much more effective than those obtained in 
earlier days when biology alone was used for this purpose. 
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Address of welcome by Mr. Michael J. Noonan, T.D., 
Minister of State at the Department of the Marine 
It is my great pleasure to be with you this morning to officially open your Third Annual Conference 
and to welcome you all to Ireland. 
As Minister of State at the Irish Government Department responsible for marine matters - Roinn 
na Mara - I must say it is a singular honour for your Association to have chosen Dublin as your 
venue for this year's Conference. It coincides with the designation by the EC of Dublin as the 
European City of Culture in 1991 and I compliment the Association's foresight. 
The Themes you have chosen for your Conference are highly topical focusing as they do on a 
number of contentious fishery issues currently being addressed by all members States. 
Fishing capacity or to describe it more concisely, the excess fishing capacity in the Community fleet, 
it perhaps the single most important issue currently the subject of debate in the context of the review 
of the Common Fishery Policy together with total allowable catches and quota allocations. 
A second Conference theme - 1992 and the Single Market with the anticipated effects on marketing 
and trade in fish products - is also a very live issue. The introduction of "the Single Market" will 
no doubt present challenges to all member states and our Irish exporters and processors are aware 
of its implications and the need to gear themselves for a more market-oriented trade in fishery 
products. 
Another major Conference theme - Coastal Management including the interaction between water 
quality and aquaculture - should also generate a lot of interest. Certainly, a properly managed and 
regulated aquaculture industry can meet the highest environmental standards and avoid damage to 
the marine environment. By and large that is the case in Ireland. We are blessed with a relatively 
unpolluted coastline but there is no scope for complacency and the maintenance of water quality 
remains top priority. 
I would like to take this opportunity to compliment the Association on its work. The promotion of 
co-operation among fishery economists in their research on fisheries and aquaculture can only lead 
to greater understanding and benefit the Community's seafish industry. It is only through such co-
operation and the widest possible dissemination of information that we can help to achieve our 
common aims - a prosperous and developing seafish industry with all the positive spin-offs in 
terms of jobs and economic activity in our coastal regions. I would certainly encourage greater 
involvement of Community fishery economists in the scientific assessment of fisheries policy 
generally. Hopefully, this three-day Conference will help towards achieving these positive goals. 
I hope that during your stay in Dublin you will avail of the chance to sample some of the social and 
cultural life of our Capital City. I understand that the Tanaiste (deputy Prime Minister) will be hosting 
a reception for Conference participants in Dublin Castle later this week and I trust you will avail of 
our hospitality. Dublin Castle dating back to 1169 should prove an interesting venue for you and 
particularly for those with an interest in archaeological or military history. 
I will conclude by wishing your deliberations in the coming days every success and I hope this 
Conference will prove as enjoyable and fruitful as your previous Conferences in Brussels and Lisbon. 
Thank You 
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Integration of the European Specialization in the World 
Seafood-Processing Sector 
by 
PATRICE GUILLOTREAU 
Ecole Nationale Superieure Agronomique de Rennes (ENSAR), Rennes, France' 
SYNOPSIS 
The main part of this paper, after the introduction, is divided into two parts, as follows:-
Part 1: Assessment and consideration olthe limitations olthe international trade indicators regarding 
the preserved and processed fish products industry 
1.1 First assessment of the European situation 
1.2 Limitations olthe use of such indicators 
Part 2: Elaboration of a new index and re-evaluation of international specialization 
2.1 Presentation and significance of this new indicator 
2.2 Results 
the significance of the findings is summarised and discussed in the conclusion. 
INTRODUCTION 
According to statistics issued by the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO, 1990), the amount of 
fish caught for human consumption has undergone a continuous increase since World War II, 
reaching almost 70 Mt in 1988 (against 32 Mt in 1960). This is a spectacular increase; yet that of 
international trade in fish is even more so, since it was assessed at 50% by volume over the last 
decade, representing 36.5% of the world catch (live weight). 
Parallel to this growth, the EC trade deficit for fish products has increased: 
-2.5 billion ECU in 1985 
-3.0 in 1986 
-3.5 in 1987 
-5.4 in 1990 
Hence, the large increase in international demand does not benefit the European producers, but is 
profitable to the producers of Southeast Asia. In fact, imports of fish products are relatively limited 
geographically to three main zones, the EC, Japan and the United States. Exports are much more 
scattered and are undergoing profound restructuring. Beyond the natural stocks issue, factors of 
international specialization have to be explained in order to enhance the value issue for individual 
countries. 
It is a matter of regret that most analyses dealing with the international specialization issue deal 
only with the commercial aspect of internationalization. The problem is even more pronounced in 
the fishing sector, where interdependence between nations is so comprehensive that it also entails 
other aspects such as production, finance and technology. 
Over the last three decades, several phenomena have emerged which suggest that international 
specialization should be reexamined. First, the multi nationalization of production processes means 
that some of the exports of one country are attributable to the subsidiaries of locally based foreign 
companies. In the same way, a portion of the imports of one country come from delocalized national 
units (e.g. imports of canned tuna in the EC). In this respect, we really should refer to territorial 
rather than national specialization. 
Secondly, both intra-industry trade and flows of intermediate goods cannot be explained by the 
classical Or neo-classical models of international trade. The former partly breaks away from the 
*See Appendix for present address. 
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classical theories advocating an inter-products specialization. (Law of comparative advantage D.Ri-
cardo 1817). The latter is attributable to the fact that countries import in order to produce. These 
facts require the generalization of analysis into effective terms rather than nominal or apparent 
terms. 
This is why new models are necessary to measure specialization, taking domestic production into 
account. Indicators that are based on exchange flows only might lead to biassed results but care 
will be taken to avoid this. 
Part 1 - Measurement and limitations of international trade indicators within the 
preserved and processed fish products sector 
International specialization has been measured in 23 countries (including the EC member states) 
which are the most active in production and international trade of sea products. For reasons of data 
availability and homogeneity, the following FAO groups of products have been used:-
1. FCF: 
2. DSS: 
3. CM: 
4. FPP: 
5. CMP: 
6. OIL: 
7. MLS: 
Fresh, chilled or frozen fish 
Dried, salted or smoked fish 
Crustacean and mollusc fresh, frozen, dried, salted, ... 
Fish products and preparations, whether or not in airtight containers 
Crustacean and mollusc products and preparations, whether or not in airtight containers 
Oil and fats, crude or refined, of aquatic animal origin 
Meals, solubles and similar animal foodstuffs of aquatic origin. 
1.1 First assessment of the European specialization 
We have been able to apply a first indicator which takes into consideration trade flows. It is inspired 
by the indexes elaborated by Balassa (1965) ,and Grubel and Lloyd (1975) in their works on intra-
industry trade. This is:-
Xi-Mi 
Bi = 1 - ---where 0<Bi<+1 
Xi+Mi 
Where X = Exports 
M = Imports 
For a country 'i' and a given industry 
The closer Bi is to 1, the more trade is intra-industry, as opposed to inter-industry. In the case of 
perfect identity (Bi= 1), exports equal imports for similar products. 
An indicator showing the contribution to the balance has been preferred to a mere ratio measuring 
the intensity of intra-industry trade:-
Xik-Mik 
Aik = * 100 where -100<Aik<+100 
1I2(XwK+MwK) 
'k' is the considered sub-industry (such as FCF, DSS, CM), it represents all preserved and processed 
sea products, 'i' is the country and 'w' means the world. The denominator shows the international 
trade in the industry (the arithmetical mean has been retained because of the imperfect equality 
between imports and exports at this level). 
Ai. can be deduced from this indicator and represents the sum of Aik per country: 
XiK-MiK 
~.= *100 
1 12(XwK + MwK) 
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Table 1 
Intra-Industry co-efficient of trade in seafood products (Aik). 1988 
A. European Community Countries 
Pro- France Italy Spain UK FR Denmark Nether- Belgium Portugal Greece Ireland 
duct Germany lands 
FCF -1.6314 -2.1999 -1.4981 -0.6987 -1.6294 -1.2110 -0.9711 -0.4175 -0.0563 -0,0919 0.4056 
OSS -0.1184 -0.8142 -0.2043 0.1125 -0.2605 0.4796 0.0799 ·0.0326 -0.9563 -0.0237 0.0296 
CM -1.2406 -1.4567 -1.5011 0.0947 -0.2990 0.1984 0.1599 ·0.3701 -0,0385 -0,0681 0.1303 
FPP -0.9297 -0.3316 0.1628 -0.9623 -0,0503 0.4530 -0.0059 -0.2043 0.2250 -0.0296 -0.0859 
CMP ·0.4500 -0.1510 -0.1095 -0,5152 -0.2221 0.1688 0.1362 -0.1066 -0.0059 0.0622 -0.0030 
OIL -0.0030 -0.0201 -0.0237 -0.1628 -0.1244 0.0266 -0.1155 -0.0266 0.0059 0.0000 0.0000 
MLS ·0.1125 -0.1007 -0,0089 -0.4323 -0.1808 0.4293 -0.1303 -0.0533 -0.0030 -0.0355 -0.0089 
Total -4.4856 -5.0742 -3.1828 -2.5640 -2.7654 2.9667 1.0955 -1.2110 -0.8290 -0.1865 0.4678 
8, Non-European Community Countries 
Pro- Japan USA Canada Norway Thai- Iceland Hong Korea China Chile Indo- USSR 
duct land Kong nesia 
FCF -11.8816 -1.2406 2.86901 2.7032 -1.1399 1.5722 -0.0563 1.7705 0.7461 0.4796 0.2398 0.6987 
OSS -1.0126 0.2250 0.9445 0.9692 0.0415 0.7816 -0.2872 0.0977 0,0148 0.0118 0.0415 -0.0711 
CM ·14.0903 -5.5959 0.8053 0.0947 1.8357 0.3198 -0.4204 1.4567 2.8631 0.1895 1.5870 0.4115 
FPP -0.9623 -1.0452 0.0533 0.2369 1.7409 0.0444 -0.0385 0.5191 0.1451 0.0918 0.0592 0.5951 
eMP -0.8290 -1.0244 0.0888 0.2546 0.6780 0.0444 -0.0799 0.5566 0.1480 0.1776 0.0178 0.1540 
OIL 0.2576 0.0355 0.0000 -0.0474 0,0000 0.0918 0.0000 -0.0148 -0.0030 0.0711 0.0000 0.0355 
MLS 0.0355 -0.0859 0.0148 0.0829 0.0799 0.2576 0.0000 -0.0355 -0.7609 1.3590 -0.0326 0.0118 
Total -28.483 -8.7313 4.7757 4.2931 3.2361 3.1118 -0.8823 4,3494 3.1532 2.3805 1.9127 1.8357 
Source: FAD Yearbook 1990 
When this equation is applied to seafood products, it gives, for 1988, the results shown in Tables 
1a,1band2. 
TABLE 2 
Countries with positive and negative Ai 1 n 1988 
Rank Countries Ai. Rank Countries Ai. 
1 Canada 4,7757 1 Japan -28,483 
2 Korea 4,3494 2 USA -8,7313 
3 Norway 4,2931 3 Italy -5,0742 
4 Thailand 3,2361 4 France -4,4856 
5 China 3,1532 5 Spain -3,1828 
6 Iceland 3,1118 6 FRG -2,7654 
7 Denmark 2,9667 7 UK -2,5640 
8 Chile 2,3805 8 Belgium -1,2110 
9 Indonesia 1,9127 9 Hong-Kong -0,8823 
10 USSR 1,8357 10 Portugal -0,8290 
11 Peru 1,2169 11 Greece -0,1865 
12 Netherlands 1,0955 
13 Ireland 0,4678 
Of the eleven EEC member states in the sample, eight belong to the group of countries showing the 
greatest deficits. Only Denmark, the Netherlands and Ireland are in the list of countries having a 
positive Ai. 
Japan ranks first by far on the list of deficitary countries, and if we consider Tables 1a and 1b, we 
see that the major part of the Japanese external deficit is attributable to two categories of products; 
FCF and CM. 
The export supply seems to be much more scattered than demand. For example, Canada has the 
greatest surplus contribution to the volume of international trade, yet for fresh, chilled and frozen 
fish, this contribution represents only 2.9% of the international flows. 
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Ai. values close to 0 either indicate countries, such as Hong Kong, which practice intra-industry 
trade intensively or else they mask the existence of flows which are relatively minor when compared 
to the whole international trade, as is the case with Greece, Portugal and Ireland. 
For comparison with the 1988 Ai values, those for 1970 are given in Table 3. 
TABLE 3 
Countries with positive and negative Ai in 1970. 
Rank Countries Ai. Rank Countries Ai. 
1 Peru 10,86 1 USA -23,20 
2 Norway 7,76 2 U.K -7,66 
3 Canada 6,60 3 FRG -6,38 
4 Denmark 3,78 4 France -5,32 
5 Iceland 3,62 5 Italy -4,74 
6 USSR 2,37 6 Belgium -2,24 
7 Spain 1,57 7 Hong-Kong -1,22 
8 Japan 1,38 8 Greece -0,29 
9 Korea 1,19 
10 Chile 0,87 
11 Netherlands 0,61 
12 Thailand 0,45 
13 Portugal 0,42 
14 Indonesia 0,13 
15 Ireland 0,07 
When we compare the situations in 1988 (Table 2) and in 1970 (Table 3). the most striking point is 
how some Asiatic countries (particularly South Korea, Thailand and Indonesia) rose at the expense 
of European countries (those of EFTA and some EC members such as Spain and Portugal). and 
South American countries such as Peru, the specialization of which is exclusively oriented towards 
the fishmeal industry and which saw its relative situation deteriorate so much over the last three 
decades that it regressed from rank 1 to rank 11 in the international ranking of exporting countries. 
The structural specialization of Portugal (marked by its involvement in a declining sector, canned 
fish) also accounts for the drop in its contribution to international trade. Japan fell from the status 
of a country with a surplus (Ai>O) in 1970 to that of the one with the greatest deficit (Ai<O) in 1988. 
1.2 Limitations of the use of such indicators 
When such indicators are used, it is not possible to assess specialization effective terms by, taking 
into account the import content of the national production and thus of re-exports. 
The nature of trade - and of specialization - should be measured in terms of the dependence level 
of a national industry upon the intermediate goods that are needed. As far as the preserved and 
processed sea products sectors are concerned, these intermediate goods correspond to the blocks 
of frozen products which will be processed later (The processed products are here defined as as 
those which can be consumed at a later time thus all kinds of chilled or fresh fish, gutted fish, fresh 
fillet, traditionally included in the primary processing in the United Kingdom are excluded from this 
definition). 
Thus, an intense two-way trade of products belonging to the same industry can cover many different 
situations, depending on the presence or absence of a locally based processing industry. Two 
contrasting situations can occur:-
14 
(a) the importing country is equipped with production facilities, imported goods are used to 
produce goods which can be re-exported. This is the case in the former Federal Republic of 
Germany for which the catch level has been considerably reduced over the last 30 years, 
but which maintains an important processing sector. This is the result of an economic 
.~-~-..•. -
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policy choice in order to settle the resource endowment issue and the induced problem of 
unemployment in the north of Germany. 
(b) Where this industrial potential does not exist, some imports of final goods may be re-
exported. The agents in these countries are only brokers and not processors, andt it is clear 
that the impact on local employment is not the same. This is the case in Hong Kong, for 
example. 
A second limit can encompass all biases inherent to the sole reference to trade flows in the 
computation of indicators. The importance of domestic production is therefore left aside. Similarly, 
the consequences of trade policies (import quotas, tariffs, subsidies for exports, etc.) partly distort 
the true nature of specialization. 
Part 2 - Elaboration of a new index and .e-evaluation of international specialization 
So as to partly suppress all bias introduced by a basic consideration oftrade flows or by the nominal 
approach of international specialization, it seems essential that domestic output be integrated into 
the composition of a new index. 
2.1 Presentation and significance of this indicator 
The weighting applied will no longer be international trade volume in the whole branch but the 
volume of the products group considered (FCF, DSS, CM, etc.). The indicator deriving from the 
preceding one will then be: 
Qik+Xik-Mik -Mmk 
Eik = * 100 where < Eik < +1 
Qwk+1 12(Xwk+Mwk) Qmk+Xmk 
In the same way: 
QiK+XiK-MiK 
Ei.= *100 
QwK+1/2(XwK+MwK) 
With Q symbolizing home output consumed within national borders. 
Such an indication is therefore a measure of a country's territorial contribution - in proportional 
terms - relative to the apparent world supply for product k. The contribution may take either a 
negative or a positive val ue. 
The major concern is to evaluate home and world outputs. Reference to a world market price is 
deemed necessary. The average world export price may take on this role. It does not affect 
computation homogeneity of the numerator or denominator. Average prices obtained are as 
follows: 
1988 k Pw(USD/tm) 
FCF 2462,7 
DSS 3774,5 
CM 6720,6 
FPP 3069,0 
CMP 6382,8 
OIL 351,9 
MLS 495,1 
TOTALK 2535,3 
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TABLE 4 
Apparent National Trade Contribution within World Supply (Eikl. 1988 
A. European Community Countries 
Pro- France Italy Spain UK FR Denmark Nether- Belgium Portugal Greece Ireland 
duct Germany lands 
FCF -0.431 -1.231 0.990 0.579 -0.360 1.923 1.571 -0.239 0.225 -0.037 0.940 
DSS 0.065 -1.120 0.141 0.742 -0.142 1.192 0.594 0.003 -1.361 0.112 0.142 
CM -1.624 -1.364 0.292 1.099 -0.396 1.732 0.215 -0.347 0.010 0.103 0.305 
FPP 0.019 1.079 2.032 -1.398 1.713 1.812 0.256 -0.167 1.059 -0.031 0.075 
CMP -2.899 -0.571 1.509 -3.546 -0.787 4.140 1.952 -0.609 0.031 0.688 -0.013 
OIL 0.035 -0.799 -0.598 -6.145 -4.647 5.296 -4.583 -1.058 0.319 0.000 0.186 
MLS -0.558 -0.630 0.739 -2.385 -0.958 6.148 -0.866 -0.343 0.049 -0.236 -0.020 
Total -0.601 -0.820 0.861 0.075 -0.069 1.973 0.795 -0.229 0.013 0.039 
0.453 
B. Non - European Community Countries 
Hong Korea China Chile Indo- USSR Pro- Japan USA Canada Norway Thai- Ice-
duct land land Kong nesia 
FCF 10.768 1.484 3.689 3.322 0.478 1.999 0.059 7.193 2.758 0.743 0.247 16.970 
DSS 14.055 0.648 2.561 2.753 14.423 2.682 -0.377 0.747 23.459 0.067 11.640 10.856 
CM -9.233 0.632 2.276 0.530 8.463 0.785 -0.351 3.038 7.903 0.657 3.449 0.555 
FPP 23.553 3.681 0.789 1.150 6.980 0.110 -0.062 3.640 0.517 1.111 0.198 20.498 
CMP 2.086 1.525 0.715 1.916 18.533 0.497 -0.531 6.994 2.911 2.503 0.513 1.493 
OIL 30.312 5.625 0.915 1.751 0.000 7.548 0.000 -0.543 -0.118 10.593 0.136 6.060 
MLS 10.909 3.204 0.772 2.482 2.766 3.582 0.064 0.467 -4.569 19.864 -0.205 7.569 
Total 9.263 1.610 2.498 2.228 6.394 1.628 -0.143 4.315 6.873 1.556 
2.932 12.150 
Source: FAO Yearbook 1990 
2.2 Main results 
See Table 4 (a and b) and 5 
This second evaluation yields conclusions apparently contradictory to those computations con-
trasting with those obtained during the previous computations. For example, a comparison of Tables 
3 and 5 indicates that the USSR remains a strong producing country, even though It ranks tenth for 
export performances. 
TABLE 5 
Countries with positive and negative Ei in 1988 
Rank Countries Ei. Rank Countries Ei. Rank Countries Ei. 
1 USSR 12,15 10 ICELAND 1,63 1 ITALY 
-0,82 
2 JAPAN 9,26 11 USA 1,61 2 FRANCE 
-0,60 
3 CHINA 6,87 12 CHILE 1,56 3 BELGIUM 
-0,23 
4 THAILAND 6,39 13 SPAIN 0,86 4 HG-KONG -0,14 
5 KOREA 4,32 14 NETHERL. 0,80 5 FRG -0,07 
6 INDONESIA 2,93 15 IRELAND 0,45 
7 CANADA 2,50 16 UNITED K. 0,08 
8 NORWAY 2,23 17 GREECE 0,04 
9 DENMARK 1,97 18 PORTUGAL 0,01 
The excellent specialization of the Asian Countries is made evident here by the fact that five of these 
countries are placed among the six best producers/exporters in the world. The example of Japan 
especially reminds us that we should not confuse dise~gagement for exports and the keeping of a 
production tool with domestic vocation, generating major external effects (shipbuilding, packaging 
industry). 
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In contrast, countries such as France and Italy are experiencing a relatively worrying situation when 
compared to their European neighbours. Poor results in external trade do not mask the existence of 
national prosperous industries! The contribution of France to world supply is positive only for three 
groups of products (DSS, FPP, OIL), none of which is among the most dynamic in terms of either 
growth or income-generation. 
Respective results from Germany and Hong Kong are illustrative of the comments in paragraph 1.2. 
The German contribution to world supply is higher than that of Hong Kong and generates more 
local employment opportunities because of the presence of a domestic processing industry in this 
European country. 
Tables 4a and 4b also enhance the geographical concentration of the various supplies. As an 
example, three-quarters of the apparent world supply in dried, salted or smoked fish emanates from 
five countries, all but part of one of them in Asia, Japan, Thailand, China, Indonesia and the USSR. 
World supply for fresh, chilled or frozen fish is more scattered since the 18 countries included in the 
sample and contributing positively to the supply achieve only 55.8% of its estimated value. 
CONCLUSION 
The introduction of non-exported home output in the computation of world specialization indicators 
sheds new light on the situation. Most of all, its worth is to avoid confusing export strategy-external 
involvement or not - and processing tool structuring. 
Globally, structural specialization in the European Community is not good, given the extremely 
sharp growth in world - and European - demand for products of which production is poorly 
represented throughout Europe, notably crustaceans and molluscs. The share of the mollusc and 
crustacean trade - mainly cephalopods and shrimps, the hallmark of Asian countries - accounts 
for one-third in value of the world trade for fish products. Poor EC external results are therefore to 
be attributed to a large excess in domestic demand, as compared to domestic supply, and to the 
European firms' uncompetitiveness. 
However, weak performances should not overshadow the value of the European processing industry 
and the necessity to support and develop this processing tool, which is truly the valuable logical 
extension of the catching activity. 
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Import Determination for Groundfish in France 
1. Introduction 
by 
CHRIS IOANNIDIS 
University of Wales, College of Cardiff, Cardiff, UK 
and 
FREDERIC LANTZ 
IFREMER, Issy les Moulineaux, France 
1.1 In this paper were examine the determination of imports for selected groundfish in France over 
the late 80's. France has the highest consumption of 'seafood' per head within the EC and is the 
biggest European importer of 'seafood'. 
The trade deficit in seafood is a important item on the liability side of the French Balance of Payments 
accounts. The deficit has been rising steadily since the mid 70's, as domestic consumption kept 
growing whilst domestic landings were shrinking severely. By 1989 France was a net importer of 
around FF 14bn worth seafood products. 
Salmon, tuna and crustaceans form the most important species groups in the imports. Groundfish 
are the next important group of species. In this group cod is the most significant and it now accounts 
for 11.5% of the sea product deficit. The value of cod imports rose, in real terms, for FF792m in 1982 
to FF1.062bn in 1989. 
The significance of cod cannot be underestimated in terms of domestic production. The value of 
fresh cod landings was second only to tuna landings between 1983 and 1988. Since then the sharp 
decrease in domestic landings has reduced its importance in value terms to the 5th place of domestic 
production. 
The foreign deficit in sale stood at a modest FF64m in 1989 but the value of fresh sale landings 
places them third in terms of the value of domestic production. Furthermore France is the largest 
European exported and importer in this species, with imports standing at FFI 01 m and exports of 
FF136m. 
1.2 European trade in cod and sale. 
Cod is internationally widely traded species and its importance has increased markedly during the 
80's. The species is traded internationally in fresh and frozen form but more frequently in the form 
of fillets. 
Cod (fresh and frozen) and fresh sale are probably the two most important species and their 
consumption has been steadily increasing despite the fact that their 'real price' has shown strong 
upward trend. 
The behaviour of French consumers in choosing between sources of animal protein in the food-
budget has been examined by Lantz and loannidis (In the press) for the period 1960·1989 and it was 
found that 'seafood products' were price inelastic compared to all other sources of 'animal protein'; 
their share in the food budget increased despite the adverse relative price change. To satisfy the 
ever growing domestic demand, in the face of reduction in landings and capacity, imports have 
played a vital role in keeping the domestic processing sector buoyant and have slowed the price 
increase. 
During the 80's cod imports fresh or frozen fillets have exceeded domestic production by a factor of 
approximately 3 in terms of both value and quantity despite a modest increase in domestic landings 
over the last 5 years. Within imports, frozen fillets are claiming an ever increasing share at the 
expense of fresh fish. 
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In France imports of cod fillets (frozen) account for over 80% of total cod imports, excluding dried 
and salted cod. In European terms, France is the second most important importer of cod and obtains 
her supplies principally from other community countries notably Denmark (32% of imports) and 
Germany (21%). The proportion of cod imports in France which originates from community countries 
is 75% for fresh, frozen and cod fillets, and the non-EC supply of dried and salted cod originates in 
Iceland and Norway which account for over 80% of imports. 
The European sale market, with FF13 bn transactions in 1988 is a less important market than that of 
cod, and is distinguished by the great volume of inter-European transactions. France represents 
17% of the market, the third most important country after Italy (33%) and Spain (19%). The main 
foreign suppliers to France, are the Netherlands, Belgium and in general North Sea coastal countries. 
At the same time France's main clients are the Mediterranean countries, Italy and Spain. 
The overall share of cod imports on total supply has shown a slight tendency to decrease but 
nevertheless the degree of import penetration is very high. 
TABLE 1 
Annual Average Cod Domestic Production and Imports 1985m1 
1989:7 in 'real terms' 
Domestic Imports Imports 
production(t) quantity (t) value (FF) 
1985 1,270 4,733 27,814 
1986 1,692 4,307 28,110 
1987 1,732 5,431 35,553 
1988 2,056 6,135 35,949 
1989 1,896 8,419 44,357 
(Import quantity in fresh fish equivalent) 
Over the same period real prices have been rising steadily with import prices rising somewhat faster 
than domestic ones. 
TABLE 2 
Real prices of Domestic Landings and Cod Imports 
Domestic Prices Import Prices Frozen 
(fresh fish) (fresh fish) Fillets 
1985 7.37 8.23 11.84 
1986 6.89 9.30 12.84 
1987 6.92 7.70 14.41 
1988 6.65 7.53 12.54 
1989 6.65 6.60 11.40 
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The degree of import penetration which is given by the ratio Imports (Imports + Domestic Production) 
has been evolving as follows: 
TABLE 3 
Import Penetration Ration for Cod 
Import Penetration Ration in Fresh Fish Equivalent 
Value Quantity 
1985 .748 .784 
1986 .698 .704 
1987 .729 .739 
1988 .713 .736 
1989 .780 .816 
The market for sale in France both at landings and wholesale level has been examined by loannidis 
and Lantz (In the press). This species is consumed almost exclusively fresh and unfilleted thus there 
is no value added due to processing, to speak of. The species is one of the most valuable and it 
accounts for 8.5% of of total landings in value terms whilst it contributes only 1.6% of total weight. 
Its price along with most other species has risen over the period by % in real terms. Imports account 
for almost half of total demand and their share is on an upward trend. 
TABLE 4 
Domestic Production and Imports of Fresh Sale 1985 
1988, in real terms 
Domestic Imports Imports Imports 
Landings Quantity Value Penetration Ratio 
(t) (t) (ff) (quantity) 
1985 278,904 100,284 33.21 .377 
1986 157,827 257,321 42.83 .657 
1987 160,379 179,665 44.79 .534 
1988 108,386 281,409 39.04 .736 
The import series for both species appear to be very volatile and they are characterised by strong 
seasonality, but there are definite trends in their evolution over the period 1985-1987m7. On one 
hand the underlying trend for imports of cod exhibits a mild downward tendency (whose significance 
depends crucially on the type of the adopted seasonal adjustment). On the other hand sale imports 
have a strong upward trend for the period 1985, 1988. Imports of sea products into France are 
subject to a tax regime in accordance with EC guidelines on such protections and measures. 
TARIFF SYSTEM 
The European Community applies a common custom tariff (TDC-Tariff Douanier Communi for all 
the products which originate outside the EC. This is an ad valorem system, Two kinds of taxes are 
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generally in force. The most commonly utilised "conventional taxes" and the "autono t " 
Th " t' " . I ' ,mous axes . e au onomous taxes app y when they are inferior to the conventional. 
Table 5 presents the rates of import tax for cod and sale. They range between 12 and 18% depend in 
on the nature of the product. However it must be noted that the EC applies preferential rates t; 
Ic~land,. N~way and the Faroe Islands. For the species in question the rate is 3.7% for wholefish 
originating In Iceland and 0% and 3% for frozen fillets from Iceland and Norway and for the Fa 
Islands respectively. roe 
Neither Denmark nor the United Kingdom impose any tax on imports of frozen fillets from these 
sources. 
TABLE 5 
Import Taxes (at 1.1.89) 
Autonomous Conventional 
Sale 15% 15% 
Cod 12%(1) 
(Whole Fish) 15% 15% 
Cod (fillets) 18% 18% 
Cod (Frozen fillets) 18% 12%(1) 
Cod (dried/salted) 13% 13% 
:~; The tax. ~ 12% is applied to the species Gadus morhua* otherwise 15%. 
The tariff IS reduced to 8% for the species Gadus morhua*. 
The EC trade policy .in cod products .has two elements. First there is an overall quota agreement 
over which lower tarlff~ operate, The Imports are the distributed to the member states according to 
~~e av~~age consumption of the last three years, and what is left is then allocated according to 
needs as they occur. Once thiS quota has been exceeded normal import taxes apply. 
Furtherm~e the EC has defined the reference price which acts as floor for the price of imports 
These minimum prices correspond to the withdrawal prices of fresh fish, adjusted for the valu~ 
added element In the filleting and freezing process. 
If during any three day period the import price is lower than the reference price then the autonomou 
taxes are applied. s 
In critiCising the European policy of erection of trade barriers, Freeze (1990) cities the very low taxes 
which other members ~f G:4TT apply to demand fish. For example the US imposes a 1.875 cents 
per lb. ~ Imports originating from GAD states. Non EC-member states in Europe find that the 
~mmunlty markets are easily accessible to them as the main consumers, France, UK, Denmark etc. 
Impose little or no taxes; however non-European countries, e.g. Canada, which are able to su I 
the speCies, find their access to the European market very difficult. pp y 
The analysis of the competitive process in the market must not be limited to he examination of the 
tariff p~lic~. It ~ust take Into account (a) the non-tariff barriers (OECD, 1985 and (b) the international 
speCialisation In each segment of the industry, CEPII (1986). 
*The vast majority of cod traded in Europe are, in fact, of the species Gadus morhua. 
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The imposition of quotas and the evolution of productivity and competitive advantage in the 
processing industry in France and its trading partners, will be of great importance for the profitability 
and thus the long-run survival of both the fishing and processing sectors. 
To examine to what extent are the recent trends in French import demand for cod and sale due to 
market growth and/or competitive pricing by the exporting countries in the following section we 
present two models of import determination which we apply to the cases of the two species. 
2, Allocating Domestic Demand 
2.1 A Simple model 
Customarily aggregate import function take the form: 
im = f(f, rp, s, z) (1 ) 
where im is real imports (for the economy, or the sector), d is some measure of demand, rp is a 
ratio of the price of the imported goods relative to those produced domestically, s denotes some 
'trend/technological' variable and finally z can be considered to represent other variable which might 
enter the model. The underlying economic rationale behind this structure is the assumption of 
imperfectly competitive markets at home and abroad, which allow sufficient product differentiation 
to exist between domestic and foreign producers. In this case of fish this might be reflected in 
differences in the freshness of the landings and/or the size distribution. In the case of processed 
fish, where value added has been incorporated in the product, competitive advantages may accrue 
to exporters due to lower per unit price either due to lower costs, high productivity or favourable 
exchange rate movements. It is questionable whether one can safely assume that total demand, d, 
is independent of this choice, but nevertheless this a commonly adopted convention. 
The functional form of equation (1) is normally assumed to be log-linear, so that the estimated 
coefficients can be interpreted as elasticities, which remain constant independently of the level of 
import demand, The dynamic version of the equation is motivated by the adoption of a partial 
adjustment model. Purchasers, in this case the distributive and processing industry, find it costly to 
totally adjust their capacity as input prices and final demand change from period to period. 
In the presence of costly capacity adjustment the processing industry will require from its suppliers 
not only competitive process but also regularity of supplies, to the extentthatthere some substitution 
between the different species or forms of the same species, the industry will try to reduce uncertainty 
in supplies by enlarging the number of suppliers. 
Thus the more uncertain are domestic supplies the more likely it is for the domestic industry to seek 
suppliers abroad, in order to achieve an uninterrupted level of production. To capture such a 
phenomenon we have included in (1) terms which reflect the uncertainty of domestic supplies, in 
terms of the variance if the forecasting errors of domestic prices and landings. These are denoted 
as 'varp' and 'varq' respectively. 
In the light of the above discussion we have estimated the dynamic versions of the log-linear version 
of (1) with the addition of the extra variable, ignoring the constant term and seasonal adjustment: 
in (im), = al*ln(d), + 2*in(im), - 1 + a3*ln(rp), + a4*varq, + varp,t 
the impact relative price elasticity is given is given by a3 and the long-run elasticity is equal to 
a3 
nrp = ""-:-a2 
(2) 
In the estimation we have approximated d by the index of real retail sales, rp is the price ratio in 
constant FF of imports, and varq and varp are computed as the squared errors from the ARIMA 
forecasting equations for domestic landings and prices. 
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2.2 Preliminary Results 
The frozen cod fillet equation was estimated using a general dynamic specification in the spirit of 
(2). After some testing, the preferred method of seasonal adjustment was the inclusion of seasonal 
dummies. The equation was estimated in levels in terms of fresh fish equivalent (the concession 
factor used was 2.84) and its own real price was included in the equation along with the real price 
of domestic landings. The parsimonious specification finally adopted yielded the following results, 
forthe period 1985 M5 to 1989 M7. 
TABLE 6 
Imported Cod Fillets: 1985:M5-1989:M7 
LQMF4,_, LRPM4, LVRS, 
.37 -.766 3.12 
(2.74) (-2.33) (3.05) 
R' = .747 h = -.56 LM(4) = 7.4 ARCH 
CHOW (mid point) = .945 JB = 3.37 
[Contract and dummy variable are not reported] (t-stat) 
LQMF4 ~ log (imported cod fillets) 
LRPM4 = log (price of imported, frozen cod fillets/consumer price index) 
LVRS = log (retail sales) 
VARQ = variance of the forecast error for domestic landings. 
h = Durbin's alternative statistic of AR(l) 
LM (4) = Lagrange Multiplier test for Ar (4) 
JB = Jarque-Beta test for normality X~ 
ARCH = Auto regressive conditional heteroscedasticity 
CHOW = Test for Structural Stability 
VARQH 
2.92 
(2.24) 
(1 ).217 
The equation has high explanatory power and is well specified. No structural instability was detected 
and its predictive power is satisfactory. The estimated coefficients have the expected signs and are 
all significant at the 5% level. The interpretation of the coefficient associated with the volume of 
retail sales as "income elasticity" is of course problematic as retail sales are merely a proxy for 
"household income allocated to food", but both its size and sign are in accordance with our 
expectations. The short run price elasticity is.72 and the long run is 1.15. 
We now turn to the fresh-cod import equation. In this case the method of seasonal adjustment used 
is a 12th order autoregressive polynomial (terms 2 to 11 have been set to zero). Unless there are 
substantial differences in quality and size distribution domestic and imported cod could be treated 
as almost perfect substitutes. Due to this close association the real price of domestic landings was 
included in the equation and to avoid simultaneous equation bias the variable was instrumented. 
The estimated coefficients testify to the assertion that no substantial quality differences exist between 
imported and domestic fresh cod as the coefficients associated with own and domestic prices are 
equal and of opposite signs. No 'retail sales' effect was found to be significant but neither 'varp' nor 
'varq' terms contributed to the regression, again as in the previous case they both entered with the 
at priori signs. The estimated price elastics show that whilst in the short-run the elasticity is not 
different from unity, in the long run, given the strong (perfect) substitutability of domestic and 
foreign landings, the elasticity increases to a value of 5. 
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TABLE 7 
Imported Fresh Cod. 1986M1 -1989M7 
(Instrumental Variables) 
LQMF1'.12 
5.2 
(4. ) 
R' = .72 
LQMFh., 
.27 
(9.95) 
h = .63 
[Constant not reported] 
LRPM1, 
-1.02 
(-4.04) 
LM(4) = 69 
CHOW(Midpoint) = 1.35 
LQMFl = log (imported fresh cod) 
LRPMl = log (price of imported cod/consumer price index) 
LRPM = log (price of domestic landings/consumer price index) 
" = indicates that the variable has been instrumented 
VARO = variance of forecast error for domestic landings. 
0(18) = Lying-box statistic 
LRPM, 
.96 
(2.45) 
ARCH(1) = .78 
JB = 2.89 
VARQ,.3 
.0000035 
(1.24) 
The same specification was adopted to model fresh sole imports, using the prices quoted at Rungis 
for imported and domestic fresh sole. The equation was estimated for the period 1985m1-1988 m12 
and it was estimated in levels; seasonal dummies were found to be superior to other forms of 
seasonal adjustment. What is rather puzzling is that no contemporaneous variable was found to be 
significant in the estimated equation. The relative price effect enters the equations with a lag and its 
magnitude is modest in the short run. The long-run elasticity of 4.7 is not dissimilar to the one found 
for fresh cod. The equations is well specified as the diagnostic tests indicate. Both the uncertainly 
terms make a useful contribution to the explanatory power of the equation, especially price uncer-
tainty. As fresh sole is consumed unprocessed, local demand fluctuations at the landing port result 
in wholesale price variations and induce substitution to a less volatile imported supply which can 
be contracted in advance. Our results here confirm our previous findings (loannidis and Lantz, 
1990b) 
TABLE 8 
Imported Fresh Sole 1985:M12 
R2 = .81 
CHOW (6)-1.55 
LSOLi,., 
.84 
(12.04) 
h = .83 
LRPWS,., 
-.66 
(-1.05) 
LM(4) = 2.75 
JB = 1.6 
Constant and seasonal dummies not reported 
LSOLi = log (imported fresh sole) 
VARQS,., 
1.00 
(1.59) 
ARCH(1) = .69 
LRPWS = log (price of imported fresh sole at Rungis/price of domestic sale at Rungis) 
VAROS = variance of the forecast error for domestic landings 
VARPS = variance of the forecast error for the price of domestic landings 
VARPS,., 
6.15 
(2.02) 
These preliminary results indicate that relative proves are important determinants of import demand 
for both cod and sole. The influence of total demand was shown to be strong in the case of frozen 
cod fillets and indirectly in the case of fresh sale. However as imported fresh cod is such a close 
substitute for domestic cod, imports keep the price of domestic landings close to the international 
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level. The EC policy of. ta~ing landings of cod by non-EC vessels results in the imposition of import 
quotas and the operatIOnal use of the reference price, causing a loss to the French consumer and a 
subsidy t~ both French and non-EC fi~hermen. This policy along with the low price elasticity of 
consumption for seafood products provides an undesirable incentive structure to both domestic and 
non-EC fishermen as it reduces the incentive to cut costs and increase economic efficiency. Our 
attempt to introduce the unpredictability of domestic landings and prices as contributor to the rise 
of imports was partially successful and seems a promising modelling device. Further investigation 
IS required to examine the export pricing policy of the non-EC countries as a function of domestic 
costs and internatio.nal prices, (Cuthbertson 1989). Finally a more in-depth investigation of the 
processing Industry IS required where frozen fillets are treated as an input in the production process 
of fish products, If o.ne IS to obtain a thorough understanding of the costs of adjustment and the 
Significance of stability of supplies of the raw material. 
3. Model of Import Penetration 
3.1 Relative Prices and Competitive Advantage 
In the first section of this paper we have mentioned that differences in size and freshness may be 
Important enough to differentiate fish landings into distinct categories in the case of fresh fish. 
Further cost advantages enjoyed by one trading partner in the processing stage, will result in 
Increased market share at the expense of the domestic producers. 
TABLE 9 
Short and Long-Run Price Elasticitites of Cod and Sole Imports 
Fresh Cod 
Frozen Fillets 
Fresh Sole 
SHORT-RUN 
1.02 
.766 
.66 
LONG-RUN 
4.85 
3.33 
4.72 
T? model such a situation consider the following simplified model of import demand suggested by 
Blsmout and Martins (1986). 
Undersome rather mild assumptions one can write the cost function which domestic processors 
minimise for a given level of demand as: 
c = (Pd1 *dlP;m *im)-p*(f(de,im)) (3) 
where c is total cost, p is the price of the final product (f(.) denotes the firm's production function, 
whose two factor are assumed to be dl (domestic landings) and im(imports). The firm is facing 
pragmatic factor prices Pdl and pim . 
Let the functional form of the production function be CES 
f(.) = [a* dl-b+(l-a)im-b) -(1/b) 
then the first order conditions for cost ministration are given as: 
imldl = [a!(1-a))*(p;m/PdIW1ll1 +b }l 
taking logarithms and adopting an obvious shorthand notation we have 
z = A - SOp 
(4) 
(5) 
(6) 
Where A = S*ln((l-a)la), S is the el?s~icity of substitution between domestic and foreign landings; 
In terms of the model parameters It IS given by S = (b/(l +b)). P denotes the log ratio of prices. 
Equation (6) can be also expressed in value terms as 
v = A+(l-S)p (7) 
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The importance of the elasticity of substitution is now clear. We can identify three cases. 1) If S=1 
the market share of imports is independent of relative prices; 2) A value of S>1 implies that if 
domestic prices were to rise (ceteris paribus) then domestic producers will lose market share; and 
finally, 3) if 0<S<1, domestic price rises will result in increased domestic market share as the fall in 
demand will not compensate for the rise in domestic prices, Therefore in the value of S we have a 
measure of the competitiveness constraint faced by domestic producers. There is also a unique 
relationship between the price elasticity of demand for domestic landings and imports and the 
elasticity of substitution, which is given as 
edl.p = S*(im/f(.)) 
eLm.p. = S(dllf(.)) 
(8) 
(9) 
It is a relative simple matter to augment the model in order to subdivide imports of a particular 
product by their country of origin, as a function of relative import prices. 
3.2 Empiricallmplementation 
The simple models given by equations (6) and (7) may now be estimated and a conclusion can be 
drawn regarding the presence of competitive pressures on domestic producers. The equations can 
be taken to represent the equilibrium long-run market division between domestic and foreign 
producers in the short run. As they both face semi-fixed factors of production with increasing 
marginal costs, (Lawrence, 1990) a Partial Adjustment Model will be used 
(10) 
Where D is the first order difference operator, P is the speed of adjustment, and z* is given by an 
equation (6). As previously we can include terms for uncertainty, relative market size, etc. 
Substituting into (10) we obtain the dynamic version of equation (6) 
Zt = t*A-(1-S)* pt + (1 - t)*Zt-1 
3.3 Results 
By transforming frozen fillets to fresh fish equivalent and then constructing the weighed import 
price index in real terms we computed z and p for cod. For sole we have used the Rungis quoted 
prices to construct the relevant relative price variable. All the variables were seasonally adjusted by 
the use of dummy variables, and the adoption of such a procedure makes the interpretation of the 
coefficient associated with the constant term impossible. 
The results of the preferred equations are presented in Table 10 and 11 for cod and sole respectively. 
TABLE 10 
Division of total Domestic demand for Cod 
LRLP LVCt_1 (Quantity) 
.846 .55 
(-2.75) (4.8) 
LRLPt LVVt_1 
-.24 .58 (value ratio) 
(-1.25) (4.7) 
(Constants not reported, (t-stat)). 
R2 = .43 h = -.55 LM(4) = 3.17 ARCH(l) = .21 
R2 = .34 h = -.19 LM(4) = 3.47 ARCH(l) = .07 
LRLP = log ('weighted' imports, price of cod/proce of domestic landings of cod). 
Lve = log (import volume of cod/domestic landings of cod). 
CHOW = 1.73 
CHOW = 1.0 
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The results forming the estimated equations are somewhat ambiguous as the estimate of the 
elasticity of substitution price depends on the form of the specification adopted. The estimate of S 
from the quantity ration equation is less than unity but a t-test on the Null hypothesis that S~O 
suggests that the Ho cannot be rejected. The conclusions of the test are supported by the evidence 
presented in the value ration equation, where the estimated coefficient (1-S) is no significantly 
different from zero). 
The long-run estimate of the elasticity of substitution is in excess of unity, indicative of the existence 
of strong competitive pressures on domestic producers. The expansion of the market will tend to 
reduce their share as imports become more dominant. 
Polices which maintain high domestic prices are therefore anti-conservationist as they encourage 
the expenditure of higher fishing effort by the domestic producers. The solution to the recent 
problems of the rapid depletion of fish stocks in the North Sea is to call for the relaxation of the 
protectionist regime for cod currently in place. New suppliers, especially Canada, should be allowed 
free access to the European market lowering the price to the consumer and reducing domestic effort, 
The indication for the improvement of the situation regarding fresh sole is not dissimilar to that for 
cod as result of Table 11 indicates. 
(Constant not reported) 
R2 ~ .47 h ~ .72 
TABLE 11 
Division of total demand for fresh sale. 
LRPW, 
-.59 
(-1.17) 
(t-stat) 
LM(4) ~ 6.94 
LVQH (quantity ratio) 
.65 
(6.06) 
CHOW ~ .09 JB ~ 6.74 
The long run elasticity of substitution is greater than unity, and is not far from our estimate for cod, 
as it stands at 1.68, indicating competitive pressures from abroad. 
4. Conclusions 
In this study we have developed two models of import determination for groundfish, namely cod 
and sole in France for the period 1985-1989. 
The French market relies heavily on imports to satisfy domestic demand and this tendency shows 
no sign of abating, for either of the species we have examined, The situation is more clearly defined 
in the case of fresh sole were the import penetration ratio rose form .377 to .736 within the last 4 
years., Real sole prices have continued to rise and they stood at 20% above their 1985 level by the 
end of 1988. Cod prices have shown considerable stability with a modest tendency ot fall over the 
past five years. The estimated dynamic equations performed well and have shown that relative 
prices are of importance especially in the case of cod, It seems to us that, imports of fresh cod 
quality adjusted are an almost perfect substitute for domestic landings, Uncertainty about domestic 
production was also a factor in the increase for both cod and sole imports. Domestic demand 
pressures exercise a powerful influence and this trend is expected to continue. 
In Part Three of this study we have developed a model of import penetration in order to examine the 
likely path of imports compared to domestic production when relative prices alter, Our preliminary 
econometric results imply that given the structure of the market for fish in France, domestic price 
increases are likely to result in domestic producers capturing a smaller share of the market in value 
terms. In the presence of policies aiming to conserve fish stocks, the imposition of protectionist 
measures which keep domestic prices artificially high is contradictory. These policies result in 
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overcapitalisation and inefficiency as domestic producers increase capacity to exploitthe extra profit 
opportunities. A policy of free-trade in all fish products seems the most logical. With efficient non-
EC producers (in terms of cost and/or resource availability) having full access to the EC markets the 
result will be a substantial reduction of domestic prices. In conjunction with the already enforced 
quota policy there will be gradual reduction in domestic capacity and a further expansion of the 
market for seafood products. 
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Review of North Sea fisheries Management in the 1980s 
by 
JAN WILLEM DE WILDE 
Agricultural Economics Research Institute (LEI), The Hague, Netherlands 
ABSTRACT 
Recommended Total Allowable Catches (TACs), agreed TACs and actual catches of cod, haddock, 
whiting, sole and plaice in the North Sea between 1981 and 1990 are compared. Conclusions are 
drawn on the adherence of fisheries administrators to biological advice and of fishermen to agreed 
TACs. 
From average fishing mortalities by year, fishing mortality indices are derived for catches as well as 
for recommended and agreed TACs. These are used as indices of fishing effort. Their relative courses 
lead to some reflections and conclusions on the soundness of the present fisheries management 
system. 
INTRODUCTION 
This study was started under the assumption that EC fisheries politicians and administrators tend 
to diverge from biological advice in fixing Total Allowable Catches (TACs), more or less undermining 
a basically sound management system. This might mean that they will diverge from independent 
(scientific) advice given in other fisheries management systems, with similar disappointing results. 
In order to support this thesis, data on the main North Sea demersal species - cod, haddock, 
whiting, plaice and sole-were taken from the October-November reports ofthe Advisory Committee 
on Fishery Management (ACFM) and were analyzed. These reports contain the biological advice to 
the North-East Atlantic Fisheries Commission for managing most of the fisheries in the region. They 
give a series of data on recommended and agreed TACs, actual catches as estimated by working 
groups, and assessments of (spawning) stock biomass, recruitment and average fishing mortality. 
These data, covering the period 1981 to 1991, are reproduced in the Appendix. In the tables. the 
assumptions about the 1990 fishing mortality and consequent catches in 1990 and the spawning 
stock biomass (SSB) in 1991 - forming the basis for the biological advice for 1991 - have been 
included. The assumptive nature of such data on the present (and the coming) year is crucial for the 
quality of the biological advice, as will be discussed later on. 
The methods of analysis were very simple: a graphic survey, the use of basic knowledge of fisheries 
biology, and simple statistical calculus. 
TACS RECOMMENDED AND AGREED 
When making graphs of recommended and agreed TACs by species, it soon became apparent that 
our view had been biased by our background. In Dutch fisheries flatfish like sole and plaice are the 
most important species. Particularly with these species the TAC's agreed upon were most of the 
time significantly higher than the TAC's advised, as show the figures 1 and 2. 
The recommended TAC for sole averaged nearly 15,000 t from 1981 to 1990, whereas from 1982 up 
to '86 the agreed TAC's were 5,000 t and more above recommended levels. Only over the last three 
years (apart from 1981) the decision makers have completely adhered to the advice. This may have 
been made easier by the advent of a very strong year class 1987, following three successive severe 
winters. This was specifically protected in '89, by the prohibition of beamtrawling with vessels over 
1800 hp south of 55°N and subsequently gave rise to very significant increases in TAC levels. 
Differences between recommended and agreed TACs of plaice started after agreement on the 
Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) was reached in 1983. The largest difference occurred in 1985 when 
instead of a recommended decrease to 130,000 tons the Fisheries Council agreed on a rise in 
TAC to 200,000 tons. After that, the agreed and recommended TACs came closer together and 
subsequently, differences have been very small. In this case the reason behind the differences was 
rather clear: fixing the TAC substantially above the recommended level enabled the politicians to 
bring the Dutch quota more in line with its fishing capacity, without endangering the size of the 
stock. 
Irish Fisheries Investigations Series B (Marine), No. 42 (1994) 33 
B 
34 
~ji~r(j{ies Investigations Series B, No. 42 (1994) 
'" 
" o 
o 
o 
o 
'" 
" o 
-
o 
o 
o 
~ 
Sole North Sea 
40 ------ ~~s~nd Catches 
-------------
30 
20-
10-
--,-----,---,--- -,--- - -~-1 98 1 ,--- 1---r-----.----,--
1983 1985 1987 1989 
o ree,TAC 
r----------
180 I /1-'/ 
I 
120 
60-
./ 
./ 
1991 
+ agLTAC 
<) catch 
Figure 1 
Plaice North Sea 
TAC's and Catches 
+ 
./-
+----, ----,----
1981 1983 
-,--------,-----~- -,--- -----r -------,--'-
1985 1987 1989 1991 
o ree,TAC agr_TAC 
<) catch 
Figure 2 
Jan Wi/lem De Wilde: Review of North Sea Fisheries Management in the 1980s 
A similar reasoning may have caused of the advice on sole be disregarded, although here the 
biologists stated that the level of fishing actually endangered the sole stocks. But possibly the 
politicians have thought this to be mainly a matter of concern for the Dutch fishermen. 
Turning to the roundfish species, - less important for the Dutch, but in general of far greater 
importance than flatfish - we see a rather different picture (figures 3, 4, 5). 
Agreed TACs for cod seem fairly close to recommendations throughout the period. The largest 
differences occurred in the middle of the nineteen eighties, when sudden swings in recommended 
catch levels after a period of relative stability were not followed completely by the Council. Since 
then the TAC's show an alarmingly downward trend, and have more than halved from 220,000 t to 
100,000 t over the decade. We will return to these features later on. 
With haddock the decision-makers closely followed biological advice. Although they did not follow 
the swings completely, the difference was never greater than 20,000 t (being about 15% in 1987). 
Even more steeply than with cod, TACs have gone down since the middle of the nineteen eighties. 
From a level of around 200,000 t they have been reduced to 50,000 t, or just a quarter. This proportion 
is nearly disastrous, and not only for fishermen. 
The whiting picture more or less resembles that of the flatfish. Before 1986 there were large 
differences between recommended and agreed TACs, the agreed being generally higher. From 1986 
onwards, the TACs were fixed close to the recommended level, which remained relatively constant 
at around 130,000 t. 
From the foregoing, it could be concluded that the fisheries administrators did not diverge as widely 
and as consistently from the biological advice on TACs as had been presumed. However, the 
recommended TACs in the ACFM data are the maximum options from biological advice. For 
roundfish generally, various options were given, with consequences for stock development and 
future catches. A reduction of fishing effort on roundfish was recommended throughout the period 
considered. Over the last years only the recommendations really have been well adhered to. 
COD North Sea 
Tac'sandCatches 
300 
'" 
200 
c: 
0 
-
0 
0 
0 
~ 
100 
j----,- ----.--------,-- ---,- -~----,',-----.-------,-- -----
1981 1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 
Cl ree TAC !- agr_TAC <) catch 
Figure 3 
35 
fSff,gtf'rs Investigations Series B, No. 42 (1994) 
Haddock North Sea 
. ________ ...AC~""d Catches 
40-
1991 
- -~-------r -------,---,------r---,------- __ 
1981 1983 1985 --,-, --r---
1987 1989 
[j rec.TAC + agrTAC 
catch 
Figure 4 
Whiting North Sea 
200 TAC'sand Catches 
160-
"' ~
0 
120 , 
0 
0 
0 
~ 
80· 
40 
1991 
J-----,. ,----- -,--- -- --1--- -,--- ---T--,----, __ _ 
1985 1987 1989 1981 1983 
rec TAG 1- agr,TAC catch 
Figure 5 
36 
Jan Willem De Wilde: Review of North Sea Fisheries Management in the 1980s 
ACTUAL CATCHES 
Some other interesting features beame apparent after looking at the graphs. Data on catches were 
included in the graphs, in order to check on the behaviour of the fishermen. These data represent 
the biologists estimates of what actually has been caught, rather than just reported landings. In 
some cases this gives rise to a lot of corrections.) Strikingly, only the catches of haddock and sale 
were almost consistently above TACs. Of the other species, catches were generally within the agreed 
TAC and on sometimes were even below the recommended TAC. 
The case of cod fishing inspires some other thoughts on what is going on in North Sea fisheries 
management. After the establishment of the CFP, catches of cod have been close to, or even under 
(1985) TACs, with the probable exception of last year. This gives rise to the following remarks: 
-In spite of not overfishing the TACs, these have gone down year after year since 1987, 
indicating a decrease of the cod stock; apparently even the biological advice did not help 
conserve the stocks. 
-Catches show a smooth course and seem to follow a more stable pattern than TACs. 
Similar observations can be made on the other species. 
Haddock TACs were overfished most of the time and this may be the main reason for the decline of 
catches and stock sine 1985. During this decline, the biologists twice saw fit to recommend a TAC 
that was not caught in the end, raising doubts about the advice. Again the TACs show large 
variations, while actual catches run rather smoothly. 
Since whiting seems to be the species that prospers best under the present management regime, 
the stock is about 50% above the 1983 level. Here the agreed TACs show the most stable pattern, 
although this is only an apparent stability as will be Seen later on. 
Catches of plaice show a smooth, slightly rising line, with TACs, recommended or agreed, varying 
around it. This stock is in good shape and offers no particular problems. 
To a certain extent the same can be said of sole, although this is more the result of the strong year 
- class recently entering the fishery, than of effective fisheries management. Catches have been 
consistently higher than agreed TACs (except for 1986) and show a wave-like pattern. Here the 
recommended TAC seems to be the most stable. 
FISHING EFFORT 
The observation of a relatively stable course of the catches of most species during the period under 
review leads to a new thesis: stating that fishing activities eventually are more stable on their own 
than when is being followed following biological advice. 
In order to study this thesis more closely, from the assessments of the actual average fishing 
mortalities given in the ACFM reports, those going with the recommended and agreed TACs have 
been derived. In a given year, with a certain stock composition, catches will be proportional to 
average fishing mortality percentages and vice versa (within certain limits). So average fishing 
mortality rates can be estimated for various catch levels when one combination of catch and 
mortality is known. The average fishing mortalities for actual catch, recommended TAC and agreed 
TAC have been transformed into Fishing Mortality Indices (FMI), taking FMI,""h in 1983 as 100(%). 
The resulting FMI", and FMI.gc are visualized in Figures 6 to 10, together with FMI"t,h' 
According to fish population dynamics theory, fishing mortality is proportional to fishing effort. 
Thus the FMls found in a certain year represent the relative levels of fishing effort required to 
produce the TACs and the actual catch. Although there are some theoretical objections to it, for our 
practical purpose's we will not wander far from the truth by extending this over the years. So in the 
following the course of FMls is considered to be representative for the course of fishing effort. 
The relative stability already observed with the actual catches is even more strikingly apparent with 
the catch mortality indices. For all species under review, FMI,""h is more or less constant and follows 
a more gradual course than both FMI", and FMI.g ,. 
Again cod is the most clear example, with FMI,""h dropping slightly under, but staying close to 
100(%). FMI", shows variations of up to 50% plus or minus around this level, while those of FMI.g, 
are somewhat smaller. 
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After the establishment of the CFP, the fishing effort (mortality) for haddock rose by some 10%, but 
dropped agam to the 1983 level. The recommended and agreed allowable effort levels were generally 
well under 100(%), but for some reason were twice put higher than the actual fishing effort. 
Effort (m.ortality) on whiting increased more or less gradually to 150% in 1987 and then went down 
to the Initial level. The agreed allowable catch once corresponded to a mortality rate of over three 
times the actual 1983 level. 
Plaice and sole seem to indicate a more definite rise in fishing effort by 20 and 10 percent respectivel 
Only With sole the biological advice seems to have been as stable as the fishery itself, be ~; 
consistently on a 40% lower level. 
The stability of the mortality indices can be measured by expressing the standard deviation as a 
percentage of the mean value. The results are given in Table 1. 
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TABLE 1 
Standard deviations of fishing mortality indices as a percentage of the mean value by 
species 
Species FMlrec FMlagr FMlcatch 
cod 29 25 4 
haddock 41 39 14 
whiting 33 63 17 
plaice 20 18 12 
sole 16 22 9 
Jan Willem De Wilde: Review of North Sea Fisheries Management in the 1980s 
Table 1 confirms the impressions given above. For all species the actual variations in fishing effort 
(mortality) were smaller than those that would have resulted if the fisheries had strictly complied 
with the recommended or the agreed TACs. For whiting and sole, the recommended level of fishing 
was less variable than the level with the agreed TACs. 
One explanation for the variability of the biological advice on TACs lies in its uncertain basis. At the 
time the advice is required - the end of the year - firm data on catches and consequently on 
fishing effort are not yet available. So for a preliminary assessment of the stock at the start of the 
coming year, the ICES working groups estimate catches in the present year and assume that fishing 
effort (mortality) has been the same as in the previous year. This, as we have seen, is generally not 
very far from the tratz. For an estimate of recruitment the findings of young fish surveys are being 
used. But since the size of stocks and recruitment, can be firmly assessed by the Virtual Population 
Analysis only after a number of years have passed, there is apparently a wide margin of error. The 
wide sweeps in recommended TACs for some species further suggest that after overshooting fishing 
opportunities in one year, the biologists tend to undershoot them the next year (and vice-versa). 
However, in their advice the TACs are only the result of an estimate of potential catches at desirable 
levels of fishing effort, meaning that this really is the guiding factor in the advice. This has been 
made most explicit in the advice for roundfish for 1991, recommending an effort reduction of 30%, 
without giving TACs. 
The variability of the biological advice, combined with the apparent stability of the fisheries them-
selves, lead us to conclude that fisheries management should be aimed at the input - effort -
rather than at the output - catches - of the industry. 
Of course, this need not necessarily imply the major effort reductions recommended by the 'Gulland' 
Commission as indicated in the graphs. Only in the case of sole has the effort recommended by 
ACFM been consistently close to that level. 
CONCLUSIONS 
1. In fixing TACs for North Sea demersal species the decision-makers have kept closer to biological 
advice for roundfish than for flatfish. 
2. The stocks about which the administrators tended to diverge from biological advice are in a 
better condition than those where they followed the advice more closely. 
3. Fishing effort by species has been relatively stable since the establishment of the Common 
Fisheries Policy, showing a slight increase for plaice and sole and a return to the initial levels for 
haddock and whiting. 
4. Biological advice is basically unstable because of the lack of firm data at the appropriate time. 
5. Fisheries management should concern the input side of the industry, regulating effort, and not 
try to regulate the output, which is still inpredictable. 
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Appendix 
ACFM data on North Sea demersal species 
SOLE 
-year 
Recommended T AC 
Agreed TAC 
Actual catch est. 
Sp.stock biomaqs 
Recruitment (agel) 
MeanF(2-8,u) 
PLAICE 
ye" 
Recommended T AC 
Agreed TAC 
Actual catchest 
Sp. stock biomass 
Recruitment (age 1 ) 
Mean F(2-IO,u) 
COD 
ye" 
Recomm. TAe (max) 
Agreed TAC 
Actual catch 
Sp_stock biomass 
Recruitment (agel) 
McanF(2-8,u) 
HADDOCK 
ye" 
Recomm. TAe (max) 
Agreed TAC 
Landings ace. WG 
Actual catch 
Sp.stock biomass 
Recruitment (ageD) 
Mean F(2-6,u) 
WlilTING 
ye" 
Recomm. TAC (max) 
Agreed TAC 
Landings ace. WG 
Actual catch 
Sp.stock biomass 
Recruitment (ageD) 
Mean F(2-6,u) 
1981 
15.0 
15.0 
15.4 
25.3 
149 
0.44 
1982 1983 1984 1985 
15.0 15.0 14.0 15.0 
21.0 20.0 20.0 22.0 
21.6 24.9 26.6 24.2 
35.4 41.5 44.4 41.3 
153 141 69 78 
0.48 0.48 0.58 0.55 
1981 
105 
105 
140 
296 
412 
0.42 
1981 
220 
220 
301 
173 
272 
0.77 
1981 
140 
140 
147 
204·) 
228 
30.0 
0,71 
1982 1983 
140 164 
140 164 
155 144 
285 310 
994 572 
0.47 0.45 
1982 1983 
235 220 
235 240 
273 234 
168 135 
559 269 
0.89 0.89 
1982 1983 
200 170 
180 181 
185 172 
242') 238 
285 241 
18.9 63.5 
0.64 0.94 
1981 1982 1983 
125 
170 
103 
151 
303 
32.4 
0.71 
120 200 
150 170 
146 105 
191') 150') 
451 349 
23.7 20.7 
0.72 0.58 
1984 1985 
150 130 
J 82 200 
156 160 
307 336 
595 505 
0.43 0,43 
1984 1985 
215 259 
215 250 
205 193 
116 107 
534 108 
0,85 0.82 
1984 1985 
172 209 
170 207 
138 165 
213 251 
190 231 
16.1 22.7 
0.99 0.93 
1984 
102 
149 
96 
135 
247 
23.9 
0.87 
1985 
118 
160 
69 
97 
242 
47,6 
OJl2 
') estimates by extrapolation oftmreported catches 
Source: ICES/ ACFM Report Extracts 1987-1990 
1986 1987 1988 
12.0 lLO 11.0 
20.0 14.0 14.0 
18.2 17.4 21.6 
33.9 28.8 37.8 
14 48 450 
0.55 0,48 0.58 
1986 
160 
180 
165 
330 
1317 
0.52 
1986 
130 
170 
163 
97 
581 
0,86 
1986 
239 
230 
169 
221 
213 
45.3 
LOS 
1986 
135 
135 
76 
154 
266 
39.2 
0,88 
1987 
120 
150 
153 
364 
548 
0,48 
1987 
200 
175 
175 
89 
257 
0.86 
1987 
120 
140 
112 
171 
150 
5.7 
1.00 
1987 
127 
135 
78 
132 
278 
50, I 
L07 
1988 
150 
175 
173 
348 
628 
0.60 
1988 
148 
160 
150 
84 
201 
0,83 
1988 
185 
185 
109 
171 
149 
10.5 
LOS 
1988 
134 
120 
100 
127 
283 
72.0 
0,78 
1989 1990 
14.0 25.0 
14.0 25.0 
21.7 38.0 
29.8 69.9 
106 99 
0.53 0,53 
1989 
175 
185 
170 
382 
574 
0.55 
1989 
124 
124 
119 
85 
324 
0.86 
1990 
171 
180 
189 
377 
584 
OSS 
1990 
113 
105 
142 
87 
161 
0.86 
1991 
21.0 
27.0 
58.0 
1991 
169 
175 
345 
1991 
92 
100 
1989 1990 1991 
68 SO 48 
68 50 50 
78 63 
104 88 
122 86 81 
12,8 53.9 
0.95 0,95 
1989 
115 
115 
84 
119 
365 
48.2 
0,69 
1990 
130 
125 
150 
204 
474 
49.8 
0.69 
1991 
135 
141 
444 
Attitudes Towards Fishing Capacity 
E.A.F.E. discussion paper 
by 
NIELS VESTERGAARD and HANS FROST 
Danish Institute of Fisheries Economics Research (DIFER), Esbjerg, Denmark 
ABSTRACT 
This paper argues that the overcapacity problem is sustainable as long as the market sends out 
wrong signals to the agents. 
The regulation of catch and effort generates economic rent only in special cases because the market 
failure still exists. 
The market failure gives the fishermen incentives to dissipate resource rent; the ability of doing that 
depends on the possibilities of transformation of species in harvesting and of the substitution of 
production factors. 
If the regulation does not try to correct the market signals, the (new) role of the economist will be to 
point out the possibilities and the magnitudes of transformation and substitution. 
1- Introduction 
1.1. The EC Commission's proposal about reducing the EC fleet is prompted by the belief that the 
ability to catch fish exceeds substantially what is needed to take the total allowable catch (TAC). The 
fishery is overcapitalized or has overcapacity. Since there can be several economic reasons for 
keeping fishing capacity above what is minimally required to catch the fish available- e.g. weather, 
variability of fish stock abundance, alternative fisheries and competition - the concept of capacity 
discussed here is technical capacity, one that is based on estimates of hold size. 
The fishing capacity must be related to some measure of the economic efficient use of both the fish 
resource and the invested capital. From an economic point of view, capacity is a function of economic 
and biological conditions and so a unique number for capacity hardly exists. Estimation of what a 
fleet wi II catch needs, a priori, 
• a given set of economic and environmental conditions 
• a concept of capacity related to economic efficiency 
• a time horizon for the analysis. 
1.2. The paper outlines the capacity problem in a traditional bioeconomic model like the Gordon-
Schafer one and discusses the assumptions behind the model. Three different attitudes towards the 
capacity problem are then discussed. 
2, Biological and economic capacity in the Gordon-Schafer model 
2.1. The Gordon-Schafer model can be presented graphically by Figure 1. The total revenue curve 
TR shows the sustainable revenue of the stock as a function of fishing effort E. The total cost curve 
TC is assumed to be proportional to effort. For a further introduction, see Clark (1976). 
2.2. Economic rent or resource rent is defined as the difference between total revenue (TR) and total 
cost (TC) and maximization of the economic rent occurs when MR = MC. (E = E(MSE) in Figure 1). 
Economic overcapacity from a society's point of view emerges, when the marginal cost of effort 
exceeds the marginal revenue of effort (when E > E(MSE) in Figure 1). Biologica\ overcapacity 
emerges when E > E(MSY) (see Figure 1). With changed conditions (e.g. increasing costs), the 
capacity from a biological point of view will stay constant at E(MSY). while from an economic point 
of view the optimal capacity will decline. 
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Figure 1. Gordon-Schafer Model 
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2.3. Under a free access fishery, the effort of the society is E(oa). If we assume normal cost-curves 
(see Figure 2), the correspondent effort level in the free access fishery for each vessel is equal to the 
minimum point of ATC-curve: e(oa). The production is efficient from the individual's point of view. 
It is a consequence of the free access. If for example MR > min AC the overnormal profit will attract 
additional vessels, which reduces catch per unit effort and hence MR. This process continues until 
MR = min AC (For the individual vessel MR is a constant function of effort, because price (p) and 
stock (X) is considered as exogenous, MR = P q X, using the assumption of homogenous vessels). 
2.4. Any attempt to regulate the catch (TAC) or the effort in order to achieve a societat goal of MSY 
or MSE will lead to e > e(oa), because MR > MR1 where MR = MC in the fishing period. The aim of 
TAC is to reduce the total catch to, for example, MSY or MSE. The present catch has in a period 
been greater than the maximum growth of the stock (in Figure 1 to the right of MSY on the TR-
curve). In a free access fishery, the adjustment will take place via changes of stocks and effort; thus 
the biological and economic equilibrium is obtained (E(oa)). If catches are reduced by TACs this 
results in excess capacity, because the fishing period will be shortened. However, in the short run 
the overcapacity is rational from the individual point of view as long as MR '" AVC (Andersen 1979) 
and in the long run as long as MR '" min AC, which is the case if the stock increases as planned by 
the "se of TACs. 
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2.5. The major conclusion is that a free access fishery results in the dissipation of resource rent 
and an overcapacity in the number of vessels from society's point of view. However that overcapacity 
is rational from the individual's point of view. We are dealing with a problem involving a market 
failure. The market sends out incorrect signals. For a fishery regulated by the use of TAC, the 
overcapacity will be expressed as too many vessels and inefficient factor proportions, thus increasing 
the effort for the individual vessel, ( Munro and Scott (1985) named these two kind of rent dissipation: 
Common property problem Class 1 and 2). 
2.6. The concept of capacity is here defined in relation to efficient factor proportion (min AC) and 
the maximization of the resource rent (minimize the number of vessels). But other definitions could 
also be used (f ex. normal capacity utilization) and the objectives for the fishery will also influence 
the optimal capacity. It could be said that the above-used concept of capacity is the approach of 
positive economics. The Gordon-Schafer model is an abstraction, because analysis of multi species 
and multipurpose fisheries and of heterogeneous vessels and the implication for fishing capacity is 
not possible in the model. Therefore more pragmatic steps are discussed below. 
3. What to learn from the concept of technical capacity 
3.1. The first step towards determination of the capacity in a fishery could be to calculate the 
technical capacity. Smith and Hanna (1988) define the technical capacity (TCA) as follows: 
TCA = TCA (number of vessels, hold size, average use in the period, technical efficiency). 
The hold size determines the upper limit of catch per trip. The average number of trips in the period 
multiplied by the number of vessels, gives for the capacity. The parameter technical efficiency 
measures the fleet's efficiency. If the fleet's technical efficiency is improved, then a greater catch 
should be possible with the same number of vessels and the same hold size. Examples of elements 
that improve the technical efficiency are adoption of new technology, new fishing methods, and 
knowledge about good fishing grounds, while for example exit of good fishermen reduces the 
technical efficiency. 
Dividing the actual catch (TAC) for the period with TCA provides a measure for technical capacity 
utilization. This measure depends also on weather, market conditions and of stock variability. 
Comparison of figures for capacity utilization for single years gives a picture of the changes in the 
excess capacity. If the capacity utilization is decreasing, the economic efficiency will probably be 
decreasing too. But we do not get any information about the courses of the changes in the capacity 
utilization; for instance when would vessels enter or leave the fishery? The concept has no prediction 
power. 
3.2. Smith and Hanna (1988) estimate for the Oregon Bottom Trawl fleet 1976-1985 the increase in 
the fleet's capacity. The number of vessels can explain 42% of the increase, hold size 32% and 
technical efficiency 26%. The concept highlights the problems concerning the regulation of capacity, 
because even the technical definition of capacity is a multidimensional function. Limiting the number 
of vessels is not necessarily an effective method of reducing the capacity, because fishermen could 
increase the hold size. As mentioned before, the concept has no economic foundation. Further, 
when discussing multispecies and multipurpose fisheries, it is difficult to use this concept of capacity. 
4. The optimal fishery capacity approach 
4.1. In this approach, estimates of the optimal size and composition of a fleet is provided using 
mathematical programming. The objective is often to maximize the total profit. The concept for 
capacity has an economic foundation, because the costs are included. One advantage of this 
approach is that it is possible to work with several fleets which can have different fishing patterns. 
A shortcoming is the assumption of a fixed proportion in inputs and outputs. 
4.2. The value of that kind of analysis is the insight it provides into characterizing the optimal 
solution, but the optimized solution is often very different from the present situation and therefore 
almost impossible to implement. This approach does not incorporate the motives of the fishermen 
with respect to supply of effort. The reaction of fishermen to changes in regulation is therefore not 
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incorporated, so the approach does not provide any guidance on the elimination ofthe overcapacity. 
One could say that the approach estimates the magnitude of an existing problem. 
5. Control of capacity and behaviour modelling 
5.1. If the methods in sections 3 and 4 are compared with the conclusion in section 2, we see that 
the problem about control of the fishery capacity is not solved. The market does not regulate the 
capacity to achieve economic efficiency. Regulation is necessary. As was mentioned in sections 1 
and 2 the capacity is a function of economic and biological conditions. Part of these conditions are 
uncontrollable and unpredictable, making estimations of the optimal effort/capacity meaningless; 
but, besides that, we know that the capacity always will tend to be too big from society's point of 
view. Estimations of the optimal capacity have to be treated with care and it must be recognized 
that only some information about the magnitude of the capacity problem is provided,( Opaluch and 
Bockstael (1984) argue that "in the face of uncertainty an appropriate goal for fisheries management 
is the achievement of an acceptable range of target levels of effort"). 
As a consequence, it seems natural to concentrate on the means of controlling and measuring 
capacity, instead of finding one figure for the overcapacity. 
5.2. The traditional bioeconomic model assumes implicitly a two-step optimization process. First 
factors are optimally combined to form an index: effort. Then effort becomes an input in the fishery 
production function. Only if the production technology is separable is it possible to aggregate factors 
into an effort-index. This effect is discussed further in the appendix. and for the multispecies version 
of the bioeconomic model, it is assumed either that the production is joint-in-input, i.e. only one 
production process exist or that the production is non-joint-in-input, i.e. production processes exist 
for each species, (Many single species fisheries are multiple-product fisheries as a result of product 
differentiarion due to output characteristics such as size). In the appendix it is specified what 
conditions have to be fulfilled to achieve consistent regulation based on the traditional bioeconomic 
model. The point is that the properties of the production technology show how regulation should 
be performed. If, for example, the production technology is joint-in-input, it is inconsistent to regulate 
each species isolated, because there are important technical and economic interactions. 
5.3. The problem we are dealing with is known from economic theory as regulating the production 
of individual multiproduct firms: 
y= F(X) 
where 
Y, X are vectors of outputs and inputs respectively. 
Assume now that the production technology is separable, and that we wish to control the effort via 
the inputs. It is possible to aggregate the outputs and inputs to indices, but because input control is 
chosen, we have to look closer at the internal structure of effort: 
where 
Xi is the input factors. 
Input regulation can limit the use of certain inputs in production and/or can limit entry into the 
fishery. Limited entry may induce the fishermen to expand the fishing power of their vessels until 
all the rent is dissipated, i.e. total costs equal to total revenue. Since managers find that limited 
entry does not create economic rent, restrictions upon input usage per vessel are often imposed. 
For example, given restrictions on vessel tonnage, fishermen reoptimize over the reduced set of 
inputs and they may fish longer hours and use more labour and equipment; they substitute inputs 
for the restricted input. Regulations can introduce further restrictions and the fishermen will again 
respond by increasing the use of non-restricted input. The conclusion is that if inputs can be 
substituted, restriction on one input will lead to an expansion of other inputs and will increase the 
fisrung costs and lead to resource rent dissipation. The success of input restrictions seems to depend 
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on whether fishermen can find substitutes for the restricted inputs or whether their creative skills 
are better than the manager's. 
F" ure 3 shows one possible response to capital restrictions. It is assumed that effort can be produced 
Ig the use of capital (vessels) and labour (gear). If effort is restricted by limiting the number of 
bYssels the costs of fishing will not increase. If fishermen are not allowed to Invest they will spend 
ve 'ney on labour (gear) and the isocost-line will move outwards. Whether that will result In a ~~:;":r lower effort depends on the rate of substitution (elasticity) between labour and capital. 
cimPbell and Lindner (1990) shows in a theoretical example that success with restricting a subset 
of inputs is more likely if: 
• it is difficult to substitute non-restricted inputs for restricted input, and/or 
• the restricted inputs proportion of the total factor costs is high and/or 
• the economic pressure to exploit the stock is not too high. 
Figure 3. Input of Labour and Capital 
C(e) C(o) 
--E 
E" > E' 
Restricting capitol to e(r) can lead 
to increased (inoptimol) use of 
labour and higher effort. 
Capital 
E· -- E E·· 
Dupont (1991) shows that restricted access and restriction on tonnage per vessels in the Britis~ 
Columbia salmon fishery lead fishermen within the seine fleet to substitute gear and labour whlc 
again to an increased use of fuel. Fishermen seem able to diSSipate rent. For the g"lnet-~r:1 fI:e~f 
all the variable inputs (fuel, gear and labour) are complements to tonnage, shOWing t e ac 
ability to dissipate rent. 
Munro and Scott (1985) conclude 'that there are too many in!'uts for all to be controlled effectliV~\ 
Hence opportunities for substitution are never entirely absent. EmpIrical work Sh~s~hat kn~7 e
th
g 
about the production technology offers information about the internal structure a e art aln f ur ~r 
that Munro and Scott's statement in general is not corr:ct. Regul~tln based on contra a InpU s 
could be (partly) successful and in accordance with the fishing firm s behavIour. 
54 Restriction on output, which is not based on knowledge of the technology, ca~ lead to 
u~~nticipated transformations and inefficiency. Regulation of one species can Ind~ce ~n Increase1 
catch of a non-regulated species, which are caught together with an another r,:,gu ate species, c . 
Fi ure 4 in the Appendix. That can lead to catches beyond the quota resulting In discards or Illegal la~din s. The reaction from the authorities is often to increase the burden of regulation. See the appen~ix for a further discussion. Besides dissipating rent because of unanticipated transformation 
in output, the resource rent, could also dissipate because of an inefficient factor mix. 
5.5. One approach that seems helpful in estimating the relevant parameters is the dual framew~~ 
( The dual framework imposes profit-maximizing behaviour on the fishermen and estlmate~ t 
parameters of the production technology via the output supply and the Input demand equations. 
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There are not imposed a priori restrictions on the production function (see Varian, 1978) " which 
provides knowledge of the individual firm's technology and costs. The approach models the 
fishermen's behaviour at the micro-level and could form the basis for effort regulation. 
6. Conclusions 
6.1. It is argued that the capacity problem arises because the market signals are wrong. The 
response from the authorities is often to introduce restrictions in order to control the capacity and 
fishing effort. These restrictions are in most cases quantity control, i.e. control of usage of input and 
output. Only very few countries use price (indirect) control. (An example of indirect control is the 
ITQ system. It is implemented in New Zealand, Iceland and partly in Greenland). The difference 
between the two types of control are - that price control tries to eliminate the market failure, while 
input and output control interfere with the production decisions by the individual firm. 
If the authorities, use input and output control that are inconsistent with the production technology 
(and behaviour) the result can be unexpected expansions in the usage of uncontrolled inputs and 
outputs. If the technology is fixed proportionally, then restricting one input cannot lead to expansion 
in the uncontrolled inputs. Therefore the rent from the fish resources can be preserved. But this is 
a special case and in general the capacity problem seems to be sustainable when using quantity 
control. 
One technique to get some information about technology is available from economic theory. And it 
could be one role for the fishery economist to point out the possible transformation in harvesting 
and substitution of factor inputs and to try to estimate the elasticities. 
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Appendix. 
The implicit assumptions behind the traditional bio-economic model. (based on Squires 
1987a and 1987b). 
A.1. The regulation has so far conceptually been based on the traditional bioeconomic model, 
consisting of a single aggregate input, fishing effort and either an aggregate output, total catch or a 
separate production process and model for each species. This approach assumes a two-stage 
decision-making process. In the first stage, factors of production are (implicitly) combined to form 
a composite input: effort. In the second stage, effort becomes an input in the fishery production 
function, i.e. harvesting function. Furthermore the aggregate production function relates total catch 
to total effort and resource abundance in a restrictive functional form. Population dynamics and 
production gives steady-state optimal levels of catch, effort and abundance. 
A.2. Typically, economists view fishing effort as an aggregate variable; an example is the Gordon-
Schafer model. The aggregation is a critical assumption; it means that the production technology is 
separable. The decision on factor combinations is independent of the decision on target of species. 
If this assumption is not fulfilled, then any attempt to construct effort from the set of inputs will lead 
to an index for effort which varies with variations in volume and composition of the output (effort 
isoquants twist around and might even intersect) and it is not possible to obtain a meaningful scalar 
measure for effort. But if the assumption is fulfilled, then consistent regulation of effort is possible 
based on the relationship between factors of production. 
A.3. The other assumption about either joint-in-input or non-joint production also can lead to 
disappointing results. For example, should the true multispecies harvesting technology be joint in 
inputs, then only one single production process exists for all the species. A bioeconomic single 
species model specifies a separate production function for each species and optimizes the level of 
effort and catch for only one of the many possible species in the fishery. The optimized results will 
neglect the other species and any possible species transformation in harvesting (see Figure 4). 
Figure 4. Joint Production of two Species 
~-------~~ Quota regulation of species 2 --~--- __________ ~ may lead to inoptimol production 
----~~ A (A -> 8) and increased catch 
.}------- --------~ Of, species 1 • 
. ~ ~'~-~ 
~ --- --.---~-y~~~ 
'" .. ~ ~~,~~.~ ..... ---------~-~---
SpeCies 1 
-- Transformationcurve -- Isar-avenue line 
Output regulation (ex. TAC) of each single species may therefore lead to catch discards, reduced 
income and inefficient product and factor proportions. In most cases the production is joint-in-input, 
which means that a separate harvesting process for each species does not exist. 
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ABSTRACT 
While the system of TACs and quotas probably will be maintained in the years to come increasing 
attention is being given to measures regarding fishing effort. The extent of these measures will 
depend on the estimated size of overcapacity. At the same time, it is being recognized that 
biology alone cannot provide satisfactory answers to the multidisciplinary problems of fisheries 
management, where technical, institutional, legal and economic factors play an equally important 
role. 
The paper points out that in the past the potential contribution of economics has been under-
estimated. It elaborates on the problem of overcapacity of fishing fleets from the point of view of 
the sector's commercial operation of. It indicates specifically in which fields economics may provide 
an improved understanding olthe logic olthe European fisheries and the relevance olthis knowledge 
to the formulation of future fisheries management policies. 
CONCLUSION 
Contrary to the traditionally European-wide biological approach, the current economic analyses 
have been mostly limited by national boundaries and interests. Further integration of the European 
Community requires also an European-wide approach to applied research in economics, as well as 
other fields related to fisheries management. A specific research programme on the economic 
overcapacity of fishing fleets is proposed. 
1. Introduction 
The MAGPs are receiving an increasing amount of attention. This can be concluded from the 
suspension of the EC/FEOGA support for new construction in the first half of 1990 justified on the 
basis that various, though not all, countries have not achieved their MAGP targets. Furthermore Mr 
Marin has expressed the opinion, in his latest report to the Commission, that the EC fleets will have 
to be reduced by some 40%. 
The objective of this paper is to elaborate upon economic aspects of overcapacity, which seem 
relevant fishery to management. 
However, before getting lost in the intricacies of the subject, it seems equally relevant to look at 
overcapacity from the point of view of fishery biology, because this science has set the current 
definitions. 
2. Biological approach 
The biological definition of fishing capacity is expressed in terms of fishing mortality and not, as 
other sciences may be inclined to be, in terms of grt, hp or the number of vessels. Mortality is 
interpreted in relative terms, as a proportion of certain year classes within the standing stock. 
From a biological point of view, this is a very sensible approach. It makes it possible to assume that 
the productivity of a certain gear remains constant (again in terms of relative fishing mortality) since 
it is determined by the state of the stock, i.e. the catchability. Furthermore, it is not necessary to 
look for a technical measure that would present important methodological and empirical problems. 
Definition of gross tonnage or horsepower is not unambiguous. Measurement and aggregation of 
the fishing capacity of different gears seems also rather imprecise: compare trawls, lines and gill 
nets. But fish do not care by which gear they are caught! 
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This approach allows for a straightforward definition of overcapacity. The total current mortality is 
composed of natural and fishing mortality. When the objective is to achieve a certain total mortality 
that is lower than the current one, the overcapacity is then equal to the difference between the 
current and the desired level of total mortality (possibly adjusted by a slight change in the natural 
one). 
This has a very important and confusing implication. When the stock is small a large reduction of 
mortality is required (high percentage), but in fact this may not represent such a great amount of 
fish. 
Even from a biological point of view, it must be recognized that this static approach is not entirely 
satisfactory for a long-term policy. In a situation of biological overexploitation, the biological 
conclusion is that it is desirable to lower the fishing mortality of the specific species in the short run 
to allow the stocks to recover, while later a certain increase of the fishing mortality may be allowed 
again, producing, it is hoped, some kind of equilibrium. There are at least three problems with this 
approach: 
1. It is not the fishing mortality but the total one which matters. Therefore one species can be 
equally protected by increasing fishing mortality of its predators - mUlti-species relations. 
In this respect it is important to note that 'management biology' is especially worried about 
the fishing mortality of certain age-groups. These must be allowed to reproduce to maintain 
the stock, while their fishing mortality may be 5-10 times higher than the natural one. On the 
other hand, the natural mortality is very high for the young fish. 
2. There may be a considerable choice of time paths. Less radical adjustments of the current 
level fishing mortality will make the time path to the desired equilibrium at a higher level of 
stock longer, but at the same time the social and economic pressures will be less grave since 
there will be more time for adjustment. Some biologists have indicated that this aspect has 
not been given much attention. 
3. The assumption of constant productivity presumes constant fishing pattern, i.e. there is no 
flexibility of using one vessel in different fisheries. In many countries this would not be 
supported by empirical evidence. 
Furthermore, it must be recognized that the natural mortality and recruitment depend to a certain 
extent on external environmental factors. Their relative importance still remains to be quantified. 
The above considerations put the concept of overcapacity in a dynamic and more complex per-
spective. Still, it should not be concluded that overcapacity is not a problem. It only implies that its 
current definition is not satisfactory because it does not take into consideration some important 
factors and it is difficult to translate into the real world of gears and boat sizes. 
As in all other fields of government policy, there is a need to formulate a long-term structural policy 
(in terms of desired size and composition of the fleet) as well as short term one (in terms of catch 
and effort adjustments to the regular changes in natural conditions). 
The introduction of dynamics into the formulation of fishery management policies, however, will 
present some serious dilemmas for the policy-makers. The biologists have pointed out that in a 
multi-species approach there is not any single MSY which can be technically determined. Instead a 
political choice has to be made between various mixes of species. Explicit choices also have to 
be made between different fleet compositions and time paths of adjustment and development. 
Furthermore, short-term fluctuations of stocks have to be distinguished from the long-term trends, 
and there is a need for a very flexible policy response. It is questionable whether politicians are 
willing to deal with such subtleties. 
3_ Multidisciplinarity of practical management 
Even if the fishery policy is formulated on the basis of dynamic biological considerations, biology 
offers a rather narrow base from the point of view of the practical implementation. Policy deals 
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with fishermen and biology with fish. The formulation of fisheries policies in the past seriously 
underestimated the relevance of the implementation phase. This has been often considered as a 
'technical detail' to be taken care of at a 'lower level'. 
Even the rather static concept of biological overcapacity, defined as excessive relative fishing 
mortality, has to be interpreted in terms of technology, economics, legislation and institutions. 
Therefore these aspects have to be taken into account concurrently with biology. The links between 
the various fields have to be analysed during the first phase of policy preparation instead of only 
during the very last one of implementation. 
Technologv 
In practice we are dealing with a multi-species/multi-fleet situation. One gear catches various species 
and one vessel can switch to various gears and various fisheries, i.e. there is a considerable techno-
biological flexibility. 
Economics 
The financial results of a vessel will determine how long it can survive in specific mix of fisheries. 
However, social considerations such as status or family business may considerably extend the life 
of a fishing enterprise beyond what could be expected on purely rational economic grounds. 
Furthermore, various national and local governments have shown considerable alertness to the 
financial problems of the fishing industry (although it is rarely enough from the industries' point of 
view)' making support funds available for social and political reasons. Even the current EC policy is 
counter-productive to structural management measures (i.e. reduction of fleet) since more money 
is available for new investments than for decommissioning. 
Institutions 
An effective follow-up of the TAC system requires that producers be carefully controlled. Although 
fishing may be a special case compared to other industries because of its specific characteristics,-
wild exploitation of renewable natural resources, - it is questionable if such controls are at all 
feasible in an open market economy. In fact the TAC-system has rather centralistic consequences. 
It also remains to be seen whether a democratic society has either 
• the institutional means (in theory and in practice), or 
• the political will to make the necessary funds available for effective implementation. Since 
fisheries comprise a very small sector, of relatively little economic importance (except to 
fishermen) it is doubtful if it will ever receive the necessary - though disproportionate -
institutional attention. 
Legislation 
Even if it does receive this attention, it is only a necessary but not a sufficient condition for drafting 
the required legislation. The nine member states that are directly involved in the Common Fisheries 
Policy have varying legal systems which will have consequences for the speed and severity of any 
judicial prosecution. The basic principles of democratic legal actions (proof of guilt, the independence 
of judges and the possibilities of appeal) make an effective fishery management policy difficult since 
only a certain percentage of infractions will be punished in the end. Two matters require further 
attention in this respect 
• Are there inequalities between the different member states in the severity of prosecution. 
• Can the Commission impose specific legal rules,such as administrative fines for specific 
infractions? 
Currently it is doubtful if the CFP is being equally applied to all. 
The above considerations make it clear that a mono-disciplinary analysis of fisheries management 
problems in ge'1eral and those of overcapacity in particular cannot produce satisfactory results 
because fishing requires detailed and effective regulation. 
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4. Potential contribution of economics 
The contribution of economics to a better understanding of fisheries problems has been reduced in 
the past (Lowestoft working group) to the calculation of future prices. The policy approach was 
simplified to the pursuit of maximum value of landings. This not only does not do justice to the 
potential contribution of economics within a multidisciplinary analysis of the fisheries problems, it 
is also strongly reminiscent of the approach to economics in Eastern Europe before 1989; value of 
landings without a consideration of the costs of production is meaningless. At the same time long-
term prediction of prices is a rather stratospheric exercise with a commodity characterized by a truly 
global market and fair substitution possibilities. It cannot be expected that a changing abundancy 
of a certain species like cod will produce consistent price changes because the cod price will be 
effected by wide-ranging developments from Alaska pollack to South American hake or from African 
hake to Australian hoki. In fact historical evidence shows that the real fish prices remain rather 
constant in the long run (similar to various other primary commodities). Limiting the contribution 
of economics to one time determination of the long term real prices, seems rather meagre for a 
generally recognized social science. 
Analysing the problem of overcapacity from an economic point of view requires that we: 
• formulate a definition of fishing capacity in physical terms as a relation between units of gear 
and volumes of fish, - and 
• make the essential distinction between the technical and economic overcapacity. 
There are two reasons why the distinction between technical and various economic overcapacities 
seems relevant: 
1. It provides understanding of the likely effectiveness of any policy which necessarily has to 
work through market mechanisms. 
2. It raises the politically sensitive aspect of income distribution (size of employment, labour 
versus capital, regional, groups of fishermen and so on). This goes parallel with the choice 
between the various MSYs in a biological mUlti-species approach. 
4.1 Definition of fishing capacity 
Until now no unambiguous physical definition of fishing capacity has been developed on an 
European-wide level because of the lack of well-coordinated research on this matter and the 
heterogeneity of the fishing activities. It is demonstrated below (see 4.1) that, with the current level 
of knowledge a clear definition may prove rather difficult. 
The meaning of the grts and kws used in the MAGPs should be questioned because measurement 
of these units is not standardized. There are examples of vessels and engines where two different 
approaches to measurement produce values which differ by factor 1.5-2. However, it is not only a 
matter of specifying a common definition but equally of its practical application to the already sailing 
fleets. In practice, this will be rather costly because thousands of vessels would have to be 
remeasured. On the other hand, applying the new definition to the newly constructed vessels would 
provide comparable data on fishing capacity only in twenty years time. 
Unfortunately, an assessment of the overcapacity cannot wait for a practical solution of the above 
definition problem of fishing capacity. 
4.2 Technical overcapacity 
The technical capacity could be defined as the quantity of fish (mix of species) which could be caught 
annually by a specific vessel or a fleet. It will depend on: 
• productivity per unit of fishing time (cpue or kg/hour) 
• number of fishing time units (hours fishing/year) 
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The productivity of a vessel will further depend on: 
• quality of the skipper and crew 
• type, size and power of the vessel, its equipment and gear 
• relative density of stock (catch ability). 
The number of units of fishing time depends on relations between 
• time in port 
• time at sea 
• time fishing. 
Obviously fishing time can be increased by reducing the other two, i.e. shorter stays in port and 
fishing closer to the home port, instead of steaming to distant grounds. 
The technical capacity can be used in varying degrees. A considerable flexibility in the capacity 
utilisation is quite characteristic for fishing vessels. In practice there is something like a 'normal' 
level of capacity utilisation. Very high (maximum) capacity utilisation of over 300 days a year can 
be achieved, while in some fisheries vessels are economically operated on 1-2 months fishing per 
year. For small coastal fleets, sea time and fishing time may lie close to each other (short trips, 
weather dependence, close grounds). However, the medium and large vessels especially will be 
able to maintain their fishing effort in case of policy limitations by changing the pattern of the three 
above-mentioned factors of port-sea-fishing time. 
It is not clear whether the current level of fishing time is higher or lower than the normal one. On 
one hand, there are some restrictions (quota) on the other hand, the fish are more difficult to catch 
and, when higher costs have to be covered, this may well lead to more fishing time in order to 
achieve the same catch or net revenue. 
The relation between the biological overcapacity and the technical one is not as straightforward as 
may seem at first. A reduction in the nominal number of grts or hps (even if they are well- defined) 
does not necessarily produce a proportionate reduction in fishing effort and even less that of fishing 
mortality. These relations need an explicit analysis. It can be expected a priori that the less productive 
vessels will be withdrawn first while the capacity utilisation of the remaining ones may increase. 
4.3 Economic overcapacity 
The introduction of economics into the analysis of overcapacity implies in the first place that costs 
and revenues have to be included. At a later stage, aspects like income distribution, regional analysis 
and possibly secondary effects may be taken into account. 
The economic overcapacity could be defined as that part of technical capacity which cannot be 
exploited economically. This leads to a concept of overcapacity which is more related to economic 
activities and less to fish stocks. Small catches at high prices can still sustain a considerable fleet on 
an economically sound basis. 
The economic overcapacity has to be interpreted within different time-schedules (short, medium 
and long term) because of the dynamics of the survival of the firm under difficult economic 
conditions. 
The free market is undoubtedly of considerable influence on the effectiveness of fishery management 
policy. The relevance of economics lies in its analysis of the behaviour of the fishing firm or of the 
sector under the restrictions or incentives of the fishery management policy and the market. 
It was assumed that administrative or technical regulations would be able to steer the sector in 
certain direction. However, empirical evidence shows that it is legally impossible to force specific 
people out of business just because the fleet is considered to be too large if it cannot be legally 
proven that they do not comply with the management rules. Practice also shows that judicial 
55 
Irish Fisheries Investigations Series B, No. 42 (1994) 
prosecution has not been a serious deterrent to prevent infractions. It is only possible to make the 
economic existence of the marginal firms difficult and to help their decision to stop fishing with 
some decommissioning scheme. Therefore an analysis of costs and benefits is relevant from the 
point of view of degree and time schedule in which the technical overcapacity can be eliminated 
with the usual policy instruments which are only indirectly effective through market forces. 
How long a fishing firm will survive under difficult economic conditions, and thus maintain the fleets 
overcapacity, will depend on its financial reserves built during the previous years, its relationship 
with its bank, its cash-flow and the acceptance of its owners and crews of lower Incomes. Non-
economic considerations such as maintaining a family business, status in the community and 
alternative employment opportunities, may play an equally important role as the economic 
ones. 
A firm will survive in the long run if the proceeds will cover all costs. It is the fiscal and social security 
system which is relevant in this context and not a specific economic approach. 
In the medium term a firm will survive when it can meet its obligations to the banks, but it does not 
necessarily have to be able to earn back the depreciations on its own capital. The extent to which 
the firm will consume its own capital will depend strongly on factors like social status and future 
expectations. In case of fishing it may be expected that many people will hang onto their boats as 
long as possible since they are their livelihood. 
In the short run, a firm can survive purely on a cash-flow basis because the banks will wait for a few 
years for the loan reimbursements. Some countries give their fishing industries quick support to get 
it through the difficult years. 
The various time schedules require different levels of gross revenues. In the short run a firm will 
survive with relatively lower earnings so that lower catches and a lower use of technical capacity 
are acceptable. 
From the above it follows that there are various levels of economic overcapacity. In the long run 
there may be a considerable economic overcapacity, but that is not necessarily the case in the short 
run. Consequently any measures taken to limit the size of the fleet will become effective only 
gradually. A high percentage of the costs of fishing operations is variable, being related to sea time 
(fuel) and gross revenues (crew share). Possibly contrary to other industries, survival on a cash-flow 
basis is an accepted part of fishing operations because of the natural fluctuations of landings and 
thus of economic results. 
Five levels of the utilisation of technical capacity were distinguished. 
Maximum - In an extreme case a vessel may work over 300 days a year, 24 hours a day 
2 Normal- There is a certain normal level of capacity utilisation, which can be determined 
from historical data. This will be often some 150 days for smaller vessels and 220-280 
days for the larger ones. 
3-5 'Financial' - Three levels of capacity utilisation may be distinguished according to the 
short-, medium- and long-term financial requirements. 
It cannot be determined a priori where the three financial levels will be in relation to the maximum 
and normal level since that will depend on the achieved physical productivity (per sea-day) and the 
prices. In reality the situation becomes further complicated because; 
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• Various fleets are exploiting the same stocks with various gears and thus also with various 
'costs and earnings functions'. Therefore it cannot be expected that a policy to protect a 
certain stock will be equally effective on all fleets. This may have far-reaching consequences 
as far as the intended and the realized reduction of fishing effort are concerned. 
• The fleets can switch from one target species to another and thus reduce overcapacity in one 
fishery and increase it in another. Such flexibility forces the policy-makers to introduce more 
detailed and complex regulations, which in their turn are more difficult to implement. 
Pavel Salz; Overcapacity in the European Fishing Fleets 
Various fisheries (combinations of vessel/gear/target species) have differing income-generating 
and distribution characteristics. Empirical economic analysis is required of the consequences of 
heterogeneity and flexibility in multi-fleetlmulti-species situations on the effectiveness of policies 
aimed at a structural reduction of the fishing effort. This heterogeneity is typical for the waters of 
the European Community. 
5. Who wants an economic analysis? 
Some of the matters raised are rather controversial and it is not at all self-evident that the policy 
makers are interested in an objective analysis since it may uproot some preconceived ideas which 
are suitable for general political discussion. Two examples may illustrate this, though in practice 
there are many more. 
First, there is the aspect of income distribution. In general political discussion this aspect is treated 
in a qualitative manner. Economic analysis may well produce undesired quantification. For example; 
From an EC point of view it may be more desirable to give the available fish resources to regions 
like Galicia or Brittany instead of to Holland, Denmark or oil-rich Scotland. For national rep-
resentatives who defend the interests of their countries in Brussels, such shifts would be unac-
ceptable. 
Second, since various national fleets are exploiting the same stocks it will be absolutely essential to 
elaborate a clear definition of fishing effort and determine its current level. This would imply that; 
• all fish stocks would have to be considered as protected TAC stocks 
• coastal fleets (below 10m) would have to be accounted for because they are fishing in 
sensitive areas (nurseries) 
• the truly active fleets in each country would have to be determined 
• one definition of grt, for example, would have to be applied to all because, otherwise fleets 
may be also reduced by simple remeasuring. 
As things now stand the MAGPs of various countries have been determined on rather questionable 
fleet data - usually the registered fleet, which is often larger than the active one, with no consistent 
measurement of grts or kws. Considerable margins have been created which will allow if necessary 
for 'paper reductions' of the fleets in the future or even for an increase of the effective fleets. 
Still, economic analysis may provide some interesting insights into the less sensitive issues as, for 
example, which is the prohibitive level of fines, relation of policy costs and value added of the 
industry, consequences of policy-induced inefficiencies, role of the secondary linkages of the sector 
or the likely effectiveness of a policy working through market incentives. 
The potential future role of fishery economics within the multidisciplinary approach to fishery 
management will be determined partly by its capacity to deal with sensitive political issues in an 
objective and 'scientific' manner. 
For those involved in empirical policy related research in fishery economics, there are many more 
questions than answers . 
6. Proposition for economic research 
It is evident that not only the concept of economic overcapacity has to be further refined and 
subsequently applied to empirical data. It must be recognized that coordination and execution of 
European-wide research in fisheries economics lags various decades behind that of biology. The 
problem of the overcapacity of fishing fleets in relation to the available stocks calls for extra effort 
in this field. 
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It is therefore proposed to launch a European-wide research programme which would aim at: 
1. Formulation of a consistent methodology on the economics of fishing capacity and over-
capacity. 
2. Review of the relative importance of the various empirical data required for the application 
of the theory (capacity definitions, assessment of statistical data, and so on). 
3. Empirical assessment of the economic overcapacities in the major fisheries and their impli-
cations for the effectiveness of fisheries management policies. 
The Measurement of Overcapacity as a Management Tool: 
An Economist's View 
by 
MASSIMO SPAGNOLO 
Instituto Ricerche Economiche Pesca e Acquacoltura (IREPA), Salerno, Italy 
ABSTRACT 
Fisheries management measures are heavily dependent on biological concepts. Overcapacity or, it 
might be better to say, overfishing, is still defined as that generating the difference between the 
current and desired levels of total fishing mortality where the various Maximum Sustainable Yields 
(MSY's) are utilized as policy targets. 
Economists are usually dependent on the same concepts and their analyses often conclude that the 
desired level of fishing effort is close to some specific Maximum Economic Yield (MEY), which is 
close to some MSY. If this is true, fisheries economists will always depend on a biological curve that 
is outside their control. The same is true when technical bio-economic models are considered. While 
the problem could be overcome by closer co-operation between biologists and economists, it is 
clear that economists should develop an autonomous way of thinking in order to satisfy policy-
makers' requirements. This means developing widely acceptable economic definitions of fishing 
effort, fishing capacity and such concepts and their use as routine management tools for policy 
purposes. 
Lack of tradition, of available and comparable data, of common research projects and, not least, the 
merely residual funding usually available for research in fisheries economics in many countries, 
tend to limit this approach. 
On the other hand, the broader concept of fishery planning is becoming a substitute for fishery 
management, and this allows economists to use more familiar methodologies. In this case, con-
servationists' measures are only one of the many options available to satisfy policy goals. 
INTRODUCTION 
Since 1954 the sustainable yield curve has been the basic tool on which economists have built most 
of their theories about fisheries management. Concepts like Maximum Economic Yield are well 
established in the literature. For a long time the distance between MEV and MSV has been an 
apparent source of debates and conflicts that became less relevant as economists introduced welfare 
considerations that brought MEY nearer to MSY for fishery policy purposes. 
Unfortunately, this conclusion did not lead to a greater co-operation between biologists and econ-
omists; indeed, it pushed them further apart because if the target is MSV, then biological tools are 
appropriate for sound fisheries management. 
However, in more recent years, parallel to the many failures in managing the resources by con-
servationist measures and provision of good biological forecasts, politicians and public admin-
istrators have been willing to recognize an increasing role for the proposals and suggestions of 
economists. At the same time, it seems to be now well accepted that fishery management has wider 
and more complex implications which underline the need to adopt sectoral planning, where biology 
is only one of the variables involved. 
There are many reason why it took so long to reach this point, but it has to be recognized that 
economists have had little opportunity to present different methodologies, either because of the 
well-established position of the biologists, or because the economists' approach has its roots in 
biological theory. It is self-evident how difficult it might be to depart from the dominant view when 
the same conceptual framework is used. 
If this is true, then it is clear that there is a need to develop an autonomous economic approach to 
fishery management. This can be obtained only departing from the traditional bioeconomic 
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approach. In this case, if I am allowed to quote Keynes' preface to the General Theory of Employment, 
Interest and Money, "the difficulty lies, not in new ideas, but in escaping from the old ones". Concepts 
like MEY have to be abandoned and the definitions of management concepts like 'overcapacity' or 
'fishing effort' have to be interpreted in economic terms. 
ECONOMIC YIELDS AS A MEASURE OF OVERCAPACITY: A PROPOSAL 
Many European fisheries, if not all, are overexploited. Overexploitation is achieved through different 
fishing systems, each of which has a different impact on the resources and a different flexibility 
which allows for divergent reactions to management measures. Therefore, it cannot be taken for 
granted that the reduction of fishing units or other technical parameters will necessarily reduce 
fishing effort. It is well known that it could have the opposite effect. 
However, overexploitation implies that the fishing fleet has redundant capacity; hence the concept 
of overcapacity postulates a situation of disequilibrium. This is usually defined as the difference 
between the actual and the desired levels of fishing mortality, but in the economic terms it could 
well be defined as those combinations of yield/effort (Y/E) which are lower than a given or desired 
average registered for each segment of the fleet. The first difference emerging from the two 
definitions concerns when there is overcapacity. The second difference lies in which are the 
redundant units of effort. A third difference is related to the efficiency of the measures that are 
necessary for there to be a return to an equilibrium. 
The importance of these differences has to be explained since they represent the core of an 
alternative management approach. 
Not all units of effort can be considered as having equal characteristics from a technical, social 
efficiency point of view. It is usual for vessels in a heterogenous fleet to compete for the same fish 
which means that each measure to be adopted should indicate who is going to be penalized and 
how to reach the goals, with minimum cost and damage. The economic approach allows for the 
group of vessels and the choice of the most efficient measure to be chosen with the lowest social 
and economic cost. 
This leads us to examine the quality of the measures which are necessary if the fishery is to recover. 
If the fish are important, it is possible that generalized measures will be undertaken, but if it is the 
fishery as a whole which is important, then a mix of interdependent measures is needed, each one 
having a different impact on the fishery, in the long or in the short run, and each having a different 
timetable. 
The contention is not that the same measure can apply equally to the whole fleet. A subsidy policy 
does not necessarily have the same impact if it is applied to an industrial vessel, which has alternative 
fishing and capital opportunities, as to an artisanal vessel, which has no alternatives. A comparison 
of individual yields with a given average yield for each segment of the fleet enables the specific 
overcapacity to be measured and allows for the right mix of measures to be undertaken to reduce 
it. 
Even more important is the choice of when there is deemed to be overcapacity. In fact, since 
overcapacity is related to disequilibrium, it is easy to check the existence of disequilibrium by 
following the economic indicators of the fleet over a period of time and comparing them with the 
registered average value. In this case, we choose the ratio Yield/Effort (Y/E). but many others are 
equally suitable, depending on the quality of data available and the policy target. Any other parameter 
related to employment, income, investment or cost structure can be used if it is comparable and 
available over a long period. 
It should be clear that resource exploitation is implicitly taken into account, since stocks fluctuations 
are readily checked by examining the variation of the vessels economic parameters around the 
given average Y /E. 
However, what is really important is that the economic approach can more sensitively monitor the 
onset of disequilibrium or, when it already exists, its variations. This is possible since economists 
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have a wide range of alternative indicators to analyse the performance of different segments of the 
fleet. Cross-section and time series analyses on catch, production value, costs per unit of effort (in 
whatever way it may be defined) have powerful and immediate explanatory and forecasting capacity. 
They have nothing to do with estimates of recruitment rates, natural stock fluctuations, or natural 
or fishing mortality, which must be monitored. 
Moreover, the Italian experience shows that biological estimates are subject to wide fluctuations, 
depending on which institute has carried outthe research, which weights have been used to estimate 
the relationship between predator and prey, which parameters have been used to distinguish long-
term fluctuations from short-term ones, what used estimate of environmental impact on specific 
resources has been used, and so on. 
ECONOMIC YIELDS VERSUS PRICES AND CATCHES 
It is always difficult to introduce prices into a discussion of fishery management since traditionally, 
economists are required only to calculate the impact that various biological measures have on the 
unit value of the catch, thus supporting biologists in their attitude to the management of resources. 
A recent example might help us to understand the problem. Since minimum permitted mesh size is 
one of the traditional means of preserving resources, biologists are demanding that the impact on 
prices of the wider mesh size should be calculated. Obviously, the implicit answer they are awaiting 
concerns the possibility that, in the short term, a reduced catch will produce an increase in prices, 
while, in the long run, after the stock has been recovered, a greater yield will raise fishermen's 
incomes. Unfortunately, there is no direct link between price and catch since the direction the 
economic yield will take depends on many independent variables which have nothing to do with 
production. This makes price estimates irrelevant in calculating the impact of biological measures. 
On the other hand, the vessels' economic yield, implicitly taking into account prices and catches, is 
an independent and useful parameter in terms of fishery management. 
A vessel's economic yield depends on which of nine combinations of catch/price ratios will be 
relevant in a given fishery. Three combinations will reduce economic yields; another three will lead 
to an increase in the yield, and two of them will produce an uncertain situation where the direction 
of the yield will depend on the rate of proportionality that exists between catch and price variations. 
In these latter cases only demand price elasticity will enable analysts to calculate the direction of 
the economic yield. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The above analysis has shown alternative ways of managing resources, independent of the existence 
of reliable biological statistics. 
But is it conceivable that fishery management might be independent of a more general sectoral 
analysis? Is it possible to think of fishery management without linking biological and economic 
technical measures with a more general sectoral planning? The answer is an emphatic 'no'. Other 
means are essential to achieve the correct ratio between resource and effort. Structural measures 
are an example, but financial, fiscal and social policies are even more important, and time is a 
decisive variable for policy-makers and public administrators. 
It must be recognized that the implementation of an economic approach requires detailed and 
reliable data, which are not always available to demonstrate that, when it is called for, it is relatively 
easy to provide decision-makers with the right answers. 
This is the case in Italy, where fishery economics were virtually unknown until the end of the 1970's. 
Today, the importance of fishery economics in the drawing up of the national fishery plan is widely 
recognized; - the results can be seen in the latest management plan. 
It is important to stress that these results have been achieved with the full support of the fishermen, 
even when they have had to renounce some of their privileges, such as capital grants and subsidies 
on fleet investment. This demonstrates that fishermen are not always opposed to scientists, as we 
often hear. Perhaps it depends on which kind of science they are dealing with. 
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On the other hand, the results have been reached with the help of public funds. The Italian 
administration created a national institute for the study of the economics of flshenes. 
Finally, I shall mention some ideas that the Association could well take up in the near future: 
1. Data collecting enables economists to carry out work out their research and tO
f 
prepare
l 
a 
report, in the same way as it allows biologists to calculate their estimates. Un ortunate y, 
data collecting is expensive, so we need proper fundmg. It IS not Impossible that each 
administration, given a set amount of financial resources directed to fishery research, will 
apportion a proper share to fishery economics. 
The experience of the EC Fishery and Aquaculture Research (FAR) programme has shown 
that something can been done, but a lot more has still to be achieved. More specifically the 
establishment of a uniform range of national research stations should be organised. 
2. To be effective, economists' proposals have to be based on standardizedd methodologiesf This requires specific research directed to the uniformity of application an mtrepretatlon 0 
such concepts as fishing effort, overcapacity and yield. 
The measurement olthe impact of EC Regulations 4028/86 and 3944/90 on European fisheries 
could present an opportunity to implement points 1 and 2 above. European Community and 
by individual member states Planning and Organising by the could lead to proper fundmg 
for these ideas. 
These are only two suggestions. Many others will be added during our discussions, but possibilities 
of success will depend on the strength our Association can achieve, and thus on the amont of 
support that each one of us can give it. 
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Regional Disparities in the Fishing Activities of the 
European Atlantic Regions 
by 
JEAN-PIERRE BOUDE 
Ecole Nationale Superieure Agronomique de Rennes (ENSAR), Rennes, France 
ABSTRACT 
This paper examines the principal characteristics of the European fisheries in the Atlantic between 
the south of Spain and Scotland. The survey was conducted in fourteen regions. In the first part, the 
data are analysed. The indicators that have been retained are: number of fishing boats, power, 
Gross Registered Tonnes (GRT), number of fishermen,volume and value of catches, main species 
caught, average landing prices, ratios for return on capital, labour productivity, landing concentration 
indice; indicators concerning the downstream of fishing activities have been devised. This initial 
approach enables the comparative and competitive assets of each region to be assessed. An analysis 
of the hierarchical ranking confirms that no ciear-cut typology emerges. In the second part, two 
methods of analysis are presented. One is an analysis of market chains (filiere) with application to 
a french region, the second is the productivity surplus account method. The analysis of regional 
data concerning fishing activities shows that opposition between northern and southern Europe 
gives a reduced picture of the fishing reality in the European regions. 
INTRODUCTION 
The significant imbalance that exists within the European Community between the size of the EC 
fishing fleet and the resources available to it requires that structural measures be introduced. If 
these were adopted, present discrepancies should be greatly reduced. 
In the mid-term, these measures should not only allow the fisheries' to become profitable again but 
should also allow downstream and upstream sectors to be maintained. 
Recent measures intended to reduce fishing effort imply that there will be a decrease in the volume 
of employment, leading to considerable economic effects both downstream and upstream of the 
fishing industry, but it is extremely difficult to forecast what these effects will be, and where they 
will have the most impact. 
Since it is probably illusory to try to forecast the social and economic impacts of a reduction in the 
fishing effort- both at European and national level- it is rather tempting to ask whether a regional 
survey could provide a criteria for comparing Europe's Atlantic regions which would allow for a 
fuller and deeper analysis of the issue. It is also important to ask how we can devise a methodology 
for solving these problems. 
ANALYSIS OF REGIONAL DISPARITIES 
The survey was conducted in fourteen regions in what is known as the Atlantic Arc, an area that 
stretches from southern Spain to Scotland. Due to weaknesses in statistical information and a 
similarity in most essential parameters in both countries, it was decided to merge regional data 
from Portugal and the Republic of Ireland in order to obtain homogeneous data,. It is obvious that 
the size of the observed entity will affect the level of results. 
A number of indices has been used, the most significant of which is based on data that can be 
obtained in a standard way, although several assessments have been necessary: number of fishing 
boats, horsepower, tonnage, number of fishermen, volume and value of catches, and main species 
caught (volume and value). The most significant computed ratios have been average landing price, 
ratios for the return on capital and labour productivity, average value per horsepower, per GRT 
(Gross Registered Ton), per ship and per fisherman also landing concentration indices. A number 
of indices downstream from the fishing activity has been developed, but these have not been 
included in the data analysis because regionalization under the same geographical criteria was not 
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possible. These indices concerned added value of the processing industry, number of employees, 
investment rate and foreign trade. All were used as a posteriori explanatory factors. 
The first data analysis brought to light a certain number of factors, taking into account common 
points and disparities between regions. This allowed the analysis to highlight the most prominent 
regions; the Northwest Spainish region, Scotland and Brittany together land 60% of catch volume 
in its region and 54% of its values. Several areas appear to be very specialized (more than 50% of 
the total value are for only three species) and include Poitou-Charentes, Northern Ireland, the 
Cantabrian region, and Scotland. This indicates how important any decrease in landing if any of the 
target species may be for these regions. It should be noted that the quasi totality of the main catches 
of fish in each of the regions is subject to Total Allowable Catches (TAC). 
An analysis of average prices showed the significance of areas such as the Spanish South Atlantic 
region and, to a lesser degree, the Cantabrian region, Brittany, England south-west and Wales. 
The analysis of production factors shows the typical disparities that exist between the Iberian regions 
and the others. Spanish and Portuguese regions have 46% of the total catches and 50% of the values 
of the fisheries, 70% of the Gross Registered Tonnage (GRT), 52% of the horsepower and 75% of the 
fishermen. 
On the other hand, an examination of productivity and value ratios points to high performance levels 
in northwest Spain, Brittany and Scotland. 
This initial analysis has allowed us to bring out the comparative and competitive assets of each 
region, but no clear-cut criteria have emerged. 
An analysis of the hierarchical ranking' yielded a dendrogram tree which allows similar regions to 
be grouped together. Such groupings are all the more homogeneous since the 'knot' at the level of 
which grouping is made has a low inertia index. 
Three levels can be distinguished in the dendrogram. The various classes are characterized by the 
type of variable which has been used along with its value. 
The first level (Nl) is generated essentially by catches per GRT and the weight of the Poitou-
Charentes region which features a strong oyster-producing industry. 
In the second level (N21. representing non-homogeneous classes, wide disparities exist, depending 
on the data: the Scotland-Brittany-Ireland agglomeration, and the northwest Spain-Portugal agglom-
eration. The levels of aggregation are very high, and the significance of different knots is not very 
clear (high inertia index> 2,5). 
The third level (N3) represents homogeneous classes grouped into four categories: 
-Scotland and Brittany both have high landed volumes per fisherman, as well as high volumes 
and horsepower. 
-the Cantabrian region and Southern Spain Atlantic have high numbers of fishermen and low 
landed volumes. 
-Northern Ireland, southwest England and Wales are similar in many repects. 
-Lower Normandy, Pays de la Loire and Aquitaine have a low number of fishermen as well as 
similar economies, at least as far as Pays de la Loire and Aquitaine are concerned. 
1 The hierarchical ranking analysis is an automatic method of analysing of data. The principle is to build a series of 
partitions of n ranks, n-' ranks,n-2 ranks, n-3 ranks fitted into one another. The partition into x ranks is obtained by 
linking two ranks of the partition in the x+l ranks.The partition in one rank is the set of all constituents. Each 
partition is included in a following rank. The higher the level of the rank indice the more heterogeneous is the set 
constituted; this index is the 'aggregation level'. In our presentation, the y axes represent this aggregation leveL 
The knots from 15 to 27 represent the successive links in this scale of aggregation level. N3, N2, N1 represent three 
significative levels to obtain different sets. For example, N3 determines A, 2, 8, 5, 14 sets; N2; determines A 1, A3, 
2.4,2.5,83,84,5.12,5.13,14 sets and so on. 
64 
Jean-Pierre Boude: Regional Disparities in the Fishing Activities of the European Atlantic Regions 
If we leave aside the North-South contrast regarding the volume of factors of production, when we 
take into account the structural features of landings - and especially efficiency ratios - the criteria 
are no longer very clear. It would be illusory to draw up a regional classification without carrying 
out a more detailed analysis. Geographical areas are extremely diverse and only an analysis 
performed for each region would allow us to predict the results of any structural measure. Only a 
trade by trade (one type of boat, one or several types of targets, one type of fishing tool) and fishing 
fleet by fishing fleet economic analysis would highlight clearfactors showing common characteristics 
among regions. 
AN ANALYSIS INTEGRATING ALL THE DYNAMIC ASPECTS OF THE DIFFERENT 
SECTORS 
It therefore seems to be necessary to analyse those economic effects induced by the European 
structural measures, using sharply defined observation units as a support. 
The first method consists of making sectoral analyses, a sector being defined as a set of articulated 
economic agents, with the outputs of one agent representing the inputs of the next one. When 
correctly carried out, this approach reveals the development or impediment factors, both at structural 
and strategic levels, for each level of the sector, as well as for the whole sector. To assess correctly 
the different upstream and downstream fluxes makes it possible to determine the employment and 
income multipliers for the sector. 
The use of this method in 1986 enabled us to work out that, for the Lower Normandy region, 
one seafishing job generated 1.18 land-based jobs, including 0.77 jobs upstream and 0.15 jobs 
downstream; the remainder were training and supervisory jobs. This method also showed that one 
French franc of landed fish in the region induced FF 1.30 upstream and FF 0.93 downstream, that is 
to say FF 2.16 in total, with the region directly benefitting by FF 1.40. 
This approach helps to identify the economic effects induced by any structural measure, provided 
that effects on landing volumes and values are already known. It also makes it easier to see which 
support measures should be implemented so that structural measures can be made more efficient. 
Such an analysis is inadequate since it does not take into account the possible evolutions regarding 
the formation of productivity gains or losses by production units. In particular, any structural 
measure may entail modifications in the production function which counteract the desired effects 
(e.g. capital-labour substitution in the fishing sector or the introduction of technical progress). 
Besides analysing these modifications, researchers could employ the productivity surplus account 
method. This method is rather delicate to implement since it implies that, using from the ship's 
accountancy data, we can accurately calculate a dissociation between product quantities and values, 
and factors of production. Nevertheless, this method has been tried on an experimental basis, with 
a simplified implementation, in the fishing sector. 
Firstly, the formation of the productivity surplus (gain or loss) has been computed in order to 
highlight how many factors or products participate in this formation. 
Secondly, without establishing a direct link with the previous stage, it is possible to compute the 
'distribution' of this production surplus among the various agents that are linked to the ships. These 
agents are the financiers, suppliers, customers, fishermen and skippers. 
It is then easy to draw a balanced account which reveals the partners who contribute to the 
constitution of these surpluses, and those who benefit from the shared-out advantages. 
If the surplus account yields information about the efficiency of a better method of implementating 
the factors of production, it also brings to light the efficiency of the firm's strengths through its 
relationship with its environment. This allows a dynamic analysis to be carried out. If a classification 
of trades or fishing fleets exists, the relevance of such an approach is obvious since, with correct 
sampling of earnings reports, it is possible to know the effects of modifications in ship productivity 
levels and the consequences induced of these modifications. 
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The analysis of regional data concerning fishing activities shows that opposition between northern 
and southern Europe gives a reduced picture of fishing in the European Atlantic regions. The 
diversity of fishing activity in these areas cannot be denied. It explains the frequent conflict between 
fishermen, in whose better interests it would be to act more like partners. 
The development of regional fishing activities cannot be dissociated from that of the other sectors. 
A better processing and value adding may lead to an improved economic situation for everyone, 
including the fishermen. Within the framework of increasing internationalization, it would be 
detrimental to the fishermen if production units became even more remote from local fishing 
activities. In the long term, this inevitably would entail both a delocalization of these units and all 
the economic and social effects which are often linked to this type of phenomenon. 
Only the implementation of methodologies that take into account all aspects of the situation (analysis 
of data, analysis of the upstream and downstream economic effects induced by fishing activities, 
analysis of modifications in productivity) will enable us to determine the consequences of any 
structural measure and so to define economic and social support measures. But this would serve 
no purpose if a large training effort were not quickly achieved at the same time: misunderstood 
measures are less efficient and also entail numerous unexpected side-effects. 
TABLE 1 
Data of the fishing activities of the European Atlantic Regions 
Regions Catches (mtl Value (ecu) Ships (number) G.R.T. Power (Kw) Fishermen 
Scotland 554,910 380,916,695 2,334 72,345 352,493 8,711 
Wales 7,636 9.006,162 415 7,332 35,724 955 
South-West England 47,497 61,014,338 971 17,155 83,586 2,235 
Northern Ireland 22,566 23,456,055 358 15,646 76,234 1,251 
Republic of Ireland 217,039 90,502,289 1,150 29,700 212,260 7,750 
Lower Normandy 71,661 93,342,079 974 11,802 82,453 1,476 
Brittany 341,417 466,463,677 2,942 104,024 456,123 6,503 
Pays de Loire 53,758 11 0,384,528 1,134 13,112 111,553 2,186 
Poitou-Charentes 87,897 176,818,358 360 6,287 40,311 2,710 
Aquitaine 22,650 51,570,612 518 13,186 67,104 1,210 
Cantabria 114,000 211,714,479 2,473 130,743 358,773 15,207 
North-west Spain 608,800 695,034,247 5,553 257,616 619,125 30,641 
South-west Spain 111,400 330,253,367 1,696 102,639 297,349 13,845 
Portugal 225,000 158,356,748 7,268 199,501 354,986 43,111 
Total Atlantic Arc 2,486,231 2,858,833,634 28,146 981,088 3,148,074 137,791 
Total E.C. 6,850,000 5,887,000,000 102,699 1,948,903 7,967,042 299,316 
Total France 577,383 898,579,254 5,928 148,411 757,544 14,085 
Total Spain 834,200 1,237,002,093 9,722 490,998 1,275,247 59,693 
Total U.K. 632,609 474,393,250 4,078 112,478 548,037 13,152 
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Figure 3 
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Figure 11 
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Fisheries Economics is a Special Kind of Economics 
by 
WIM DAVIDSE 
Agricultural Economics Research Institute (LEI), The Hague, Netherlands 
In this paper the readers attention is drawn to the fact that a major expansion may occur 
in a fishery suffering net losses over many years. How can this be explained and what are 
the consequences of this phenomenon for the management of fishing capacity? 
For many years the costs and earnings have been calculated for Dutch cutter fisheries. In eight of 
the past ten years net losses occurred; one year showed a break-even situation and only one year 
(1986) was profitable. Nevertheless, investment activities were at a high level in most years, resulting 
in a rise of fishing capacity in terms of horsepower with nearly 50 % from 1980 to 1989. 
Average horsepower per vessel rose from 725 hp in 1980 to 1000 hp in 1989. 
Aggregated net result 
of Dutch Cutterfisheries 
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Such a development is at odds with economic theory. It is impossible for enterprises to expand 
when there are continuing losses. An average return on investment (RO!) of 2-3%, the level in the 
Dutch cutter fisheries, is too low for an enterprise to survive in the long run; expansion in this case 
seems to be a wonder. How can this be explained? Were the calculation methods wrong, or did the 
fishermen not act in accordance with the theory? 
FINANCING NEW VESSELS 
LEI work generally accepts standard accounting principles: 
• Depreciation of the ships is based upon the replacement value so that rising prices for new 
cutters lead to higher depreciation. 
• All costs of production factors are calculated, like a renumeration for the owner and full 
interest costs for the invested capital. 
There was one phenomenon which upset the calculations: ships replaced by new ones were sold at 
prices which far exceeded the book-values of the old ships. The selling price of a six-to-eight-year-
old cutter often was at the same level as the original investment. A typical and actual example 
shows how a new ship could be financed though depreciations that was not fully earned due to 
losses. 
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Finance of a new cutter 
Selling price old cutter 
Redemption of remaining debt 
Financial means for new cutter 
NLG 
Finance from exploitation in 7 years: 
• Savings 
• Depreciation 
• Redemptions of debts 
Total 
Investment premium new ship' 
Total of self-generated finance 
Building costs of new ship 
Contribution of own capital: nearly 40% of total finance 
1 Premium for all investments, not only in fisheries. Not in force now. 
1,800,000 
550,000 
1,250,000 
-490,000 
+900,000 
-435,000 
-25,000 
540,000 
1,765,000 
4,500,000 
From the fiscal point of view, the results in seven years of operation would be less unfavourable 
because of lower depreciations and lower amounts for labour and interest (no costs for the owner). 
So the high prices which the investors received for their 'old' ships were the most important source 
of finance for the new ones, thus partially explaining the high level of investment in a situation of 
net losses. 
The conclusion is that fishery economics have special features, especially with regard to profit 
calculations. This suggests that commonly practiced accountancy rules should be re-examined. This 
reflection upon methods calculating of profit may take place within the EAFE, especially within a 
common project of four institutes. This refers to a cost and earnings study for North Sea Fisheries 
as one of the EC FAR projects, which started in April 1991. 
FAMIL V ENTERPRISES 
Another explanation for the survival and even expansion at a very low rate of return of the fishery 
has to be sought in the decisions of the fishermen. Their decisions differ from the decisions of the 
supplier of capital, upon which most economic theories are based. Theories about investment 
selection, the valuation of the company's assests, profit calculation were mainly formulated from 
the point of view of the shareholder/owner,who wants a maximum profit and a maximum return 
on invested capital. 
That is not however the attitude of the fishermen. Except for the industrial fisheries, like distant water 
fisheries the enterprises of the fishermen are family enterprises. This means that the continuation of 
their existence as independant fishermen/ vessel owner's and the transfer of their business to 
their children and grandchildren is a more important incentive than profit maximization. Even 
maximization of their status within the local community may be a more important goal than profit 
maximization. 
We can see that fishermen in the Dutch cutter fisheries are able to continue their enterprise at a very 
low or even negative rate of return on capital. This refers especially to the fishermen who bought 
the very expensive second-hand ships and the 'non-investors'. The fishermen do not require the full 
interest on their equity and are able to remain in the fishery as long as their debts can be repaid. 
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This can be illustrated by a remarkable development in the period 1980-1984, when each year a 
substantial net loss occurred for the cutter fisheries. Nevertheless, the number of vessels increased 
in this period from 535 to 611. 
The family enterprises in other EC fisheries probably show the same characteristics as the Dutch 
ones. In agriculture, too, family enterprises survive even when net losses dominate. In fact, Dutch 
agriculture would be impossible if the volume of labour had to be paid in accordance with the wages 
in industry and if the owners required the usual return on their money. 
What is the consequence olthe special economy offamily enterprises for the management of fishing 
capacity? 
• Ambitious programs for fleet reduction may fail. Family enterprises have the capacity to 
survive bad economic circumstances. Fishermen may prefer to continue their enterprise, 
accepting a very low remuneration for their labour and capital, rather than benefitting from 
decommissioning schemes. 
• If fleets can be reduced a limited number of fishing enterprises would enjoy rather high 
profits in a protected industry. The position of the remaining enterprises would be quite 
different from that in the past with free competition as a main characteristic. 
In fact management of fishing capacity requires a sharp definition of its main goal; with respect to 
the Common Fisheries Policy, a choice has to be made between a fishing capacity atthe level needed 
to fish the TACs, thus creating a limited number of enterprises with a high level of return on 
investment, and a greater number of enterprises operating under sub-optimal economic conditions. 
In the latter case, the real fishing effort should be lowered by regulation such as a maximum number 
of days at sea. Such a situation would be more in accordance with developments in the past, when 
profitability used to be rather low. 
The main goal of a skipper/owner is not only profit maximization. Remaining in the fishery sector, 
being a fisherman, is at least of equal importance. Therefore I shall conclude by asserting that 
fisheries~ecnmics is socia-economics! 
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A Further Contribution to the Individual Boat Quota (lBQ) 
Debate 
by 
J.P. HILLIS 
Fisheries Research Centre, Dublin, Ireland 
It is by now widely accepted that optimal levels of fishing effort lie far below those currently existing 
in the great majority of European Fisheries. On the Beverton and Holt (1957) yield per recruit function 
used as a standard part of preparation of management advice by the ICES working groups. effort 
yielding optimal catches (the 'F max' value) is normally well below that current and taking as 
standard the approximate percentages of revenue accounted for by fixed costs (25%) variable costs 
(25%) and share wages plus profit (50%) reported by David and Banks (1985) and O'Connor et al 
(1980), it has been shown that the profit obtainable from a fishery at optimal effort is much greater 
than current profit Figure 1 (Hillis, 1990a, 1990b, 1990c). Furthermore using these cost and profit 
ratios on available yield per recruit curves (ICES Working Group Reports) shows that for Irish interest 
fisheries, optimal effort can be low as 23% of current effort (Irish Sea Whiting) and maximal crew 
shares plus profit is slightly greater for whole fishery of the manning level of the fleet is reduced 
commensurably with the number of boats to the minimum necessary to take optimal catch, then 
with increased fleet profit divided among a much reduced labour force, increases of up to about 
800% with some species can be envisaged. 
Methods of protecting fish stock have been enumerated by Cunningham, Dunne and Whitmarsh 
(1985) among others. Measures so far in the European Community have included the traditional 
ones of minimum mesh and minimum landing size plus Stock TAG's divided into national quotas 
since 1982. Since these measures have proved relatively disappointing in their capacity to rehabilitate 
stocks, the introduction of further measures has been proposed, such as the Multi-Annual Guidance 
Programme (MAGP) requiring member states to reduce fleet capacity. The situation now is that 
most exploited stocks are enfeebled, such conservation measures as have been applied not having 
succeeded very well in improving their condition. There are signs that some managers would like 
to solve the problem by reducing fleets to such an extent that they could not physically overfish 
significantly. This appears to be the basis of the warning by EC Commissioner Marin of his belief in 
the need for a 40% average reduction in fleet capacity (Harney, 1990) and the call by Michael Holden 
(1991) since his retirement from the EC Commission for TACs to be replaced by a licensing system 
under which fleet sizes would be reduced to levels too low to significantly overfish the stocks. 
The problem is that to access maximum long-term (equilibrium) profits requires such a reduction in 
effort that the distribution of the ensuing elevate provides the classic economic efficiency versus 
equity dilemma. For example, with Irish Sea cod, 75% reduction in effort, will eventually yield 91% 
increase in the total fishery crew shares plus profit, with fleet size unchanged, which of course 
entails an average rise of 91% in income to all of the labour force of unchanged numbers; the boats 
however would be tied up for 75% of the time, and would be retained in unchanged numbers mainly 
to guarantee jobs to the existing number of crews. With reduced fleet size to that needed to exercise 
25% of the original effort (i.e. reduced by 75%) one has to envisage each boat with its original crew 
multiplied by 4 maintain job levels, which would be complicated but would yield an average 
increase in income of 125% (i.e. multiply incomes by 2.25). Should the labour force be reduced 
commensurably with fleet sixe, the overall original profit x 2.25 would not be shared by merely 25% 
of the number of the former labour force, so individual incomes in the surviving labour force would 
be 9 times higher than their originalleve!. Other fish species show changes along the same lines-
of the labour force is cut to that commensurate with taking the optimal catch, the considerably 
increased overall profit will be divided amongst a considerably reduced number of fishermen, 
resulting in spectacular increase in individual income, especially amongst gadoid (cod, haddock 
etc.), fishermen. The classic efficient economic solution is to advocate such reduction of the fleet 
followed by taxation of the incomes to remover the "supernormal" element in the profit. "The 
unpopularity of such measures requires no comment" (Clark, 1985), but is to be appreciated that 
fishermen might well be better off paying a tax/fee for trespassers/poachers to be kept away from 
their stocks than they would be if they did not have such a service. 
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The fact that member states of the EC on the mainland of Europe have been given decommissioning 
schemes with scrapping grants 50% funded by the EC has led a number of British sources to imply 
that they have a "right" to a decommissioning scheme. The fact is that a decommissioning scheme 
will help the fishermen and it will help boatyards more (where employment is bound to shrink if 
fleet size is reduced) but in the long term it will only help fishermen of one generation and their 
offspring will find it an industry well nigh impossible to enter for employment. 
It thus might well be much less costly to design a system to reduce fishing hours but not immediately 
fleet size, and to pay (i) to compensation for losses in catches and (ii) for a surveillance force to 
ensure compliance with the rules, allowing boats (subject to observation of safety criteria) to reach 
the ends oftheir normal working lives before being scrapped, a point also made by Anderson (1986). 
Methods should also at least be considered of retaining the labour force size at level near its current 
on the grounds that a rehabilitated fisheries should provide enough income to support them at a 
higher level than is possible at present, and also yield/tax revenue to pay for collection of the 
large amount of information necessary to ensure that an effort reduction scheme without fleet 
minimisation (tie up or individual quota) is being implanted according to plan. 
It is interesting to note that whereas outside Europe some progress has been made with Individual 
Transferable Quotas leading to increased profit and fleet reduction (Clark et ai, 2989, Piner and 
Huston 1990) in Europe, the emphasis has been on the allocation of national quota to boats within 
the EC TAC and quota system, with little or no transferability (Salz 1990). In Iceland, after 10-15 years 
of individual boat quotas with transferability very strictly controlled, the industry is now moving 
towards a pure Individual Transferable Quota (Arnason 1990); Iceland however has no significant 
unemployment problem In the United Kingdom, a potential basis for orderly reduction of effort with 
minimum job losses exists in the arrangement of the Anglo-Scottish fish Producers' Organisation 
centred at Berwick-on-Tweed, where the PO's quota is allocated to boats on the basis of the numbers 
of men employed in the crew. This appears to be a very forward seeing arrangement. 
There are of course a number of others to be considered, such as (i) the problems of guiding the 
industry through periods of initial loss when effort reduction measures are first applied (ii) the 
exhaustion of quota for one but not all species caught in a mixed fishery, (iii) fluctuation in abundance 
of stocks and (iv) excessive discarding at sea to upgrade the size of fish comprising the landed 
catch. The second may probably best be solved by a carefully calculated system of inter species 
transferability of quotas so designed that if one species is conserved to a lesser extent than originally 
intended, then compensation is exercised by another species are being conserved to a great extent. 
Fluctuation in abundance are best catered for by basing quotas on percentages of TAC rather than 
on a fixed volume. To combat excessive discarding at sea, it might be most effective to consider the 
Norwegian system of banning discards; in effect under this system all fish caught must be submitted 
to the inspection of the port authorities, which as well as facilitating detection of small commercial 
fish dumped to make way for larger ("high grading"), would draw attention to usage of undersized 
mesh through excessive volume of undersized fish. 
However, the main problems of implementation acceptance of initial losses etc. all depend strongly 
on the co-operation and maximum involvement of the industry itself, and signs of this are already 
appearing in Iceland and the Anglo-Scottish FPO area tonnage but two. It is therefore in the interests 
of the fishermen and their representatives - assuming they would like to increase average incomes 
by say 50% - to examine ways themselves of reducing effort, surviving the period of initial loss, 
and organising the distribution of the increased long-run profit in a situation where time, boats or 
both must be limited to avoid depleting the stock back to its current poor, overfished level. 
These are the people whose incentive should be strongest and who with help and backing of the 
management economists should be in the best position to regulate the fisheries so as to eventually 
access the substantially increased profit. 
REFERENCES 
Anderson, L.J. 1986. The Economics of Fisheries Management: Revised and Enlarged Edition. 
Beltimore (John Hopkins). 
Anon. 1989. Report of the Irish Sea and Bristol Channel Working Group. ICES CM1989IAsses:13. 
80 
J.P. Hillis: A Further Contribution to the Individual Boat Quota (lBQ) Debate 
Arnason, R. 1990. The Icelandic Fishing Industry, Changing Structure and Performance. University 
of Iceland Working Paper (Unpublished). 
Beverton, R.H.J. and HOLT, S.J. 1957. On the Dynamics of Exploited Fish Populations. Fish. Invest. 
(Ser. II) 19. 
Clark, C.W. 1985. Bioeconomic Modelling and Fisheries Management, New York, Chichester, etc. 
(Wiley). 
Clark, I., Major, P.J. and Mollett, N. 1989. The Development and Implementation of New Zealand's 
ITQ Management System in Neher, P.A., Arnason, A. and Mollett, N. (ed). Rights Based 
Fishing. NATO Series E, 169: 117-149. 
Cunningham, S., Dunn, M.R. and Whitmarsh, W. 1985. Fisheries Economics - an Introduction. 
London and New York. 
Davis, J. Banks, R.R. 1985. The Structure and Economic Performance of the Northern Ireland Fleet. 
Belfast (Department of the Northern Ireland Fleet. Belfast (Department of Agriculture for 
Northern Ireland). 
Harney, F. 1990. Slash, EC Fleets by 40% - EC will get tough if states won't. Fishing News 4019 (7-
12-90). 
Hillis, J.P. 1990a. Courses of Action of Effort Reduction: a Discussion Document. Pesca e Navegacao 
1011102 (especial) 17-18. 
Hillis, J.P. 1990b. The Suitability of the North-west Irish Sea for an Effort Control Campaign to 
Increase Profitability. Proc. 4th Biennial Conference, IIFET (Esbjerg). 
Hillis, J.P. (in the press). Some European Observations on Individual Boat Quotas. Proc. 5th Biennial 
Conference, IIFET (Santiago). 
Holden, M. 1991. Scrap TACs - control by licencing. Fishing News 4024. (18.1.91):20. 
O'Connor, R. Cruthchfield, J.A. Whelan, B.J. and Mellon K.E. 1980. Development of the Irish Sea 
Fishing Industry and its Regionaf Implications. Economic and Social Research Institute, 
Dublin. Paper No. 100. 
Pinner, B. and Huston, J. 1990. Fight ITQ's. Fishing News 3996 (22.6.90): 6-8. 
Salz, P. 1990. Current Policy regarding Cutter fisheries in the Netherland. Pesca e Navegacao 1011102 
(Especial): 46-48. 
81 
Technological and Institutional Dynamics: The Role of the 
UK Herring Industry Board From 1945 Onwards 
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ABSTRACT 
The role of institutions in the development of fishing technologies is frequently overlooked. Yet 
these institutions hold considerable sway over the industry and contribute greatly to the overall 
economic environment within which technological change occurs. The paper considers the con-
tribution of one such institution, the UK herring Industry Board, to the shaping of technological 
change and the mechanisms by which it undertook its research activities. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Rapid technological change occurred in marine fishing between 1945 and the 1970s; diesel engines 
replaced steam, radio communications and navigation came to be regarded as essential tools of the 
fisherman and nets and ropes made from synthetic fibres ousted their cotton and hemp counterparts. 
This experience, common to most of the world's fisheries, and has since been recognised as the 
second industrialisation of fishing (Cushing, 1988, pp. 234-258). However, technological change 
does not always present itself to the fishery in a positive light; it acts as a two edged sword, initially 
raising productivity but also establishing a self-perpetuating pattern of intensifying competition that 
drives forward innovation. 
The participation of the UK herring fishery in this process of global technological advancement was 
notable, not least because of its impact upon the resource base. The highly exploitative new 
purse seine and pelagic trawl fishing methods employed from the mid-1960s in conjunction with 
sophisticated shoal location devices were the undoubted cause of the depletion of the resource 
base. The trend of declining catch rates which established an incentive to adopt ever more effective 
boats and gear was finally halted with the prohibition of herring fishing in North Sea (1977) and 
West of Scotland (1978). 
Innovation in the herring industry resulted from the diffusion of new fishing technologies and 
endogenous development. A common bond between the two mechanisms by which the innovations 
entered the fishery was provided by the Herring Industry Board, the regulatory body established 
to oversee the industry's management. The Board performed the evaluation, development and 
promotion of fishing technologies with the objective of steering the fleet towards efficiency and 
profitability. Originally intended for the immediate post-war restructuring of the fleet the Board 
continued the research and development of fishing technology through to the 1970s. As such its 
activities provide a unique insight into the institutional contribution to the development and diffusion 
of fishing technologies. 
TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT IN FISHING 
Research and development is the deliberate search for, and the subsequent refinement of, new 
technological solutions to identified needs. The manner in which these processes are undertaken, 
and their subsequent success or otherwise, is conditioned by a number of factors. The identification 
of problems and the degree of certainty that they are resolvable lies at the core of the research 
process. The mobilisation of sufficient resources, the evaluation of performance and the absorbtion 
of change are critical tasks facing institutions seeking to provide solutions. These tasks in themselves 
*Now University. 
Irish Fisheries Investigations Series B (Marine), No. 42 (1994) 83 
Irish Fisheries Investigations Series B, No. 42 (1994) 
are subject to constraints of time and cost. Compatibility with past practices or intended futures 
further conditions the process. 
Technological change involves modification to both the technology and technology practice; the 
hardware of boats, nets and ancillary gear software of organisational and operational skills. For 
example, technological change may result in an increase in vessel size but this may in turn influence 
what technologies will be demanded in the future. Changes to vessel size and the diversity and 
complexity of the gear and ancillary equipment alter the composition of the hardware element. 
Technological change also enforces restructuring of the way fishing is organised and performed; 
ownership and remuneration systems may require adjustment to accommodate equipment costs 
while new technology necessitates the learning of new skills and, in sorne cases, the unlearning of 
old practices. The extent to which new technology changes the process of fishing is dependent upon 
whether innovation is a complement too or substitute for the existing regime. An example of an 
innovation intended to complement the current vintage would be a new type of shoal location 
device. An example of a substitute would be the employment of a new type of vessel, such as the 
stern trawler replacing the side trawler. 
Awealth of literature has emerged detailing how fishermen perform the selection of new innovations 
and the means by which they are tested and evaluated. This has tended to obscure the institutional 
contribution. The majority of the world's fisheries since 1945 have been subject to a degree of 
control, regulation and support. For several reasons this support has extended to the developrnent 
and testing of fisheries technology. Fisheries institutions can perform the search for potentially 
useful technologies, provide support and expertise to the industry to promote its adoption and 
acquire information that may assist its management ofthe fishery and the enforcement of regulations 
and standards. 
The development of new technology is conditioned by the environment within which it takes place. 
The marine environment imposes strict restrictions upon how development activities are undertaken; 
while limited on-shore simulations of fishing technologies are possible they cannot replicate the 
extreme conditions experienced during actual fishing. The development of fishing technology was 
achieved without extensive recourse to formal scientific modes of enquiry. Rather, development 
and testing under those conditions for which it was intended predominated. 
Below are identified seven major mechanisms by which fisheries authorities can assist the emerg-
ence of new fishing technologies emerge and undertake their appraisal: 
1. through the use of research vessels. 
2. through the use of commercial fishing vessels under contract to undertake trails. 
3. through co-operation with other fisheries institutions. 
4. through co-operation with manufacturers of fishing boats and gear, and manufacturers of 
equipment with potential fishing applications. 
5. through skills transfer: (a) overseas visits with industry representatives; (b) industrial place-
ments; (c) the employment of overseas fishing expertise. 
6. through the encouragement and support of fishermen's own research and development. 
7. through recourse to specialist expertise outside fisheries institutions. 
While in existence the Herring Industry Board employed all of these measures to facilitate the 
technological advancement of the industry. 
DEVELOPMENT THROUGH THE USE OF RESEARCH VESSELS 
Fisheries research necessitates the practical testing of new technologies under operational con-
ditions. The use of research vessels for this purpose offers several advantages for the fishery 
organisation. Firstly, while designed to operate as fishing vessels they also make provision for 
measuring and monitoring equipment, space for which is often not available on commercial vessels. 
Secondly, the use of research vessels also enables the organisation to undertake research without 
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prejudicing fishermen against the technology, which may be possible while technologies are in an 
early stage of development. 
Against these must be weighed the disadvantages of research vessels. Perhaps the most obvious 
disadvantage of acquiring and maintaining a number of research vessels are the costs incurred by 
the organisation. For a relatively small industry-specific body such as the Herring Industry Board 
these costs were considerable. Secondly, the variety of vessels is likely to be limited and consequently 
their findings could have little significance for a proportion of the fleet. 
In the immediate post war period the Board had little option but to acquire their own boats. A large 
number of the herring fleet had been requisitioned by the Admiralty and many of these had been 
lost during service. However, this was not the major impediment to using commercial boats; those 
vessels not destroyed had long passed the point of obsolescence. Consequently, few boats were 
worth employing for research purposes while fishermen were primarily concerned with returning 
to their occupation. 
A second factor underlying the Board's acquisition of its own research vessels was its continued 
determination to establish the type of vessel most suited to catching herring in good condition at 
the lowest cost. This objective entailed research beyond simply finding the least cost methods of 
performing pre-war tasks; options were available that could have had a major effect upon the 
industry. One such was shift from year-round prosecution of herring around the coast to the use of 
dual purpose vessels capable of switching over during the year between herring and demersal 
fishing on the same grounds. 
The design of these vessels followed pre-war investigations carried out by the Board to determine 
hull-forms that would afford greater fuel efficiency. Following the war industry representatives were 
consulted to see if these boats were of an acceptable design; the new designs were considered 'too 
revolutionary' but the Board expressed the hope that the industry would gradually come around to 
the new designs. 
In 1946 the Board tendered for two 65 ft. diesel powered steel hulled drifters of the new design for 
research purposes. Tests carried out on the new vessel types confirmed the Board's expectation 
that these could increase profitability by reducing the variable costs of catching herring, (Herring 
Industry Board, 1950, pp. 34-39). These boats were seen as embodying best-practice, being econ-
omical to run and performing well during fishing. As such, they represented for the Board a model 
of technological advancement which the Board was keen to see duplicated throughout the fleet. 
The two vessels gave the Board a high degree of flexibility over the research projects which 
could be undertaken. Importantly, they allowed for the simultaneous evaluation of a number of 
technologies, such as trials to ascertain the potential of shoal locations and communications 
technologies in the late 1940s. Research of this type is particularly significant given that many ofthe 
more important developments in marine fishing since 1945 resulted from the interaction of several 
innovations in a technological nexus, (A classic example of a fishing process that exploited the 
nexus potential of developments in hydraulics, electronics and synthetic fibres was purse seining, 
see Whitmarsh, 1977, pp. 109-110). 
The use of their own research vessels should be viewed as a response to the inability of the 
commercial fleet to provide a platform upon which to undertake trials of new technologies. 
By the early 1950s the fleet had rebuilt and was able to fulfil that function and consequently the 
necessity for research vessels was not so great. The Board's research vessels were subsequently 
chartered to fishermen in 1951. One lessee was sufficiently impressed with the vessel he had 
chartered to purchase it in 1953. The remaining vessel was retained by the Board for research 
purposes and was later transferred to operations under the auspices of Department of Agriculture 
and Fisheries for Scotland. The primary role of the research vessel in the Board's research program 
was assumed by the commercial fishing vessel, although the research vessels of other fisheries 
agencies continued to provide support and specialised monitoring equipment whenever necessary. 
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DEVELOPMENT THROUGH THE USE OF COMMERCIAL FISHING VESSELS 
The integration of commercial fishing vessels into the Board's research program began in earnest 
from the early 1950s, although there had been pre-war precedents. A number of factors underscoring 
this change in direction appear to have been significant. Firstly, the Board's programme to the early 
1950s had been concerned principally with the adaptation of existing inventions, such as sonar, the 
Decca Navigator, the radio telephone and the diesel engine. By the early 1950s the potential of these 
devices was fully appreciated by herring fishermen and their knowledge regarding their use had 
become widespread. The Board's attention turned towards the dedicated fishing technologies then 
emerging from manufacturers and towards the examination of alternative methods of catching 
herring. The interest in fishing techniques was stimulated by the renewed concern with reducing 
the cost of catching herring. The fleet had prospered from the immediate post-war demand for 
cheap protein, but as the revival of consumerism began to gain momentum it was recognised that 
the industry would once again be subject to stringent competition from other foodstuffs once 
rationing ended. 
The Board's financial position also necessitated a move towards employing commercial vessels. 
The provisions of the 1944 Herring Industry Act had included direct Government funding for those 
research activities in which the Board had engaged. As the industry moved towards financial stability 
it was to generate sufficient income to support the Board, through a levy on landings and the issue 
of licences. Commercial vessels were a cheaper means to achieve the same end. 
Given the intention to carry out tests under working conditions the use of commercial vessels was 
not surprising, but it is necessary to recognise the advantages that derive from such an arrangement. 
The choice of a particular fishing method encourages learning by doing around that technique and 
the subsequent development of variations upon the original theme. Learning by doing has been 
responsible for much of the post-war technological progress in fishing and explains why non-
formalised knowledge has been to the forefront. As Eddie, (1983, p. 44), notes, 
how to make the best of echosounders, warp tension meters and other fishing aids was 
discovered, not by the engineers who developed them, but by the highly-successful skippers 
who were the first to be persuaded to try them out. 
These skippers were able to evaluate new technologies by virtue of their tacit understanding of the 
complexities of commercial fishing. 
The potential for learning by doing is best realised when there is a high degree of familiarity with 
the technology in question. In the case of the UK herring fishery the choice of, and adherence to, 
particular fishing methods encouraged innovation to occur in this manner while d&termining the 
subsequent direction oftechnological progress. The Board's research activities from 1945 recognised 
as much; the stated intention being to raise the productivity of the predominant drift and ring net 
fishing techniques. In the opinion of the Board the potential for development had been demonstrated 
by the increase in productivity following the widespread adoption of new technologies, such as the 
echo sounder, which complemented their use. Through the increasing employment of new tech-
nology it was hoped that these fishing methods would allow a reduced fleet to meet the requirements 
of the processing sector. 
The function of any fisheries agency is not only to develop new technologies but also to encourage 
their use, and this rationale underscored the Board's actions throughout the period. The involvement 
of commercial fishermen contribute towards this objective. One reason for this was, as pointed out 
by the Board's General Manager, that the Board did not "want to burst on the industry with some 
entirely novel idea" ( Anon. 1966-67 (para. 638)), which might only serve to alienate fishermen and 
prejudice them against innovation. Collaboration between agency and industry champions the use 
of a new product/process and enables fishermen to form opinions on performance and suitability. 
Typically, competitive pressures force fishermen to imitate the adoption of those technologies that 
offer a competitive advantage to early adopters; by advertising these advantages the agency aims 
to accelerate this process. 
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DEVELOPMENT THROUGH CO-OPERATION WITH OTHER FISHERIES AGENCIES 
In the UK a clear division of responsibility was established for research between the fisheries 
departments and the non-governmental bodies. The former were to be concerned with fundamental 
marine research and investigations into the efficiency and effects of catching methods. To fulfil their 
obligations to the industry, the latter were to carry out pilot experiments in a commercial situation. 
The Herring Industry Board, following this principle, stated its objective of dealing mainly with the 
sponsoring of research by appropriate organisations, and of the application, either commercially or 
experimentally, of such findings from fundamental research as seem to merit development, (Anon. 
1954, p. 28). 
The Board contributed to the research of other institutions but, as the smallest of the governmental 
and non-governmental fisheries agencies, was more often the recipient of funding and facilities to 
support its own projects. The assistance provided to the Board by other domestic fishing institutions 
took one oftwo forms; assistance for specific projects generally involving the loan of some particular 
equipment, expertise or funding, and the longer term co-operative relationship. Of these it was the 
latter that had the most significant impact upon the Board's activities. 
Following its formation in 1952, the Board enjoyed its closest relations with the White Fish Authority, 
a non-governmental body formed for similar reasons and performing similar tasks. Unlike the Board, 
the structure of the White Fish Authority made provision for research and development. Following 
the opinion of the Fleck Committee on the importance of research and experimental work in marine 
fishing (Anon, 1960, Cmnd. 1453, Para. 321. the White Fish Authority's research activities were 
further extended and the Industrial Development Unit established. From the mid-1960s the Board's 
relationship with the White Fish Authority became ever closer as the Board began to devolve much 
of its research relating to the catching to the White Fish Authority. The merger of the two authorities 
was suggested on several occasions during the 1960s as the Board's status was reduced by the 
diminishing scale of herring fishing, although this did not take place until the formation of the Sea 
Fish Industry Authority in 1981. 
The first major collaborative agreement came with the establishment of the Herring Industry 
Board/White Fish Authority Joint Technical Committee on the design and construction of inshore 
fishing vessels as a joint response to the Merchant Shipping Safety Rules of 1965. This collaboration 
came at the time when trawling for herring was becoming more widespread and therefore the 
processes of herring fishing and white fishing were converging. The degree of collaboration was 
heightened when in 1967 the Board announced its intention to channel specific work on the catching 
sector through the W.F.A.'s Industrial Development Unit, a measure strongly influenced by the 
increasing financial constraints upon the Board's ability to undertake such work (Inability to fund 
extensive research became more acute during the 1960's as the Boards income from a levy on the 
catch decreased as landings fell). The relationship varied according to the type of research the 
Industrial Development Unit was engaged in and whether it had been initiated by either the Board 
or the White Fish Authority, though increasing it was the latter that provided the lead. 
It should also be recognised that the Board enjoyed relations with several non-fishing institutions. 
Among the collaborating institutions were the National Institute of Oceanography, the Ministry of 
Defence, the Torry Research Station and the National Physical Laboratories Ship Division. Also, in 
addition to the domestic fisheries institutions the Board also maintained contact with overseas 
agencies, although collaboration does not appear to have been extensive. Trials of Canadian and 
U.S. developed technologies in 1972 were indicative though that the Board was willing to go beyond 
the U.K. to obtain expertise. This principal was evident in the Board's relations with manufactures 
and overseas fishermen. 
DEVELOPMENT THROUGH CO-OPERATION WITH MANUFACTURERS 
A significant proportion of the technological innovations adopted by the UK herring industry in the 
post war period had their origins in manufacturing. Electronic shoal location, navigation and 
communications, hydraulic gear handling, synthetic fibre nets and ropes all originated in the 
manufacturing sector and were intended primarily for non-fishing uses. The transition from invention 
to innovation is a two-fold process; firstly, it is necessary to recognise that an invention can be 
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usefully applied to a certain purpose and, secondly, that its use for that purpose establishes the 
possiblity of profits being derived from its use. Manufacturers, fishermen and fishermen's institutions 
all contributed to the innovatory climate that saw these innovations come into general usage; 
manufacturers aimed to earn profits from sale of boats and gear, fishermen sought new technology 
to gain an advantage over competitors while institutions such as the Herring Industry Board strived 
to establish a profitable and efficient industry. 
Reference to the Board's Annual Reports reveals that co-operation with manufacturers was not 
uncommon; that co-operation was not reported more frequently was probably the outcome of the 
limited space available in the Board's Annual Report in which to report on the year's developments 
in the catching sector. Those projects in which the co-operation of the manufacturers was indicated 
dealt principally with new and untested technologies, where the input from manufacturers would be 
most effective, although it would be expected that much small scale collaboration went unreported. 
Collaborative trials offered a number of advantages to the Board; not only was it able to keep pace 
with new developments in a field undergoing rapid technological advancement but co-sponsored 
trials were also less draining on Board funds as both parties generally contributed to the expenses 
incurred. 
Although influential within the industry it was likely that the Board's practice of testing within the 
fleet was the prime attraction for manufacturers; the motives of manufacturers for employing 
commercial vessels were ostensibly the same as those of the Board. Commercial vessels provided 
manufacturers with a rigorous testing bed for their products that was credible among the potential 
customers. It has long been recognised that much of the information that promotes the diffusion of 
new technologies is acquired through experience of the technology in action, through word of 
mouth or by observing the landings made by the vessel partaking in the trials. Manufacturers 
recognised that a technology's satisfactory performance in commercial tests could establish for it a 
favourable reputation among the fleet. As in other industries during the decades following the war, 
manufacturers of fisheries equipment would be fully aware of the benefits to be gained from 
associating a particular brand of gear with success. 
Collaborative research into the potential for synthetic nets and ropes between the mid-1950s to 
the early-1960s illustrated the productive potential of such arrangements. Although the potential 
applications for synthetic fibres was recognised early on, the translation of that potential into 
effective fishing gears was not so readily achieved. A number of problems beset the transition from 
cotton to synthetic fibre nets and rigging; the determination of type of twine best suited to the task, 
the rigging of the nets so as to be suitable for use with the existing gear and knot slippage distorting 
the mesh of the nets. The Board engaged in trials with a large number of manufacturers of nets, 
ropes and gear to resolve such problems, with the initiative for such undertakings coming from both 
parties. 
DEVELOPMENT THROUGH SKILLS TRANSFER 
While the Board utilised commercial fishermen's unique knowledge of herring fishing it was 
understood that this consisted almost exclusively of skills relating to drift and ring net fishing. 
Consequently, while herring fishermen were capable of evaluating technologies appertaining to 
these techniques technologies that fell outside this experience presented problems. 
These problems were evident during trials of a purse seine net by a Lerwick fisherman in 1950 and 
1951. In the original trials the gear was damaged owing to the inexperience of the fishermen who 
normally fished by the ring net method. Once repaired the Board consulted the fisherman involved 
to ascertain whether experience suggested possible modifications to the gear for use under the 
conditions found in UK waters. The results were reported in the Board's Annual Report: 
the modifications which he [the fisherman] suggested were of such a nature and extent as to 
change the whole character of the net and the Board concluded that the purpose could be served 
equally well by using an orthodox ring-net, (Anon., 1951, pp. 27-28). 
The trials were discontinued and the gear returned to Norway. 
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Fishing techniques such as purse seining and trawling had no tradition in the UK fisherY and 
consequently fishermen had little option but to test these techniques with the skills they already 
possessed. As indicated in the above example, this was not always a good match. The Board acted 
to augment the experience of the UK fleet by harnessing the comparative advantage of overseas 
fishing expertise in these techniques. The Board's position was summarised in 1966 by its general 
manager, who opined that "when you introduce any new method you tend to go to the best expert 
there is, wherever he may be in the world, and pick his brains". (Anon. 1966-67 (Para 654)). 
The key problem highlighted by the above case of the purse seine trials was the lack of experience 
with fishing methods alien to the UK industry but frequently employed by other herring fishing 
nations. Unlike many of the new product innovations, such as the echo sounder or hydraulically 
operated deck gear, these were not readily assimilated within the existing pattern of herring fishing 
and necessitated learning new skills. The most effective means of acquiring these skills was to see 
the gear in action and participate in the fishing process. The Board organised a number of visits 
overseas to familiarise UK fishermen with alternative fishing gears, such as the purse seine, pair-
trawl and mid-water trawl. The engagement of overseas fishermen to direct trials of new fishing 
technologies aboard vessels of the UK fleet gave fishermen the opportunity to learn new skills on 
familiar grounds. The need for re-skilling was underlined by a member of the North Scottish Light 
Trawl Fishermen's Association who, commenting upon the experience gained from such activities 
by fellow members, recognised that "we have a lot to learn; we have been learning a lot". (Anon. 
1966-67, Para 702, p. 155). 
While overseas fishermen contributed greatly to the technological advancement of the UK industry 
domestic fishermen generated their own innovation, a fact not lost on the Herring Industry Board. 
DEVELOPMENT THROUGH THE DEVELOPMENT OF INDUSTRY PROJECTS 
The Board's activities aimed to direct herring fishermen's innovative tendencies towards that 
technology which it regarded as best suited to the fishery, the overall intention being to disseminate 
opinion regarding the availability, cost and performance of the technology on offer. The participation 
of herring fishermen in Board trials and the open circulation of results were the principle mechanisms 
by which it hoped to achieve this objective. This, however, was not a one way dialogue and the 
Board was open to suggestions from the industry. 
Several types of activity undertaken by herring fishermen could have suggested areas for develop-
ment in collaboration with the Board. Fishermen commonly engaged in incremental adjustments to 
their vessels and gear with the intention of establishing a competitive advantage over their fishing 
rivals. Over time a continuing process of incremental innovation could lead to significant revisions 
of the vessel, gear or mode of operation, which could then be brought to the Board's attention for 
evaluation and development. The co-operation with a drifter owner in the early 1960s to develop a 
drift net hauler of hiS own deSign was the outcome of the owners own experiments in this field, with 
the owner seeking Board assistance to develop the device beyond the prototype stage. Fishermen 
also approached the Board to investigate particular needs or examine developments they themselves 
had come across from other sources, such as the request from a commercial operator to investigate 
the potential of lugger fishing in the mid-1950s. 
Industry projects were undertaken where viable, although Board activities were limited in this field. 
Not surprisingly most herring fishermen sought to retain any advantage they may have gained 
through their own initiative and, as intimated earlier, their principal contribution to developing the 
Board's thinking on technology and the fleet came through their contribution to Board projects. 
DEVELOPMENT THROUGH RECOURSE TO SPECIALIST EXPERTISE OUTSIDE FISHERIES 
INSTITUTIONS 
The construction of dual purpose vessels capable of fishing for herring or demersal species had 
been encouraged by the Board but were still not in general use by the early 1960s. Board attention 
was drawn to the increasing necessity for herring boats to supplement their earnings from fishing 
other species as concern over the sustainability of then current levels of fishing effort intensified. 
89 
Irish Fisheries Investigations Series B, No. 42 (1994) 
The main impediment to their adoption for many herring fishermen was the difference in crewing 
requirements between the two techniques; seining required two fewer crew members than the 
more labour intensive drifting but the occupational structure of herring fishing did not readily lend 
itself to flexible-crewing arrangements. (Crewing difficulties present in gear-switching between 
drifting and seining arose because crew members often relative shareholders. Drift net fishing was 
usually organised on a relatively egalitarian 'team' basis, and continuity in crew composition 
contributed to the overall efficiency of the fishing operation.) Harmonising the crewing requirements 
of the two techniques would remove the major obstacles to gear switching. 
A firm of industrial consultants was engaged in 1961 to ascertain the most effective means of 
reducing the manpower requirements of drifting to those of seining. This was to be achieved via 
the mechanisation of the on board labour process following a detailed study. Subsequently three 
developments were outlined as especially worthy of development; a hydraulically driven net roller 
with powered hauling sheaves and mechanised net shaker and bush rope coiler. The successful 
development of these products would, it was foreseen, conclude in sufficient ergonomic savings to 
allow for the reduction of the drift net crew. These findings were readily accepted by the Board 
which understood that, at that particular time, the fleet was not ready to adopt new fishing techniques 
and therefore gains in productivity would have to be achieved within the drift net regime. 
From the early to mid 1960s the consultants recommendations formed a research agenda which the 
Board actively pursued. Considerable effort was expended upon developing and testing devices 
that would achieve labour savings in drift net fishing, which extended to developing nets and 
rigging suitable for use with the new devices. The Board's efforts were superseded mid-decade by 
developments in pelagic trawling and purse seining, both of which offered higher catch rates and 
reduced crewing requirements. The mechanisation the drift net labour process was discontinued 
but similar development work continued for the ring net fleet. 
CONCLUSION 
The principle of direct government intervention in the UK marine fishing industry dates from the 
early 1930s, with the creation of the Herring Industry Board indicating the future direction of 
government intervention. The degree of government intervention increased steadily after the war; 
by the early 1960s it was held that the industry was incapable of surviving without assistance (Anon. 
1960). It was under these protective conditions thatthe rapid technological advance olthe UK fishing 
industry took place, there being an active will to seethe diffusion of best practice fishing technologies. 
The development and evaluation of new fishing technologies formed a central part of the Board's 
overall strategy to modernise the herring fishery from the earliest times. This represented a clear 
change of direction in U.K. government attitudes towards the development of marine fishing, which 
had previously expressed the view that the size and technical composition of fishing capacity should 
be determined by market forces. This perspective was abandoned following the recommendations 
of the Elliott Committee that provision be made for undertaking research. That research could 
contribute to increasing the productivity of fishing vessels was reiterated by the Report of the Fleck 
Committee, which acknowledged that "the Herring Industry Board meets with little criticism on this 
count" (Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Fishing Industry). 
During the period 1945-1960 the Board was primarily concerned with raising the operating efficiency 
olthe established methods of herring fishing, using drift and ring nets. This entailed finding superior 
equipment to that currently in use which could be bolted on to current practice. Such activities could 
be undertaken by trial and error at sea to ascertain whether Product A (for example, synthetic fibre 
nets), were superior/inferior to product B (cotton nets). Such trials required little more than the 
provision of a boat and the equipment in question and, consequently, we find that the majority of 
the Board's research activities during the period consisted of trials using either their own boat or 
those of contracted fishermen while co-operating with manufacturers to ensure access to the latest 
developments. 
The Board held that the herring market of the early 1960s was able to absorb a greater quantity of 
fish than was forthcoming from the domestic fleet. Two factors appear to have persuaded the Board 
that this problem necessitated a technological solution. The Board was influenced by the historical 
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precedent of the 1930s, which illustrated the problems that could arise for the fleet if the market 
contracted. While a larger fleet would produce the desired increase in catching capacity, it may also 
be vulnerable to a downturn in the market. Secondly, while considering its response to this situation 
the Board was aware of the large landings then being made by European fishermen using new 
fishing techniques on grounds also fished by UK fishermen. This demonstrated to the Board that a 
technological solution to the problem of undersupply was possible if they followed the European 
example. The Board had experimented using new fishing gears from the beginning of its research 
activities, but upon the basis of trial and error rather than the systemic investigation necessary for 
a radical departure from common practice. 
The manner in which such research was undertaken was primarily dictated by the operational 
resources available to the Board for such purposes. Unlike the White Fish Authority, the Board had 
insufficient funds to operate its own research department and, consequently, was forced to seeks 
collaborative mechanisms by which it could sponsor development activities. This favoured research 
projects orientated towards the evaluation of technological developments from other sources and 
their modification for herring fishing under the conditions faced in UK waters. 
Throughout its attempts to promote the diffusion of new technology amongst the UK fleet the Board 
pursued the goals of raising awareness of innovations among fishermen and removing obstacles to 
their successful adoption. The practice of undertaking research activities at sea alongside the 
commercial fleet had the effect of inducing a demonstration effect (That such 'demonstration effects' 
are present in marine fishing is clear. While the competitive pressures of fishing under open access 
necessitates the adoption of new technology, the diffusion of new technologies is an imitative 
process). As a result, the effectiveness of new technologies under operational conditions could be 
seen by fishermen, thus raising the legitimacy of the Board's subsequent recommendations. 
The research activities olthe Board represented part of an overall strategy to promote the productivity 
and efficiency of the herring fleet. In addition to providing leadership the Board also gave direct 
financial support for investment in new boats and gear. The increasing sophistication of fishing 
technology necessitated ever higher levels of investment and it is probable that the pace of 
advancement would not have been so rapid in the absence of grant and loan assistance from the 
Board. 
One rationale for delegating research in the catching sector to a public authority is that they are not 
subject to the same financial constraints that inhibit individual fishermen from innovating freely. 
Somewhat ironically, the Board found itself increasingly constrained from the mid 1960s by a 
reduced income from the levy charged to herring fishermen and from a shift in governmental 
attitudes, signified by the Fleck Committee report, that favoured self sufficiency as a goal for the 
fishing industry. From the early 1960s it began to formalise aspects of its research activities as 
illustrated through its growing relationship with the White Fish Authority and its use of outside 
expertise. 
An examination of the Board's research activities from the early 1960s indicate that its contribution 
to the technological advance in the industry was diminishing. By the mid 1960s it had become 
appare~t that the Board:s influence over technological choice was slight, as demonstrated by the 
rapid diffUSion of pelagiC trawl and purse seine fishing techniques. While the Board's continued 
existence from this point may have been necessitated by a number of related factors, principally 
related to marketing, its role of as innovator had been superseded by an industry that had become 
self-sufficient in this capacity. 
Given the past history of the industry is not unnatural that the Board remained preoccupied by fleet 
modernisation and technological advance. However, the Board was unable to adapt its objectives 
once the industry was ready to assume this role. With hindsight, it is possible to argue that the Board 
should have directed its energies towards the management of the fishery and the establishment of 
an effective agenda for conservation. Notably, while the Board variously advocated a number of 
management and conservatory positions it continued to patronise the familiar, but increasingly 
obsolete, stance on technological progress. 
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Overall, the Board can be credited with some success in promoting a more rapid pace of technical 
innovation amongst U.K. herring fishermen. While the Board was not responsible for the develop-
ment of the new pelagic trawl and purse seine techniques or for their adoption by UK fishermen, it 
is probable that without the Board identifying and overcoming early technical problems the transition 
would have been less smooth. This policy, however, was not without its critics from within the 
industry some fishermen expressing the opinion that the new fishing techniques promoted by the 
Board were destructive of the natural resource. The Board itself held reservations about the possible 
results of new fishing methods upon the resource base (Whitmarsh, Reid, Gulvin and Dunn "Natural 
Resource Exploitation and the role of New Technology: The UK Herring Industry, 1960-1980"), but 
continued its promotion of technological change as necessary for the long term improvement in the 
industry's fortunes up until the closure of the fishery. 
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ABSTRACT 
An optimising model is developed to determine the sequence of total allowable catches of western 
mackerel which would result in the maximum present value ofthe stream of annual rents. It is found 
that the optimal steady state fishing mortality would be one half to one third of recent levels. For 
the base formulation of the model the optimal plan calls for periodic fishing, with a moratorium on 
fishing for the first two years, and for a very substantial catch in the third year. The sensitivity of 
pulse fishing as an optimal strategy is tested with respect to number of solution iterations, asym-
metric charges for increasing fleet capacity, quadratic adjustment costs, harvesting stock effects, 
the rate of discount, and the price elasticity of demand for mackerel. 
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INTRODUCTION 
A system of setting total allowable catches (TACs) for a wide range of fish stocks for Member States 
of the European Community (EC) was institutionalised in 1983 under the Common Fisheries Policy 
(CFP). Judging from the TACs set since then, it is clear that they would have to be set much lower 
to allow a substantial future flow of economic rents from most European fisheries. Many stocks are 
under pressure, or overexploited. Some have been so heavily exploited in the past that for a time 
harvesting has had virtually to cease. Such has been the case with North Sea herring, is currently 
the case with North Sea mackerel, and may in future be the case with western mackerel. 
It is of concern that nowhere in the system of determining TACs, from the International Council for 
the Exploration of the Sea (ICES) working groups to the EC Fisheries Commission, via the Advisory 
Committee for Fisheries Management and the Scientific and Technical Committee for Fisheries, 
does there appear to be any attempt to estimate the economic surpluses which could be derived 
from alternative settings of TACs through time. Although efficiency considerations must be weighed 
against equity considerations, some estimates of potential surpluses are essential. Gulland (1987) 
argues that in order to improve the efficiency of management of North Sea fisheries the long-run 
strategic benefits and beneficiaries of TAC settings must be identified, with a shift in emphasis away 
from short-run tactical considerations in setting TACs. 
At present the advice on TACs to the EC Fisheries Commission is based on a range of biological 
criteria. Laevastu and Favorite (1988, p.193) state: "The setting of TAC has, in most cases, the 
objective of protecting the reproduction capacity of stocks so that these will not fall below levels 
where recruitment might be severely limited by an inadequate size of spawning stocks". A much 
more fruitful approach would be for the Fisheries Commission to arrange for biologists and 
economists to combine their expertise and produce estimates of economic surpluses for alternative 
TAC regimes. Otherwise the suspicion must exist that TACs are set little lower than open access 
catches, implying a very high weighting on short-term employment in the industry. 
Whilst there are good public choice reasons for the lack of progress in implementing more econ-
omically efficient TACs, another reason may be that the optimal harvest profiles for multicohort 
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fisheries tend to be highly irregular, particularly for the initial years. This phenomenon is referred 
to as periodic fishing, or pulse fishing in the extreme case where zero fishing continually alternates 
with high levels of fishing. It has been noted and rationalised by Hannesson (19751. Clark (1976) and 
Horwood and Whittle (1986). It is associated with imperfectly selective harvesting technologies, 
under which juvenile fish are caught indiscriminately with adult fish even although the adult fish 
contribute most to rents. Hannesson (1975) found that in simulations for North Atlantic cod, present 
values obtained for fishing mortality held constant over time were not far below the maximum 
present value from pulse fishing. 
The aim of this paper is to describe a dynamic optimisation procedure for a multi cohort fishery 
problem, which can also provide as a by-product relatively smooth harvesting profiles with modest 
reductions in net present value from the optimal value. As well, alternative fisheries problems are 
formulated which take account of some of the costs associated with year to year changes in harvests. 
The western mackerel fishery is taken as an example application. 
THE MODEL 
The model is used to find the annual sequence of rates of fishing mortality across all years which 
results in the maximum present value of annual social rents, given initial stock numbers in each 
cohort. Equations for the annual catch and updating of stock in each cohort taking account of 
recruitment and natural and fishing mortality are based on the Beverton and Holt (1957) model. 
There are n age classes. The stock numbers in the i-th cohort in year t are denoted x;.,. Using u; to 
denote the proportion of stock in the i-th age class which is sexually mature, and w'i the average 
weight of fish in the i-th cohort at spawning time, the spawning stock biomass is: 
n 
Bt ==' L Ujw?Xj,t 
i=1 
Recruitment is given by the Beverton and Holt (1957) stock-recruitment equation: 
X'.H' =yB,/(1 +B,/8) 
or is set as a constant: 
XU+l = x, 
(1 ) 
(2a) 
(2b) 
Instantaneous rates of fishing and natural mortality are assumed to hold constant throughout the 
year. The stock updating equations are: 
Xi+l,t+1 = Xi,! exp{-qJt - m) (i=1, ... ,n-2) (3) 
(4) 
where f" the control variable, is the instantaneous rate of fishing mortality, q; is the proportion of 
fishing mortality effective on fish in the i-th age class (selectivity) and m is the instantaneous rate of 
natural mortality. As shown in (4), provision is made for fish surviving beyond age n. They are 
treated as having the same average weight of aged-n fish. 
Using matrix notation the stock dynamics can be summarised as: 
Xt+l = £1+1 + D,x, (5) 
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where X, is the (nx1) vector of stock numbers at the start of year t, :;,+, is a (nx1) null vector except 
for Xu+' (from equation 2) in the first element. Elements of the (nxn) matrix D, are zero except for: 
d;.;.u = exp(-q;f, - m) (i=2, ... ,n) (6) 
(7) 
Thus non-zero elements of D, are a function of f" and non-zero elements of 1>,+, are a function of .2\,. 
In subsequent analysis of optimality conditions it is necessary to refer to the (nxn) matrix 0)(,+,/0.2\,. 
This is written: 
G, + D, (recruitment function 2a) (8) 
0)(,.<,/1\.2\, = D, (constant recruitment 2b) 
where Gt is a (nxn) null matrix except for: 
g",., = u;wly/(1+B.lel' (i=1, ... ,n) (9) 
The social net return in year t is the social value of the harvest h" measured by willingness to pay, 
less the cost of effort in obtaining the harvest. Willingness to pay is given by the area under the 
demand-for-fish schedule, which for a linear demand schedule is: 
WTP{h,j =ah,+bhU2 (10) 
where a and b are the parameters of the inverse demand schedule. 
If the simple Schaefer (1957) harvesting function applies, the instantaneous harvest of i-th age class 
is: 
(11 ) 
where e is instantaneous fishing effort and '\l is a constant termed the catchability coefficient. The 
instantaneous rate of fishing mortality for the i-th age class is: 
hJx; = f; = '\le (12) 
Allowing for fixed selectivity in harvesting from age classes: 
(13) 
where f is potential instantaneous fishing mortality for all age categories. It follows that if effort is 
maintained at constant level throughout year t at e" the potential instantaneous fishing mortality 
also remains constant at f, = '\le,. Moreover, if total harvesting cost is proportional to e" it is also 
proportional to f" and can therefore be written as c,f, where c, is the cost per unit of potential fishing 
mortality. 
The harvest from the i-th age class over year t is obtained by integrating all instantaneous harvests 
over the year, and equals: 
h;., = wjx,,(1 - exp(-q;f, - m))q;f,/(q;f, + m) (14) 
where Wi is the average catch weight of fish in the i-th cohort. Equation (14) is an approximation to 
the extent that Wi depends on past and current rates of fishing mortality. 
Total harvest for the year is: 
n 
h, = L hi,! 
i=1 
(15) 
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The net social return in year t is thus: 
y{x"f,} =ah,+ bh1/2-c,f, (16) 
where X, denotes the stock vector. 
As there is no obvious terminal date for the cessation of fishing the planning period is treated as 
endless. It seems reasonable to suppose the stock dynamics equations remain the same across all 
years. Demand and harvesting functions are more likely to change over the planning period, but 
they are also assumed to remain the same for lack of other information. These assumptions make 
the problem stationary, which means that an optimal policy relating f, to X, for year t is also optimal 
for any other year. The problem considered here is how to set f" f" ... so as to maximise the present 
value of social net returns, and is stated as: 
00 
maximise L(1 +r)1-1y{~"f,} 
t=1 
with respect to f" f" ... 
subject to f, ;0, 0 
2S:1 given 
(all t) 
and x,+, = ~,+, + DUI, (alit) 
where r is the annual rate of discount. This is a discrete-time optimal control problem. 
THE SOLUTION PROCEDURE 
(17) 
Optimising methods which have been used to solve discrete-time multicohort fishery problems 
include non-linear programming (e.g., Horwood, 1987), mixed integer programming (e.g., Glen, 
1990) and dynamic programming (e.g., Kennedy and Watkins, 1986). Other methods have been 
based on approximations to the optimality conditions of dynamic programming. For example, 
Horwood and Whittle (1986a and b) show how a linear control rule can be determined for multicohort 
fishery problems which is locally optimal around the optimal steady-state stocks for each cohort 
and the optimal steady-state fishing mortality. Kennedy (1989a) allows for the shadow prices of 
stocks in each cohort to change across years, but solves for the near-optimal fishing mortality in 
each year with the approximating constraint that there is no change in the shadow prices from the 
beginning to the end of that year. 
The solution approach of Kennedy (1989a) is extended in two ways. Allowance is made for the price 
of fish to be a linear function of catch, and for a Beverton and Holt recruitment function. Secondly, 
an iterative procedure is used to successively improve on harvesting profiles until the optimality 
conditions hold to some required degree of accuracy. An important result from the western mackerel 
application is that the potential increase in net present value from the iteration procedure is marginal, 
and comes at the expense of a change from a smooth harvesting profile to highly irregular profiles. 
The optimality conditions for the solution to (17) can be derived from first principles very directly 
using the recursive functional equation of dynamic programming (see Kennedy 1986, Ch.1). Let V {x.J 
denote the present value of social net returns from setting f" f,+" ... optimally each year for evermore. 
Note that because of discounting V{2<,} is finite, and that because the problem is stationary and the 
planning period boundless, the value of the same stock vector ~, in any other year would also be 
the same. Thus it should be the case that: 
V {x,} = max[ y{x"f,} + aV {x .. ,}] 
f, 
(t-1,2, ... ) (18) 
where a = (1+r)-' and x .. , is related t~, and f, by the stock dynamics equation (5). The equation 
splits the value of the stock between the current net return from deciding on f, and the discounted 
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value of the stock remaining for the start of year 1+1, provided f .. " f .. " ... are set optimally. 
Assuming that the expression In square brackets is a concave function of f" the complementary 
slackness conditions for the optimal setting of f, in (18) are: 
= 0 for f; > 0 
(19) 
<Oforf;=O 
where ),<1+, is the (nx1) vector OV /~,+, evaluated at~ .. ,. 
The meaning of oV/ox,.,+, = A,.,+, is immediate. It is the present value of an additional unit of stock 
In the I-th age class, given the stock level is X' ... 1o and is the Lagrange multiplier or costate variable 
of t~er methods. If the .vector &,+' were known for alit, it would be possible to solve (19) for optimal 
f, = f, for alit. By rewriting (18) as: 
V{x,}=y{x,,f;}+aV{x,,,} (t=1,2, ... ) (20) 
differentiating with respect to l!" and using (8), the relationship between &, and & .. , can be written: 
(t=1,2, ... ) (21 ) 
By the envelope theorem, because (19) holds, terms for change in t; do not appear in (21). 
However (19) is not of immediate help unless ),'+' is known. The method adopted for finding a 
solution IS to first find a f, path and corresponding x, path (t=1,2, ... ) for which (19) and (21) hold 
approximately, and then to Improve on the paths by an iterative process until (19) and (21) hold to 
some reqUired degree of accuracy. 
Th~ initial trial path is obtained by first supposing than, is not too much different from1,. Setting 
&, - &, In (21). and given the initial stock vector l!" an estimate of optimal)', is: 
~, = [I - a(G, + D,)]-' 0Y/Ol!, (22) 
)Nhere I is an (nxn) ident~ty matrix. Substituting~, for optimal)', in (19) for t=1 and solving for f, = 
f,. gives an estlmat.e of f,. The stock updating equation (5) enables~, to be found for ~, and f,. By 
~Imllar argument, A3 may be found, and hence the entire trial decision path ~" and associated x and 
&, paths. -, 
If there is some t = T for which fT.= fT+, = ... andih =.2<T+' ... then},T =},T+' = .... In other words at 
time T a steady state is attained h = r, l!T ==l!' and},T ==1'. The path frm~' onwards is opti';'al 
because (19) and (21) are satisfied. 
~ iterative procedure starts to improve on the f and~ paths. A backward sweep is conducted from 
t-T ~ t=1, In which (21) IS used to find iteration-1 estimates.}.t, ... J,l of ),;, ... ,&; for points on the f 
:,nd l! pa,ths. A forward sweep IS conducted from t=1 onwards, in which (19) and (5) are used to find 
~ and. l!,. Successl~e Iterations of backward and forward sweeps are conducted until there is no 
significant change In paths between iterations, and (19) and (21) hold to the required degree of 
accuracy. 
Model Data for Western Mackerel' 
Background 
Th h' b' ( e Istory, lology, technology and management olthe mackerel fishery are described by Lockwood 
i988). The management of ':lackerelto 1984 has been reviewed by Whitmarsh and Young (1985). 
he Sea Fish Industry AuthOrity (1989) analyses the marketing prospects for mackerel. The western 
~ackerel stock IS regarded as distinct from the North Sea mackerel stock, with a spawning ground 
J outh-west of Englan? and the Irish Republic. Adults follow an annual migration path starting in 
une from the spawning ground north around the coast of Britain to the feeding grounds off the 
D 97 
Irish Fisheries Investigations Series B, No. 42 (1994) 
coast of Norway where they winter. They make their return to the spawning ground in January and 
February. 
The stock continues to be regarded as overexploited. Lockwood and Shepherd (1984, p.179) warned 
that the western mackerel stock was declining rapidly due to catches exceeding the TAG. The 
spawning stock biomass has declined recently from a 1983-85 average of 2,231 kilotonnes to a 1986-
88 average of 1,768 kilotonnes (International Council for the Exploration of the Sea (ICES), 1989, 
p.46). The 1986-89 average estimated fishing mortality was 0.26, compared to an estimated sus-
tainable value of 0.15 (ICES, 1990, p.21). It is of interest to investigate how these compare with 
economically efficient values of fishing mortality through time. 
Biological Data 
Most of the biological data required for the stock dynamics equation (5) and the instantaneous 
harvest equation (11) are obtained from the 1988 report prepared by the Mackerel Working Group 
of ICES (1988, Table 5.4). Age-specific parameters are shown in Table 1. Natural mortality is set at 
0.15 for all age classes. The Mackerel Working Group does not provide a recruitment function. One 
function used was the Beverton and Holt equation (2a) employed by Horwood (1987) and Horwood 
and Whittle (1986b): 
XU+1 = 2.02B,/(1 + B,12160) million 
where B, is spawning stock biomass in kilotonnes. The function was based on data available to the 
end of 1982, but a plot superimposed on a scatter diagram presented by the ICES Mackerel Working 
Group showing recruitment at age 0 against spawning stock biomass for the years 1972 to 1985 
(ICES, 1988, Figure 5.1) suggested a reasonable fit. Alternatively, given random environmental 
factors may be more important in determining recruitment than spawning stock biomass, the 
following setting (2b) is also used as an alternative: 
XU+1 = 3,030 million (Ii t) 
based on year 0 numbers (ICES, 1988). 
TABLE 1 
Age-specific Biological Parameters' 
Age Stock numbers Weight in Weight at Proportion Fishing 
(years) at 1.1.88 catch spawning mature mortality 
(millions) (kg) (kg) patternb 
n, Wi Wi u, q, 
0 3,030 0.049 0.000 0.00 0.00 
1 2,630 0.176 0.070 0.08 0.04 
2 2,250 0.222 0.139 0.60 0.52 
3 807 0.318 0.233 0.90 0.74 
4 2,630 0.399 0.268 0.97 1.00 
5 154 0.478 0.363 0.97 1.00 
6 232 0.513 0.371 0.99 1.00 
7 701 0.492 0.392 1.00 1.00 
8 439 0.496 0.402 1.00 1.00 
9 246 0.577 0.459 1.00 1.00 
10 84 0.635 0.483 1.00 1.00 
11 + 303 0.696 0.507 1.00 1.00 
'Source: ICES (1988, Table 5.4). 
b Normalised so that 1.00 corresponds to fishing mortality f = 0.27. 
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Economic Data 
The countries reporting the three highest catches of mackerel in 1987 from both western and North 
Sea stocks are (in kilotonnes): Scotland (200), Norway (130) and Ireland (96) (ICES, 1988, and 
Department of Agriculture and Fisheries for Scotland, 1988a). Whilst the total of reported catches 
from both stocks is 581 kilotonnes, the estimate of the total actual catch is 628 kilotonnes, split 615 
and 13 kilotonnes between western and North Sea stocks respectively (ICES, 1988). Most of the 
mackerel catch is exported to Eastern Europe in a trans-shipment process known as klondyking 
(Wood, Roberts and Oxley, 1986). 
Because the Scottish fleet catches the largest component of the mackerel harvest, price and cost 
data for Scottish landings are taken to apply to the total catch. A more disaggregated model might 
be desirable, but this would require more data and a mOre complex model. There are no published 
cost and earnings data for Irish vessels catching mackerel, which are mainly mid-water trawlers. 
The Scottish catch is taken primarily by Scottish purse seiners for which cost and earnings data are 
available. Purse seiners are also used for the Norwegian catch. 
The average price of mackerel obtained by the Scottish fleet in any year is taken to be the reported 
value of the Scottish catch in that year divided by the reported tonnage. On this basis the average 
price for 1987 was £113 per tonne for a total catch estimated by ICES of 615 kilotonnes. For the years 
1983-1987 the real price of mackerel remained relatively constant, as did total estimated catch. Catch 
showed little trend over the same years, with a mean of 614 kilotonnes and coefficient of variation 
of 5 per cent. This historical record is not very helpful for estimating the price elasticity of demand 
for mackerel, though some estimate is important for use in an optimising model in which catches 
quite different from those historically observed may be considered. The elasticity appears to be 
high. The Marine Resources Assessment Group (1986) estimated price functions for mackerel using 
monthly Scottish data. Kennedy (1989b) used these functions to estimate a short-run elasticity for 
total estimated catch per month of about -10, allowing for the fact that Scottish landings are about 
one third of total landings. The demand for total estimated catch per year would likely be mOre 
elastic. In the model linear demand schedules are used which pass through the average 1987 price 
of £113 per tonne and the 1987 total estimated catch of 615 kilotonnes, with an elasticity of demand 
of minus infinity for the base run, and -5 for sensitivity analysis. 
The coefficient for harvesting cost per unit of fishing mortality was estimated as follows. The Scottish 
purse seiners caught mackerel and herring in the ratio of about 2 to 1 by weight in 1987. Cost and 
earnings information collected for a sample of the purse seiners by the Sea Fish Industry Authority 
in 1987 was used to estimate the average cost of catching a tonne of mackerel or herring. It was 
assumed that the costs of catching a tonne of each fish were equal. The average cost per tonne was 
multiplied by the estimated total tonnage of mackerel caught in 1987, and divided by the ICES 
estimate of fishing mortality for 1987 (0.27) to give a rough estimate of cost per unit of fishing 
mortality of £211 million. 
MODEL RESULTS 
Base Parameter Settings 
The optimal catch and spawning stock biomass sequence over 20 years for the base parameter 
settings and recruitment equation (2a) are shown in Figure 1. It was obtained after 40 iterations of 
the solution algorithm. For the first ten years periodic fishing is practised. Harvesting is suspended 
for the first two years, allowing stocks to increase. Heavy harvesting is pursued in year 3, catching 
about 645 kilotonnes, compared with an estimated 1987 catch of 615 kilotonnes. Catch falls to zero 
in year 6. After year 9, harvests are more stable, never exceeding 300 kilotonnes, and reaching a 
steady-state harvest of 269 kilotonnes by year 33. Though the spawning stock biomass in year 20 is 
about the same as that in year 2, numbers of fish are more evenly spread across age classes. 
Fishing mortalities required for these harvests are shown by the dot-filled bars in Figure 4. Peak 
mortality is 0.19 in year 3, compared with an estimated 1987 level of 0.27. Steady-state fishing 
mortality is 0.087 by year 25. The present value of net returns across infinite years is £135m, the 
steady-state annual net return being £12m. This contrasts with a present value calculated to be 
£46m if fishing mortality were to continue each year at 0.27, until the annual surplus is driven 
negative in year 5. 
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Figure 3 
Optimal catch and stock for first iteration 
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The harvesting profile obtained for recruitment fixed at 3,030 million per year shows higher harvests 
on average (Figure 21. but still considerable year-to-year variation in harvest over the first ten years. 
The steady-state fishing mortality is 0.129, which is reached at year 20. The present value of net 
returns is £195 million. 
The general conclusion from these runs is that the efficient long-run fishing effort is less than one 
half of the 1987 level, and the efficient long-run catch is less than two thirds of the 1987 level. 
However, catch levels would be quite irregular over the first ten years, prompting two questions. 
One is whether it is possible to find very nearly the same present values with a more regular harvest 
profile over the first ten years. With the solution procedure employed, the first-iteration solution 
always shows a relatively smooth harvest profile. This is because the harvest for each year is 
determined using the approximating constraint that the optimal marginal value of the fish stocks in 
each cohort is the same in the following year as in the current year. The first-iteration harvest profile 
is shown in Figure 3 for the Beverton-Holt recruitment function. The long-run steady-state harvests 
and stocks are the same, but fishing is not periodic. The reduction in present value is only 1.3 per 
cent. 
The second question which arises is whether there are any costs associated with year-to-year 
variation in catch levels which are being ignored. Some of these costs and the sensitivity of the 
stability of the catch profile to particular parameters are considered in the following sections. The 
solutions presented are those obtained after 40 iterations. 
Capacity and direct harvesting costs 
The treatment of costs in the base run is appropriate if all costs are directly related to fishing effort 
and hence fishing mortality. However, in practice the harvesting capacity of the fleet targeting 
western mackerel may be subject to the problem of asset fixity. Net returns associated with changes 
in fleet capacity may be asymmetric. There will be investment costs in adding to capacity, but if 
harvesting is below capacity it may not be possible to obtain a corresponding return from the excess 
capacity. For example, it would not be possible to redeploy vessels and gear in harvesting herring 
if TACs for herring were sufficiently stringent. The opportunity cost of excess vessel capacity is then 
zero, and the relevant costs of harvesting for decision-making consist of direct or variable costs 
only. In such cases the investment decision is referred to as irreversible, and the capital installed as 
non-malleable, bacause there are no exit opportunities for capital. The problem of optimal irre-
versible investment in fleet capacity has been dealt with analytically by Clark et al. (1979) for 
common-pool fisheries models. 
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Figure 4 
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Irreversible investment in fleet capacity is allowed for in the model by charging for any additional 
capacity rented in at the beginning of each year, and checking that in the solution capacity rented in 
is non-decreasing from year to year. Non-decreasing renting in of capacity indicates that reversal of 
prior investment would not be socially profitable. It is likely to be optimal for stocks which are 
initially overexploited. The same approach was followed by Kennedy (1989a) in an application to 
the southern bluefin tuna fishery. 
Although the investment decision is irreversible, fleet capacity decreases through time in the absence 
of investment through physical depreciation at the rate 1\. Thus if fleet capacity measured in terms 
of potential for fishing mortality at the beginning of the year before year 1 of the plan is denoted by 
f8, fleet capacity at the beginning of year t of the plan is: 
11 = 18 (1-1\)' (23) 
Any capacity rented-in to cover a requirement above fl is charged for at a rate of c, per unit of fishing 
mortality. The recursive DP functional equation becomes: 
V{x,} = max[ y{x"f,} -c,k,+uV {x,+,} I 
f, 
where k, { 
= f t - H if ft > H 
Writing 
z,=by//lf, + u(I\l.+"/lf,)~, 
conditions for optimal f, = f; are: 
o < Zt < C2 if t; = fi 
(24) 
(25) 
These conditions are used in the model to find f;. The rate of physical depreciation was set at 5 per 
cent per annum, a rough estimate based on the finding from Scottish fishing fleet data (Department 
of Agriculture and Fisheries for Scotland 1988b) that the weighted mean age of Scottish purse 
seiners is 12 years. The per unit cost of fishing mortality of [211 m was split between [131 m for 
running and labour costs (c,) and [80m for vessel and depreciation costs at 5 per cent per annum 
(c,), based on SFIA 1987 cost and earnings sample data. 
Optimal fishing mortalities over 20 years for direct cost coefficient c, = [131 m and capacity expansion 
cost coefficient c, = [80m are shown in Figure 4. They are compared with optimal fishing mortalities 
for the base run with c, = [211 m and c, = [0. Corresponding optimal catches are shown in Figure 
5. With allowance for zero opportunity cost of excess vessel capacity but positive capacity expansion 
costs, there is minimal harvesting in year 1 but substantial harvesting in year 2. Over the first 20 
years investment in new vessel capacity is not socially profitable. Fishing mortality exceeds that in 
the base run for the first 20 years. Fishing mortality continues to follow depreciated fishing mortality 
capacity to a low of 0.058 in year 30. In all subsequent years additional capacity is rented in, and by 
year 50 stocks and fishing mortality are the same as for the standard run. 
ADJUSTMENT COSTS 
There may be reasons to constrain or penalise year-to-year changes in fishing effort or fishing 
mortality. Examples of adjustment costs which may be incurred with periodic fishing include loss 
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of current returns from labour and boats if they are idle because there are no alternative employment 
opportunities, and reduced future returns when fishing recovers if markets and processing capacity 
have been lost. Another important cost is that of ensuring the planned effort reduction is actually 
carried out. As has been pointed out by Anderson (1987) and Sutinen and Andersen (1985), fisheries 
management should take account of not only the economic surplus generated by a management 
regime, but also the costs of monitoring and enforcement under the regime. The costs of monitoring 
and enforcement are likely to increase more than proportionately to a required reduction in fishing 
effort. 
Whilst it is unlikely that adjustment costs are symmetric for positive and negative changes in fishing 
effort, there are costs associated with increasing fishing effort, such as high short-run marginal costs 
of increasing fishing capacity. 
To allow for adjustment costs a quadratic term was included in the annual net return function. The 
recursive DP functional equation becomes: 
V{x"f,.,) = maxI y{x,.f,) -c3(f,-ft-1)'+uV{xt+"f,) 1 
f, 
(26) 
where C3 is the adjustment cost coefficient. Shepherd (1980) advocated a quadratic adjustment cost 
as part of "cautious optimisation", in an attempt to reflect more realistically the aim of policy. 
Horwood (1987) constrains year-to-year changes in mortality and Horwood (1989) introduces a 
quadratic adjustment cost in optimising models for North Sea herring. 
The value of the C3 adjustment coefficient is difficult to estimate empirically, and no attempt was 
made to do so in this application. By way of illustration, Figure 6 shows the results obtained for C3 
= £500m per unit change in fishing mortality squared. Compared to the pulse fishing strategy for 
the base run the catch profile is smooth. The greatest between-year change in fishing mortality is 
from 0.27 in year 0 to 0.17 in year 1. The adjustment cost for year 1 is thus £50m, which compares 
with net return for year 1 before charging adjustment costs of £60m. However, by year 2 the 
adjustment cost is less than 10 per cent of net return. 
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Stock coefficient in the harvesting function 
Cooke and Beddington (1984) present various reasons why the relationship between expected catch 
per unit effort and stock abundance may be concave rather than linear. This follows if, for example, 
total effort is the sum of search and catch effort, or the catchability coefficient is variable. 
Clark (1985) has pointed out that whilst the Schaefer harvesting function (11) is plausible for a fish 
stock uniformly distributed in the sea, it is not so plausible for pelagic stock which shoal. For a 
pelagic stock such as mackerel a more appropriate function is: 
(0<~>1) (27) 
Bjorndal (1987) finds ~<1 for production functions estimated for North Sea herring. Compared to 
the case for ~=1, the incentive to pulse fish is reduced because the reduction in future effort cost 
resulting from lower future stocks is more limited. 
From (27) required fishing effort is: 
(28) 
which breaks the simple proportionality between effort and fishing mortality across all age classes 
in the standard model. Equation (28) cannot be easily accommodated in the model, but as an 
approximation the following equation relating effort to total biomass is used: 
[ 
n ]'-B 
e, = (f,hiJ) . ~ x;., 
1=1 
(29) 
Continuing to assume that cost of effort is directly proportional to effort, the net social return 
equation becomes: 
Y{X"f,) =ah,+ bh1l2-c,(f,/tjJ)(x,l)H (30) 
where 1 is a column vector of ones. 
Results are shown in Figure 7 for a trial value of ~ = 0.6. Compared to the harvesting policy in the 
base run for which ~ = 1.0, the degree of periodic fishing is reduced. Though there is still no 
harvesting in year 1, there is significant harvesting in year 2. 
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Figure 8 
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The rate of discount 
The incentive to pulse fish is greater the lower the rate at which annual social net returns are 
discounted. The planner is more willing to forego harvests in the early years so as to benefit frnm 
the lower harvesting costs associated with higher stocks in later years. Figure 8 shows the effect of 
increasing the rate of discount from 10 per cent for the base run to 20 per cent. Again the degree of 
periodic fishing is reduced, with substantial harvesting in year 2. 
The price elasticity of demand 
A reduction in the elasticity of demand for mackerel makes periodic fishing less attractive. A strategy 
of exchanging lower harvests in early years for higher harvests in later years is more costly because 
the marginal cost of a foregone sale when harvest is low is greater than the marginal return from 
an additional sale when harvest is high. In the base run of the model demand is infinitely elastic, 
with p = £113/tonne. Figure 9 shows results for a linear demand schedule with price elasticity of 
demand -5 for p = £113/tonne and h = 615 kilotonnes. Optimal catches are smoothed across the 
years, with some harvesting in year 1. 
CONCLUSION 
Model results suggest that the optimal long-run level of fishing effort directed at western mackerel 
would be one half to one third of current effort. An important contribution which this type of model 
has to offer is the estimation of the value of social returns from alternative fishing policies. This 
information appears to be entirely absent from the current process of determining the total allowable 
catch. Although reference is made to biological criteria, in the final analysis the main crit~ria appear 
to be broadly economic and social but without quantification. 
However, in urging a present value criterion, there needs to be more work carried out on model 
formulation and data collection. Policies which recommend moratoria or drastic year-to-year chan-
ges in catch have to be treated with caution until a check is made for any costs or returns associated 
with changes in harvesting which may have been ignored. Checks should also be carried out to see 
if smoother harvesting profiles can be obtained with little sacrifice in present value. This can be 
done with the solution procedure described in this paper without additional computation. 
In the case of the western mackerel model, the extenl10 which periodic fishing as an optimal strategy 
becomes less pronounced is demonstrated for: asymmetric charges for changes in utilised fleet 
capacity; quadratic adjustment costs; a reduced stock effect on harvesting; an increase in the rate 
of discount; and a reduction in the absolute price elasticity of demand for mackerel. Tests for each 
of these modifications were conducted singly, but they would most likely be reinforcing if applied 
in combination. Obviously the need for these modifications is a matter for empirical investigation. 
They should not be built into a model just to avoid periodic-fishing prescriptions. 
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NOTES 
1. For more detail on the data used see the full report by Kennedy (1989b), which also contains a 
listing of the FORTRAN program for the solution procedure. 
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AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT POLICY 
Individual transferable quotas (ITQs) have so far been applied to only one major Australian fishery, 
the southern bluefin tuna (SBT) fishery. Most of this paper therefore deals with the SBT experience. 
However, it is Government policy to start introducing them more widely: 
The Government recognises that ITQs facilitate autonomous adjustment of fishing fleets and 
solve the problem of resource rent dissipation but also notes that there can be some problems 
with implementing them. The Government's position is that ITQs should be the preferred 
method for managing fisheries. Their practicality should be examined before other management 
controls are considered. (Commonwealth of Australia, 1989, p.24) 
Geen et al. (1990, p.26), after referring to the problems of over-capitalisation and over-exploitation 
in the multispecies south east trawl fishery, state: "The need for changes to the current management 
system became obvious and culminated in the recent announcement that a system of ITQs on all 
major species is to be introduced by 1992". Already a type of ITQ system has been applied to 
gemfish, part of the south east trawl fishery. In 1989 the total allowable catch (TAC) of 3 kt was 
allocated to qualified fishermen as individual quotas which could then be leased to other quota 
holders (Commonwealth of Australia, 1989, p.47). 
The appeal to government of ITQs lies in their promise of economic efficiency, recently stated to be 
a goal of fisheries management. The Government has recently laid down policy objectives which, 
compared to policy objectives of other administrativ.e authorities such as those of the European 
Community's Common Fisheries Policy, are remarkably succinct (Commonwealth of Australia, 1989, 
p.vii): 
(a) to ensure the conservation of fisheries resources and the environment which sustains those 
resources 
(b) to maximise economic efficiency in the exploitation of those resources 
(c) to collect an appropriate charge from individual fishermen exploiting a community resource 
for private gain. 
THE IMPACT OF QUOTAS ON THE SOUTHERN BLUEFIN TUNA FISHERY 
SBT is a long-lived species, which can survive to over 20 years of age. During their juvenile phase 
to the age of about 7 the fish are exploited by Australian vessels in the Australian Fishing Zone (AFZ) 
along the southern coasts of Australia. Japanese long liners harvest SBT in their adult phase on the 
high seas in the 'roaring forties' belt extending west from New Zealand to South Africa. 
From 1968-69 the Japanese annual harvest fell from a peak of 60 kt to 20 kt in 1982-83. Over the 
same period the Australian harvest rose from about 8 kt to 20 kt. By the early 1980s the relatively 
high levels of the Australian catches led biologists to warn that the fishery faced recruitment failure 
and stock collapse. The Australian Government introduced a TAC of 21 kt in the 1983-84 season. In 
1984 ITQs were introduced, which gave holders an entitlement to fish in perpetuity for a share of 
the TAC set by the Government at the beginning of each season. The Australian TAC is announced 
each year after tripartite negotiations between Australia, Japan and New Zealand which determine 
the global quota and country shares. Under ITQs the Australian TAC has steadily fallen, to just 5.3 
kt for 1990-91. Some of the adjustments which have occurred in the Australian fishery are listed 
below. As Geen and Nayar (1988) note, the extent to which these were caused by the introduction 
of ITQs has to be judged in the context of what would have been the alternative management regime 
in the absence of ITQs. 
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(i) Number and type of vessels 
The number of vessels has declined by about 80 per cent (Commonwealth of Australia, 1989, p.47). 
There has been a marked reduction in pole and line boats. Numbers of purse seiners remained at 6 
from 1984 to 1987, but only 4 were operating from 1988 to 1990. Before the introduction of ITQs 
only the Japanese used longliners. There is now some domestic longlining off the east coast of 
Tasmania. Three Australian owned longliners received catch for preparation for the Japanese 
sashimi market in the 1989-90 season. 
(ii) Shift of effort between locations 
A major concern before the introduction of quota controls was the high level of exploitation of 1 
and 2 year old fish off Western Australia. The number of very young fish caught off Western Australia 
has fallen to 3 per cent of the numbers caught in the early 80s. There has also been a collapse in 
SBT catch off New South Wales, as vessels diversified into other fisheries. Geen and Nayar (1988 
p.377) argue that this would have occurred to some extent anyway given the losses being made 
and the decline in fish abundance before ITQs were introduced. Quota was sold by holders in 
Western Australia and New South Wales to tuna vessel operators in South Australia. These operators 
had few options for diversification. 
(iii) Change in net returns for boats remaining 
Each vessel is now taking a larger catch, so other things equal the cost per tonne of catch is less. 
Older, higher-value fish are targeted for sale on the Japanese sashimi market resulting in higher 
revenue per tonne of catch, though this is to some extent offset by higher handling costs and the 
higher steaming costs of accessing deeper schools of fish further out to sea. Before the introduction 
of ITQs most of the Australian catch was sold to Australian canneries for a relatively low price. With 
ITQs, vessels pass over the opportunity to fish concentrations of young fish in favour of higher-
value fish. 
HOW SUCCESSFUL HAVE !TOS BEEN FOR THE SBT FISHERY? 
From the Government's point of view the ITQ system has worked quite successfully for the SBT 
fishery. Rents to the fishery have been calculated to be much higher than under alternative man-
agement regimes which have been proposed (Geen and Nayar, 1989). The catch of young fish has 
been reduced. The opportunity cost of catching young fish is very high because if they are left their 
rate of weight gain is relatively rapid and their price increases. Management costs are high for 
monitoring and enforcing the system, but in 1986-8744 per cent of the management costs were 
being recouped from operators, and a higher proportion (up to 90 per cent) is being sought. 
Key features of the SBT fishery which make ITQs an appropriate management system are: 
(i) Because the species is long-lived, the TAC setting each year is not so subject to changes in 
setting as a result of a change in one year's recruitment. 
Iii) The fish is not retailed fresh in Australia, reaching the consumer after processing either in 
Australian canneries or after preparation for sale on the Japanese sashimi market. This 
means that the number of outlets for the catch is relatively limited which facilitates checking 
of catch against quota entitlement. However, the increasing trans-shipment of Australian 
catch to Japanese carrier vessels increases monitoring costs. 
(iii) Excess fishing effort from Western Australia and New South Wales was able to diversify into 
other less regulated fisheries, but nevertheless probably reducing rents elsewhere. 
(iv) It is relatively easy to target SBT of a particular age category for catching, so the problems 
of highgrading (discarding low-value fish to avoid going over quota) and by-catches are not 
severe. 
THE DOWNSIDE 
From the industry's point of view there were some problems. No special adjustment assistance was 
provided for those exiting from the fishery. However, because quota entitlement was initially 
allocated on a formula basis rather than bid for, all operators gained a capitalised rent which was 
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realised by those leaving the fishery. The formula gave a weighting of 75 per cent to the best 
season's catch over the previous three seasons and 25 per cent to investment in boats and gear. 
Allocation was not without disputes. Bain (1985, p. 16) has stated: "It has been very difficult to 
allocate quotas in an equitable and acceptable manner and the Government is facing protracted and 
costly legal and political arguments on this issue." 
There is evidence that the industry was surprised by the successive reductions in the TAC over the 
years. Operators who had not expected TACs to fall severely subsequently found themselves 
overcapitalised. There will always be uncertainty over future TAC settings due to stochastic recruit-
ment, natural mortality and migration, and to the limited control over harvesting by overseas 
operators. However, the efficiency of the ITO system could be improved if the agency responsible 
for setting the TACs gave an indication of the range in which future TACs were likely to be set. This 
has been argued before by Kennedy 11986, p.4). Even with setting TACs on a biological criterion 
such as avoidance of recruitment failure, it was clear that the overfishing of juvenile stocks in the 
late 70s and early 80s would delay recovery of the parental biomass for several years after the initial 
cutback in the TAC. If the declared aim of management is maximising economic rents, dynamic 
optimisation should be used to help in setting current TACs and in charting likely future TACs. The 
need for this type of information is evident in the remarks of a spokesperson for the New Zealand 
Fishing Industry Association: 
The third plea is for the discussion and dissemination of harvesting strategies which look some 
years into the future with the options for future management decisions and the updating of 
future TACs agreed depending on the outcomes of future research activities. 
It is very common for the stock assessment process to yield a single allowable catch figure, 
whereas the expectation or possibility of future increases or decreases is probably of much 
greater relevance to the commercial investor. (Rhoades, 1990, p.39) 
REACTIONS TO PLANS FOR ITOS FOR OTHER FISHERIES 
There are good reasons to suppose that the rapid restructuring which occurred in the SBT fishery 
after introduction of the ITO system will not occur in future in a multispecies fishery such as the 
south east trawl if ITQs are imposed on a range of species simultaneously. This is because if fishing 
is already overcapitalised, it is difficult to find alternative productive uses of vessels and gear. The 
New Zealand experience is important to note in this regard. Across-the-board introduction of ITOs 
resulted in very sluggish restructuring. This is not an argument against implementing ITO schemes 
simultaneously, rather it is just indicative of the difficulties involved. However, if TACs were to be 
set on economic rather than biological criteria, TACs would be set higher the lower the opportunity 
cost of excess vessel capacity. 
Rhoades (1990) has also argued that there is no incentive to explore new areas for catch of a species 
subject to ITOs. Under any management system it is impossible for an individual finder of a new 
ground to appropriate all the long-run returns to the find, but under an ITO system the finder is 
restricted in the extent to which he can capture short-run rents. This may be detrimental to the 
fishery as a whole. 
The problem of ensuring that the total of targeted catch and by-catch is within quota is much more 
difficult in the case of a multispecies fishery. Referring to the New Zealand experience, Rhoades 
(1990, p.39) states: "". problems with by-catch have not been resolved despite three years oftrying". 
The managing director of a South Australian ship construction firm and chairman of the Great 
Australian Bight Trawl Industry Association has voiced COncern about the social impact of ITOs. He 
has said in relation to the Government's newly stated management policy quoted earlier and the 
introduction of ITOs for the south east trawl fishery: 
The problem of the social effects of the rationalisation impact of ITQs is well known through 
SBT. ". the Commonwealth's policy statement puts all emphasis on economic efficiency and 
generating maximum economic rent from the fishery. This is clearly a change in emphasis by 
the Government and industry needs to assess its position. (Thomas, 1990, p.34) 
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CONCLUSIONS 
On efficiency grounds the introduction of ITQs to the SBT fishery can be judged a success. Geen 
and Nayar (1988) estimate that rents generated by the ITQ system in 1986-87 (Au$6.5m) far outweigh 
the management costs (Au$0.6m). 
The Australian Government now plans to apply ITQs to many other fisheries which is likely to reduce 
the scope for rapid fleet rationalisation and to lead to by-catch problems. These problems have been 
evident to New Zealand fisheries managers, who still judge the system a success (Clark et al., 1986, 
p.349). 
Copes (1986) has argued that the ITQ system should not be seen as a universal panacea. Different 
systems will suit different fisheries. He outlines 14 (non-exhaustive) possible problem areas. Lindner 
and Campbell (1989) have identified some sources of inefficiency which can arise with ITQs. For 
example, they argue that under an ITQ the optimal level of investment is lower than under sale 
ownership of the fishery because the reduction in the returns when catch rates are low are less than 
the increase in returns which can be made when catch rates are high. However, overall the 
Antipodean experience so far suggests that experiments with ITQ management are worth taking 
further. 
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ABSTRACT 
The first attempt to manage the fish stocks around Iceland began in the 1950s by extending the 
nation's territorial fishing limits. The first specific regulations were put in place in 1967. Since 1984, 
the demersal fisheries have been managed with a combination of effort and catch quotas on an 
individual vessel basis. This paper describes this system and comments on some of its effects and 
consequences. 1991, management has been based on a new law calling for a comprehensive 
system, with individual transferable share quotas (lTSO). The paper examines the rationale of this 
law. 
HISTORICAL ACCOUNT 
Fisheries management in Iceland had its foundation in a 1948 law providing for scientific protection 
of the fish stocks. On the basis of this law, between the fishing limits were extended 1952 and 1975 
from 3 to 200 nautical miles. A law providing for the specific management of the fisheries was 
passed in 1976. In 1984 the introduction of a comprehensive quota system for regulating the 
demersal fisheries was also based on this law, although later a special law was enacted to provide 
for this system. 
The first direct regulation of coastal fisheries started in 1967 with a quota regulation of the inshore 
shrimp and scallop fisheries. Here catch quotas essentially were issued to processing plants rather 
than to the boats. 
Quota regulation was also introduced in the herring fishery. In 1965 a total quota or total allowable 
catch TAC was set, and in 1976 the TAC was divided into individual vessel quotas. In 1979 these 
vessel quotas were made transferable. Similarly, vessel quotas were introduced in the capelin 
fishery in 1980 and were made transferable in 1986. 
The most important fisheries in Iceland are the demersal fisheries, which amount to some 80% of 
the total landing value, of which cod is the main species. The value of the cod landings generally 
amount to half the value of all fish landings in Iceland. The average cod catch in Iceland over the 
last six years has been some 345,000 metric tons. 
Apart from technical regulations, like mesh size regulations or closing areas, the first comprehensive 
mechanism for regulating the demersal fishery was introduced in 1977. The main purpose was to 
limit the cod catch since the stock level was at an all-time low immediately after the cessation of 
foreign fishing in Icelandic waters in 1976. These regulations amounted basically to effort limitations. 
Extended holiday periods were prescribed for boats during Christmas and Easter and other holidays. 
In addition, a total quota was issued for the net-fishing boats. The effort of the trawlers was held in 
check by limiting the number of fishing days in cod fishing; cod fishing was defined as any trip 
where cod exceeded 15% of the landing. 
Simultaneously the government tried to limit new entries into the fisheries mainly by controlling all 
the major sources of financial investment. In 1978 a strict regulation on importing fishing vessels 
was introduced, together with reducing favourable loans for the domestic construction of vessels. 
Nevertheless, the fleet continued to increase. 
*See Appendix for present address, 
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In 1983 the cod catch was at an all-time low and estimation ofthe cod stocks showed a sharp decline, 
partly caused by a reduced growth rate. It was evident that the prevIous regulations were no longer 
satisfactory, apart from their negative effects on the fleets efficiency. 
Under these severe circumstances, the Ministry of Fisheries, together with the major organizations 
in the industry, agreed to regulate the demersal fisheries in 1984 with a combination of effort 
limitations and individual vessel quotas. This system was extended and amended In ~everal ways 
and was in use throughout 1990. A new law regulating the quota system was passed In the spring 
of 1990 and came into force on January 1991. Here a final step was taken towards a comprehensive 
system of individual transferable vessel quotas. 
This paper describes the two Icelandic quota system: the one in effect from 1984 to 1990, and th,e 
new system. The paper refers to several studies on the effects of the quota system and mentIOn s 
the public discussion on these management systems. 
QUOTA REGULATION 1984-1990' 
The regulation governing the demersal fisheries from 1984 to 1990 underwent several changes. 
However, since none ofthese amendments changed the basic nature of the system, we shall examine 
the general features of the system and comment only on the major changes. 
There are three basic elements in this management system: limited entry, effort limitations and/or 
catch limitations. 
Limited entry . 'd' f h 
As early as 1978 there was an indirect restriction on new entries. In a law 1~84 provi Ing or t e 
licensing of all fishing vessels over 10 GRTs. In 1988 was passed in 1988 this limit was lwe~ed to 6 
GRT but since 1991 it covers all fishing vessels. Those vessels engaged In the flsherles.1n 1983 
obtained fishing licences. According to the 1984 law, a new vessel can be introduced mto the 
fisheries only as a replacement for a ship that has been taken properly out of operation. The 
replacement vessel has to be of a similar size as its predecessor; but. there has been a tendency to 
upgrade the replaced vessels. 
Catch quotas . f h' 
The operation of each vessel was regulated under the quota system with one a two mec anlsms. 
The basic rule was regulation with catch quotas better known as individual transferable (ve~sel) 
quotas or ITQ whereby the annual catch of each vessel of the major demersal species IS I.,m'ted. 
Otherwise, there are no limitations on the fishing operation, apart from the technical regulations on 
mesh sizes area and gear restrictions and the temporary closing of spawning or Juvenile groundsf On the oth'er hand, a vessel could opt for a so-called effort quota (EQ), whereby the number a 
fishing days is limited. We shall first look at catch quota system. 
Catch quotas were issued in 1984 to vessels taking part in the demersal fisheries in the period 1981-
83. Initially there were only quotas for cod, haddock, saithe, redfish, catfish, plaice and Greenlang 
halibut although later some of the less important species were Included In or left out of the IT 
system'. The quota species generally amounted to over 95% of the total demersal landings. For the 
remaining demersal species, there were no limitations. The quotas Issued are share quotas, they 
allow the vessel to land a certain share of the TAC for each of the species. To stress the fact that the 
quotas are share quotas, henceforth we shall use the acronym ITSQ instead of the more traditional 
ITQ. The quota shares were based on the average catch of each vessell~ the period 1981-83. There 
were certain adjustments to this rule, mainly to take account of the situation where vessels were out 
of operation for an extended time during the reference ~erid. Spedfic rules applied to a vessel 
which also had licences in other regulated fisheries (shellfish or capelln). 
1 The author is indebted to Krist jim Skarpheinsson, Division Head, Ministry of F~sher.ies, for sup~IYi~9 ~UCh ~~ the 
information in this section. See also his contribution, Udviklingen i styringen afflskenerne Island, In t e racee mgs 
of the 22nd Nordic Conference on Fisheries, Rnne, Denmark, 13-15 August, 1990. 
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On the basis of these quota shares, the vessels could operate under catch quota limitations, whereby 
the annual catch for each species is limited by the amount calculated from the vessel's share of the 
annual TAC. Limited exchange of quotas from one demersal species to another was allowed in 
some pre-described ratios, reflecting the landing prices. Furthermore, exceeding the annual quotas 
by 5% was also possible of course at the expense of next year's quota or keeping 10% of the current 
quota for the following year. 
The regulation allowed for the transfer of annual catch quotas between vessels. Transfer ring from 
one community to another required a special permit. However, these restrictions had little or no 
effect. As regards the transfer of the quota shares and thereby the right to annual allocation of catch 
quotas the situation is different. In the period 1984-87 only transfer of the quota share from a vessel 
taken out of operation to a new one was allowed. As of 1988, quota shares may be transferred 
practically without restriction, and, transferring quota shares between vessels in operation has been 
allowed since 1991. 
Effort quotas 
Instead of catch quotas, individual vessels could under the management system used between 1984 
and 1990 opt to operate under effort quota limitations.' The number of permitted operating days 
was restricted by a general rule that took into account the class and size of the vessel. Generally 
speaking, the effort quota reduced the normal operating time by 20%-30%. 
The effort quota was combined with catch restrictions. Initially this limited only the cod catch of the 
effort quota vessels, but later on the trawlers operating under the effort scheme had to comply with 
limitations on some other species as well. These limitations were not as restrictive as those under 
the pure catch quota scheme. The upper limit was the maximum of either an average quota for 
vessels in the same class or the individual quotas raised by 20% in the beginning years and after 
1988 by 10%. The effort quotas were in no sense transferable, neither the operating time nor the 
upper limit on catches. 
The reason for including the option of an effort quota was twofold. First, there was not a consensus 
on the move from the earlier management system based upon effort controls, to a pure ITSQ system. 
The effort quota scheme can therefore be seen as a hangover of the previous management system. 
But, secondly, even among those favouring an ITSQ system, some voices said that those fishermen 
scoring low in the system due to a relatively low catch in the reference period (1981-83) should have 
a chance to improve their status. Therefore there was a built-in feedback from the EQ system to the 
ITSQ system in the sense that the catches obtained under the effort scheme could increase the 
individual quota shares. Thus vessels operating for some time under the EQ system would come 
back to the ITSQ system with a better status than before. Since this meant a lower share for the 
ITSQ vessels, they pressed for a change in the regulation in 1988, saying that the total shares of the 
EQ vessels should remain constant, thus creating harsh competition among the EQ vessels. 
Small boats 
The management system applied to the entire demersal fishing fleet, with one important exception: 
the smallest boats, defined as those under 10 GRT, were not covered. There was free entry into this 
fleet and there were no catch or effort limitations. In 1987 several regulations were introduced and 
in 1988 the vessels in the 6-10 GRT size class were included under the general licensing scheme, 
although to their catches were omitted by certain regulations investigates. 
The next section investigates the effect of this loophole. 
Evaluation of the quota regulation 1984-90 
In this section we report on the few studies available on the impact of the Icelandic quota system.' 
21n the first year, 1984, the effort quota option was actually open to only a few boats. 
3 We refer mainly to a forthcoming book by Ragnar Arnason, Dept. of Economics, University of Iceland, The Icelandic 
Fishing Industry: Changing Structure and Performance; a thesis by JesperRaakjc:er Nielsen, Fiskeriregu/eringen ved 
fart/i1jskvpter, Institute for Production, Aalborg University Centre, January, 1990; the monthly .l£gir, and the annual 
report, Utvegur, both published by the Icelandic Fisheries Society. 
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Total catches 
The quota system was introduced in 1984 under the pressure of a major biological crisis which led 
to a severe reduction in the TAG for cod. Therefore, in the beginning, the main purpose of the system 
was to control the total catches. Figure 1 shows average numbers for this management system from 
1984 to 1990. The columns show first the TAG proposed by the Marine Research Institute second, 
the TAG set by the Ministry, and third the actual catches for each of the species covered by the 
system. 
Figure 1 
Average proposed and actual catches, 1984-90. The vertical scale is in thousands of metric 
tons. 
Cod Haddock S aithe Redfish Greenland 
Halibut 
~ Proposed by the 
, •• Marine Research 
Institute 
%D Set by the Ministery 
liill of Fisheries 
~ Actual Catch 
Source: Addendum to a parliamentary resolution to revise the law on management of fisheries, 
No. 292, submitted to the Icelandic Parliament 1990-91. 
At first glance the system seems to have failed to limit the catch. The (weighted) total catches 
exceeded by 22% the TAGs proposed by the Marine Research Institute. But the excess was only 12% 
if compared to the TAGs set by the Ministry. Furthermore, this excess catch is easily explained. First, 
there is a built-in mechanism in the EQ system for vessels to exceed the set quotas. Secondly, most 
of the time the small boats had relatively free play. Both these effects were well known and it was 
predictable that the EQ effect could lead to some 10% overfishing. Therefore the total catches were 
basically within the limits expected by the Ministry. On the other hand there is a larger discrepancy 
if one looks at individual species. Here the ministerial TAGs were exceeded extensively for cod and 
Greenland halibut. while for other species the TAGs were not met. These results reflect the rather 
wide possibilities of changing quotas of one species into those of another. 
Effort versus catch quotas 
Figure 2 shows the proportion of the fleet operating under the ITSQ system, the rest being on EQ 
licences. In 1984 the EQ system was not a general option and few boats were eligible for it. However, 
although the EQ was open to all from 1985, most of the fleet opted for the ITSQ system, although 
the Eel system was more akin to the management they were used to. This may indicate that it was 
not necessary to include the EQ system as a means of adjustment from the old to the new 
management system. The industry started to realize the benefits of the too liberal EQ system in 
1986. A study conducted before the introduction of the system indicated that, based upon economic 
rationale an almost equal number of vessels would opt for each of the systems. This prediction is 
in agreement with the average situation during the whole period. 
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Figure 2 
Proportion of vessels (as % of total number) opting for ITSO (in contrast to EO) in 1984-
90. Only boats concentrating their fishing on demersal species are included. 
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Source: Various volumes of Utvegur. 
Increased efficiency 
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E!.:I Boats 
The second objective of the quota management system was to increase efficiency and reduce the 
size of the fishing fleet. Let us first consider efficiency. In the short run at least, it can be measured 
as the operating cost of harvesting a unit catch. Since operating cost is roughly proportional to 
effort. the easiest way is to look at the changes in effort or operating time. This is illustrated in Figure 
3, which shows the actual fishing effort over a decade and also a curve of predicted efforts obtained 
by comparing distinct exponential growth curves with the observations prior to the introduction of 
the quota system and again after its introduction. Before 1984, effort had been increasing by 6% 
annually. The effort was reduced by some 21% with the introduction of the system, although after 
that it increased again, but only at a rate of 2% per annum. 
Figure 3 
Actual and fitted indices of total demersal fishing effort in the period 1978-88. 
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119 
Irish Fisheries Investigations Series B, No. 42 (1994) 
Total effort is a crude measure of the cost of fishing, particularly if one is trying to isolate the effect 
of the management system from other factors. These other factors are principally changes in stock 
sizes. 
Figure 4 is an attempt to calculate the cost of fishing a unit catch of cod, where the effect of changes 
in stock sizes has been eliminated. The stock effect is considerable since the exploitable biomass 
varied with a factor of three during the observation period. It is difficult to eliminate this effect; the 
error margin is considerable but unfortunately is not known exactly. Nevertheless, there is no reason 
to believe that these calculations are biased either in favour of the old mamagement system or the 
new. With these reservations, Figure 4 indicates that there has been a reduction in the cost of 
fishing, at least for the boats in the first three years of the quota system, i.e. 1984-86. 
Figure 4 
Changes in the cost of cod fishing per unit of catch. Base year of index 1983. 
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Source: Addendum (written by T. Helgason and S. Olafsson) to a bill on management of fisheries 
1988-91, submitted to the Icelandic Parliament in 1987. 
Transfer of quotas 
How has the reduced effort and increased efficiency been achieved? First, the reduction in effort is 
either directly forced by the EQ system or is allowable implied by a reduction in the catches in the 
ITSQ system, as compared the allowable catches under the previous system. the improved efficiency 
is attributable to two main causes. On the one hand, fishermen will concentrate their fishing in the 
periods most suitable for fishing when faced with a reduction either in operating time or the size of 
the allowable catches. On the other hand, it is to be expected that they will also transfer quotas from 
the less efficient vessels to the more efficient ones. 
On average 17%4 of the annual quotas have been transferred between vessels; varying between 
10% and 20% from year to year. Most of this transfer of quotas has occurred locally between vessels 
owned by the same person or within the same community. However, there has also been a 
considerable transfer across the country. 
4 See Raakjcer Nielsen, p. 47. 
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Figure 5 
Net trading in quotas in the period 1984-89 in metric tons of cod equivalents. Left columns 
shoW trading in permanent shares (through trading in vessels) and the right ones trading 
in annual quotas. 
16162 8422 
-20682 -13145 
Source: Egir, No.7, 1989. 
Figure 5 shows the net quota trading - both trading of annual quotas and quota shares (through 
trading in vessels) - between seven constituencies in Iceland.5 It is obvious that the main trade is 
from the south and south-west to the north-east. This can easily be explained: the spawning stock 
of cod has declined considerably from its size in the reference period used for calculating the quota 
shares, and in the south and south-west most fishing is of this spawning stock. Thus, it is natural 
that the boats in this area were willing to sell some of their share and thereby reduce the economic 
blow of the decline of their fish stocks. 
The prices paid for annual quotas varied somewhat, but were generally in the range of 20%-30% of 
the landing price of fish. 
Quota shares change hands either indirectly through the sale of vessels or directly by transferring 
the shares. This latter option was in force only during the last three years of the system, i.e. since 
1988. Such direct trade in quota shares nevertheless has resulted in some 50 ships being taken out 
of operation. 
5 Actually there are eight voting constituencies. Here the Reykjavik constituency is combined with the Reykjanes 
constituency, the south-west peninsula. 
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The going price for quotas sold this way has been c. 150% of the landing price of fish or five to 
seven times the going price of annual quotas. This amounts to a calculated internal rate of return of 
approximately 15%-20% assuming that the buyer is acquiring a permanent quota right. This interest 
rate is about twice the real interest rate, which reflects the doubts the quota market has about the 
future of the quota system. 
Figure 5 shows the size of quotas transferred between the constituencies through trade in fishing 
vessels. The picture is basically the same as regards trade in annual quotas; a move from the south 
to the north. 
Investment 
One of the major goals of a fisheries management system in Iceland and elsewhere, where the 
marine resources are overexploited, is to create incentives to reduce the capacity. Several studies 
have been conducted in the last two decades starting with a thesis by R6gnvaldur Hannesson' to 
estimate the optimal fleet size in the Icelandic demersal fishing fleet. The results vary according to 
assumptions, but all call for at least a 20% reduction of the current fleet and some conclude that in 
the long run after recovery of the stocks the fleet will be abouttwice too big. In the quota management 
system itself, the effort limitations restrict the operating time to almost two-thirds of the normal 
operating time.' And since almost half the fleet seems to be better off under these restrictions rather 
than the catch limitations, this indicates that the conclusion that the fleet could immediately be 
reduced by some 20% cannot be far off. A recent survey' among vessel owners - where they were 
asked how large a quota they could handle - also shows that the fleet has been as much as one-
third under utilized. 
An ITSQ system should be the ideal instrument for trimming the fleet down to the optimal size. But 
then at least three conditions have to be satisfied: the system must be closed, (i.e. must include all 
vessels and be without loopholes). the quotas and quota shares must be freely transferable, and the 
future of the system somehow must be secured. This last condition is satisfied if the quota shares 
are a permanent private property or if they constitute a long-term user right. But the guaranteed 
future availability of quotas on the market should also be sufficient. 
figure 6 
Gross investment in fishing in the decade 1980-89 in mill. Ice!. kr. (at 1980 prices). 
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71n the 1990 regulations the allowed operating time of the trawlers under EQ limitations is 230 days per year. 
H Conducted by the Fisheries Research Institute of the University of Iceland. 
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The Icelandic quota system before 1991 did not fulfil any of these conditions entirely. We have 
already mentioned the loophole about the small boats. The dramatic increase in the number of 
these very small fishing vessels can be read from the continuous curve in Figure 7. Furthermore 
the quota allocation was based only on temporary laws, and the future of the system has neve; 
been secure. And, thirdly, only after 1988 could there be any talk about freely transferable quota 
shares. Consequently, Investment in the fishing fleet (and also in processing) continued in the period 
of the quota management system, as can be read from Figure 6. 
The reasons why ha~e been given to some extent, the management system failed to halt investment 
In the fleet: In addition, there were two other specific reasons First, due to restrictions in funding 
normal maintenance had been rather low in the few years before the introduction of the new system' 
But In 1986 these restrictions were relaxed. This resulted in a maintenance boom but also partly i . 
a thorough overhaul of the ships. This was wrongly entered in the books as 'inve~tment'. Secondl; 
;~ut one-fifth of the trawler fleet were transformed from fresh-fish trawlers into freezers. Whether 
s change has In any way been influenced by the management system itself cannot be decided. 
A major reason for the increased investment is the loophole regarding the smallest boats which 
wfere exllempted from the management rules for most of the period. Figure 7 shows how the ~umber 
a sma boats Increased dramatically. 
figure 7 
Investment in small b~ts of less than 10 GRT. Columns show investment in GRT and the 
contInuous curves shows the number of new boats. 
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Changes in the allocation of landings 
~g:in, it isdifficult to see how or why the management system has influenced the allocation of fresh 
.'S . Certalnl~ the dominating force has been changes in market prices. Freezer trawlers emerged 
In the Icelandic fishing fleet during this period, and are lately taking as much as 15°;' of the demersal 
catch. . ° 
:~rthermre, export of fresh fish in containers is a new and increasing activity, but whether or not 
e IS IS a consequence of the management system is an open question. These changes occurred 
venhthou9h there IS a penalty built into the system for exporting fresh fish, since there is a quota 
surc arge of up to 20% for such allocation of the catch. 
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Enforcement of the system 
The Icelandic quota management system has been easy to implement, although the introduction of 
the vast number of small boats into the system in 1988 called for a greater administrative effort. 
Registration and enforcement is in the hands of the Ministry of Fishing. The system has called for 
an additional five people who are mainly engaged in on-the-spot controls. Penalties are of an 
administrative nature, mainly the temporary withdrawal of fishing licences. Lawsuits have not been 
necessary. Furthermore, there have been relatively few complaints about the quotas issued. Special 
cases are treated by a commission consisting of members from the industry and the Ministry. It has 
succeeded in dealing with all cases. 
It is considered that registration of fish landed in Iceland is very accurate and that there is little 
cheating through unofficial landings. The reports from the vessels are checked against reports from 
fish buyers. Increased direct export of fresh fish has called for collaboration with foreign buyers, 
which works satisfactorily. 
One of the major problems with individual quota systems is the discard problem, which occurs 
mainly in connection with by-catches, or if there is a difference in price for fish according to size or 
quality. Both these factors are partly taken care of in the Icelandic system, the first one by allowing 
some flexibility in exchanging the quota for one species for another, and simply by the transferability 
of quotas enabling a fisherman to buy quota rights to cover his eventual by-catch. There are special 
rules regarding small fish, but it helps that there is very little variation in price by size or quality. The 
Ministry considers discarding to be a minor problem. The media, however, every now and then 
report about discards, mainly from the freezer trawlers. A survey conducted among fishermen 
themselves indicates that about one-tenth of the trawler catches is discarded. However, the validity 
of this survey has been disputed.s 
THE NEW QUOTA SYSTEM 
A new law on the management of fishing was passed by the Icelandic Parliament in the spring of 
1989 and went into force on 1 January, 1991. This is a comprehensive law covering all fishing. The 
main changes are for demersal fishing: 
Elimination of effort quotas. The management system is therefore a pure ITSQ system. There 
is a certain adjustment in the form of a compensation by which vessels having a quota share 
less than the average in their classes receive an extra share amounting to 40% of the difference. 
This adds some 5% to the total quota shares. This is, of course, at the expense of the other 
vessels. There are restrictions on the transfer of these extra shares for the following 5 years. 
All vessels are covered by the system. This means that the exemptions granted to the smallest 
boats are eliminated. There is a 3 year adaptation period for boats using only hooks. 
There are some changes to do with transferability. Basically the transfer of annual quotas 
remains unchanged. Although in some cases specific permits are needed, experience shows that 
these are easily obtained. The transfer of permanent quota shares has almost fully liberalized. On 
the other hand, there is a new clause regarding the sale of vessels out of a community: the 
community has pre-emptive rights. It is doubtful that this will have any effect. It can be concluded 
that the quotas and the quota rights are for all practical purposes freely transferable. 
A permanent system? For the first time the law governing quota management has no time limit, 
but it does have a special clause requiring Parliament to take it up and to revise it in two years. 
We shall come back to this in the next section. 
Various changes. The annual quota period is no longer the calendar year but the period from 
August 31 to September 1 . This change calls for a shorter period in the first year. The possibilities 
for exchanging the quota for one species for another are somewhat reduced. The same holds 
for transferring quotas from one period to the next. To a certain extent the quota shares refer 
to the whole marine resource, i.e. are a kind of resource quota and not only single species 
9 The fishermen were asked how much they think other fishermen discard. 
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quotas. Thus the Ministry is allowed to compensate for a severe reduction in the TAC in one 
species by granting quotas in other species. 
PUBLIC DISCUSSION 
The quota system was originally accepted by the vessel owners. The fishermen have been more 
reluctant. Their organisations have never accepted the transferability of the quotas. It must be noted 
that they have little to say when a vessel owner decides to sell quotas or quota shares; the fishermen 
get no compensation in these cases. 
The political parties have not been united on the quota issue. All the laws have been passed by 
narrow margins. The latest - and the most important- revision of the law was passed by a margin 
of only one vote. It is likely that that law will be revised when it is reviewed in two years, but there 
will be hardly any departure from the basic principle of ITSQ. 
Fisheries management has been the subject of many projects and papers atthe University of Iceland. 
Generally speaking the scientists are in favour of the ITQ system. Most of them recommend either 
a public sale of quotas or at least taxing the quotas, instead of issuing them on a historical basis 
and without any charge." The arguments are basically economic, some claiming that the reduction 
of the size of the fleet will be faster that way. Others point to the direct and indirect influences of 
fishing on other industries in Iceland and claim that only a quota charge can guarantee a normal 
economic climate for everyone. 11 
10 Two books were published in 1990, in Icelandic, with popular accounts of these viewpoints. One, HagsCEld i hut;; 
Greinar urn stj6rn fiskveilJa, (T. Helgason and 0.0. Jonsson, eds., Hask61autgilfan and Sjavarutvegsstofnun 
Hask6lans, 1990) includes articles by twelve authors. The other, Fiskistofnarnir via {sland: PjoJareign ella rfkiseign 
(Stofnun J6ns Prlakssn~r, 1990) is an essay by Hannes H. Gissurarson which contains a different viewpoint. 
11 The author is indebted to Om D. J6nsson, Director of the Fisheries Research Institute at the University of Iceland, 
for his assistance in writing this paper. 
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ABSTRACT 
This paper describes work in progress on the construction of a Nordic Fisheries Management Model 
(NFMM), a comprehensive simulation model that will be used to test different methods of fisheries 
management. 
In this model, the fisheries can be managed with various quota schemes, individual vessel quotas 
or different kinds of total quotas. The individual quotas can be made transferable in the model, with 
markets for annual quotas as well as quota rights. Among other management tools to be included 
are closed seasons and general or individual effort limitations. 
The fundamental entities in the model are companies engaged in fishing andlor fish processing. 
The timescale of the model is theoretically unlimited. The model can be aggregated, for example, 
by letting a company represent a whole class of vessels. 
The model will be written in an objective style, thus making it flexible and reusable. The modelling 
activity was started at Christian Michelson Institute in Bergen in 1988 but since the autumn of 1990 
work has been centered at the University of Iceland. 
Initially the project was financed by different Norwegian sources but since mid-1990 the work has 
been sponsored by the Nordic Council of Ministers and the Icelandic Ministry of Fisheries. 
The work has been scheduled to be finished in late 1992. 
INTRODUCTION 
Fisheries management is evolving rather quickly towards some kind of individual vessel quota. In 
the North Atlantic area Iceland has had a leading role in this development. Since 1984 the Icelandic 
fisheries have been managed with a combination of individual catch quotas and effort limitations, 
but as of 1 January 1991, the Icelandic fisheries have been entirely managed with individual, 
transferable vessel catch quotas. Canada and Norway have been using quota schemes, together 
with other systems for managing their fisheries. On the other hand, the member states of the 
European Community basically rely on total quotas and technical controls. 
In Norway the pros and cons of a comprehensive quota system have been much discussed publicly. 
In 1988 work was initiated at the Christian Michelsen Institute in Bergen to develop a model to 
simulate the effects of different quota management schemes on the Norwegian demersal fisheries. 
This initiative was a follow-up of a modelling of the pelagic fisheries (Flam 1983) done earlier at the 
same institute. Information was also drawn from the experience that had been gained in the 
construction of a simulation model ofthe Icelandic demersal fisheries (Helgason and Olafsson 1988). 
This modelling activity was carried out between 1988 and 1990 at the Haugesund Maritime College 
and has been documented in several reports (Wallace et al 1988, Wallace and Helgasson 1990, 
Wallace 1990, and Bjelland 1990). However, we shall not elaborate here modelling work in this paper 
but refer mainly to 4 for a general outline. 
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As of mid-1990 this modelling activity has been supported by a grant from the Nordic Council of 
Ministers under a special prvgramme on mUlti-species research. Simultaneously the model has 
been redefined and the main a.ctivity transferred to the Fisheries Research Institute at the University 
of Iceland. The Icelandic Ministry of Fisheries IS co-sponsoring the project, principally the data 
collection and adaptation to the Icelandic case, since the Nordic grant covers only general aspects 
ofthe modelling work. This current modelling will be referred to as the Nordic Fisheries Management 
Model (NFMM). 
This report describes the purpose of the model and its current status. 
THE GOALS AND TARGET GROUP OF THE NFMM 
The NFMM is intended to be a toolfor practical fisheries managers to test their ideas about changes 
In their management policies. It IS hoped that the model will describe in some detail potential 
development in the short and long run in fleet size and structure and will predict which temporal 
and spatial changes will take place in the fisheries. Here we are particularly interested in the effects 
of fisheries management on regional development. 
It should be emphasised that the model is intended for practical use. Therefore, it is important that 
it is developed in close collaboration with the people engaged in day-to-day management of the 
fisheries. 
Nevertheless it is hoped that the model will also be helpful in research, in particular in connection 
with mUlti-species models. 
THE BASIC STRUCTURE OF THE MODEL 
The model simulates the behaviour of an entire fishing fleet over a period of several years under a 
certam management regime and given economic externalities. 
As regards management regimes, the focus is on different catch quota systems, ranging from total 
quotas only to permanent but transferable individual vessel quotas. Great flexibility in the definition 
of quotas is emphasised. Thus vessel quotas may be combined with group quotas, whereby certain 
classes of vessels, say trawlers, share a common quota which may be smaller than the sum of 
quotas of the individual trawlers. Similarly, different levels of restrictions on transferring quotas 
may be included. 
In addition to catch quotas, different kinds of effort limitations will be taken into consideration. 
The main emphasis will be correctly imitating the behaviour of the fishing firms cor'ectly. In many 
cases there IS a high degree of vertical integration in the industry. Thus, in Iceland, about 80% of the 
fishing fleet is owned by the processing industry. Therefore it is considered necessary to include 
fish processing and fish markets in the model, although in the beginning the processing part will be 
modelled rather naively. 
The biology is self-contained .. In the first version it will be elementary and based upon a single 
species model; hence there Will be no ecological feed-back. Provision is made for extending the 
corresponding modules In such a way as to encompass various factors, such as stock dependent 
growth. 
The model is basically deterministic, but provision will be made for introducing randomness - for 
example in the biology and in the catch rates. 
MODEL ELEMENTS AND THEIR INTERRELATIONSHIP 
In this section we give a short overview of the main elements or objects of the model. The model 
includes the effects of short-term, medium-term and long-term decisions. Short-term decisions 
include decisions re.garding a single fishing trip or decisions on how to process the current landings. 
Medium-term deCISions deal with the bUYing and seiling of quotas and the choosing of fisheries for 
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the boats. Medium-term refers to a year or to the remainder of the current management year. Long-
term decisions deal mainly with investments or trading in boats or quota rights. 
Authorities is the module in the model taking care of all fisheries management. It opens and closes 
fisheries, issues quotas (or sells them). It keeps books on all quota rights, both in individual and 
hierarchic quota systems. 
Companies, i.e. fishing firms, are the basic entities of the model. Generally a company owns one or 
more fishing vessels and/or processing facilities. When applied to a real situation, say in Iceland, 
the companies of the model will be images of real fishing enterprises of which there are some 400. 
The smallest ones will be eventually grouped together in the model into fictitious aggregated 
companies. The activities of a company include advising its boats about choice of fisheries and 
landings, its processing plants (if any), selling and buying fish (if engaged in processing), and trading 
in quotas and quota rights (if applicable). The companies in the model are basically profit motivated. 
This effect will be described by a simple linear optimization model for each company to make 
medium-term decisions. Short-term decisions will be rather straightforward, to begin with. But after 
the processing has been incorporated, the product mix and dealings on the fish markets again will 
be modelled with a linear model. Long-term decisions will be based upon the medium-term decision 
process. Thus investment in, say, quota rights will be based upon experience, whereby it will be 
calculated whether the company would have been better off with a permanent quota rather than 
renting annual quotas on the spot market. At a later stage, some long-term planning may be adopted. 
Boats, or vessels, are related to companies. Thus, they do not have an independent decision-
making capability. Some intelligence may be added at a later stage, especially regarding short-term 
decisions. The boats accept messages from the companies on what to do. Basically the boats 
operate tour by tour, but that does not exclude the simpler continuous simulation. 
Fishery is a homogeneous fishing activity in area, gear and vessel type but not necessarily in vessel 
size. Boats engage in one fishery at a time. One of the main decisions each company must make is 
to select fisheries for its boats. 
Stocks are the biological fish stocks from which the catches are taken. They are renewable according 
to the biological formulae incorporated in that object. Quotas can be issued on stocks or on units 
smaller than stocks. This flexibility is needed, for example, in the Norwegian cod fisheries where 
quotas for the Barents Sea might be different from those for the Lofoten area. 
Quota markets are of two kinds, rental markets where companies buy and sell annual quotas, and 
markets for permanent quota rights. Marketing will take place periodically in the model and will 
basically be cleared at each event. This will involve an iteration process which may slow down the 
model. Thus we may have to be content with only a partial clearing of the markets. 
Fish markets will be included in the model as internal objects, but initially they will be treated as 
external, which means that they accept any externally given amount of fish at a given price. 
IMPLEMENTATION 
The model is being developed in the object-oriented programming fashion and written in C++. 
Object-oriented programming is highly realistic. Every entity or object of the model describes a real 
activity, such as a fishing vessel and its operation. Object-oriented programming enables flexibility 
and decentralized work. Once it has been decided which messages each object must be capable of 
handling, the objects can be developed further independently of each other. It is easy to define 
different objects of the same class. Thus there may be different kinds of company objects as, for 
example, for modelling companies with different types of profit motivation. 
To some extent, different management options will be selected by choosing proper parameters. On 
the other hand, full flexibility will be achieved by constructing different authority modules or objects. 
A portfolio of such will be included with the model, but since the model-makers probably will not 
foresee all the possibilities, the object-oriented approach will make it easy to develop special objects 
at the request of each customer. 
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The model is bei~g developed on a SUN workstation under the UNIX operating system. It is hoped 
that the final version of the model also can be run on such a workstation. 
The model will be menu-driven and great emphasis will be laid upon graphic and visual output. 
DATA 
The model will require considerable data collection and analysis. (See [7] for preliminary study on 
the analysIs of fls.hlng .cost.) This must be the responsibility of each user. However, we hope that 
the experience gained In the first Implementation (for the Icelandic fisheries) will be helpful to othe 
users. r 
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ABSTRACT 
In this paper we discuss the Icelandic experience of managing fisheries through an ITO-system. In 
the first section we give an indication of the importance of the fisheries for the Icelandic economy. 
In the second section we discuss the reasons why it is necessary to manage the fisheries. In the 
third section we describe the main characteristics of the Icelandic ITOs-sytem and how it has evolved. 
In the fourth section we discuss development of the fleet and in the final section we describe the 
trade in quotas in Iceland, the volume of quotas traded and the main types of exchanges that take 
place. 
1. The Icelandic fisheries 
For many years the fisheries policy has been at the centre of public debate in Iceland. Since the 
fisheries sector is of fundamental importance in the Icelandic economy, this is not surprising. Fish 
products account for some 70% of exports. Even though only 13% of the working population works 
in the fisheries and the fisheries contribute some 17% to the GOP, its fundamental importance can 
be seen by the macroeconomic impact and its role in Ice lands economic growth and development. 
Figures 1 and 2 show this. In Figure 1 we have plotted the total catch at fixed prices, the terms of 
trade of goods exported from and imported to Iceland, and the GOP at fixed prices. 
Figure 1 
The total catch, the terms of trade and the GOP at fixed prices 1957-1990 
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A simple regression can also be used to show the importance of the fisheries sector. We found that 
the equation (t-ratios are in the parenthesis): 
DGDP = 0.26*DCATCH + 0.15*DCATCH(-1)+0.10*DToT 
(4.07) (2.52) (1.54) 
+0.22*DToT( -1 )+0.096*DToT( -2)+0.024 
(3.51) (1.44) (4.27) 
fitted with OLS explained some 72% of the total variation in the growth rates of GDP. Figure 2 shows 
the actual changes in the GDP and the changes which the above equation predicted. 
Figure 2 
Percentage changes in GDP 1960-1990. Actual and fitted values 
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The size and importance of the fisheries sector makes Iceland the only country in Europe where the 
fisheries form the economic basis of an independent monetary and fiscal system and an independent 
state. Iceland is the only country in Europe where the exchange rate and monetary and fiscal policy 
depend primarily on the fisheries. Since the fisheries is the most important sector of the economy, 
and the one that is most competitive in international markets, its performance is of crucial importance 
for the Icelandic economy. No other sector of the economy can cushion the effects of one bad 
harvest or of bad management of the fisheries. 
2. Why fishing effort must be controlled 
The need to regulate the fisheries stems from the fact that the resources of the sea are a common 
good. If the fisheries was to be left on its own, there would be a strong tendency to expand the 
effort beyond what is biologically and economically optimal. It is therefore not possible to achieve 
the optimal allocation of the productive resources through the automatic mechanism of the market. 
The standard Schaefer fisheries model shown in Figure 3 illustrates this phenomenon. 
The upper part shows the total costs, revenues and the value of the sustainable catch, while the 
lower part shows the marginal productivity. The optimal effort is at Eopt, where the marginal 
productivity is equal to the marginal cost. When the natural resources of the sea are free, there is 
strong tendency to expand the fishing effort beyond the the optimal level (Eopt). The reason is that 
the individual fishermen find it rational to increase effort and fishing capacity as long as the total 
effort is less than the equilibrium effort (Eeq.). There is a difference between sustainable marginal 
productivity and the individual marginal productivity as the fisherman sees it. The reason is the 
scarcity of resources. Expanding the effort initially will increase the total catch, but as this goes on, 
the fishing stocks Will be depleted and the catch per unit of effort will be diminished. When there is 
free access, the fishing capacity will outgrow the productivity of the natural resources of the sea, in 
some cases until the fish stock collapses. The limitation of the productivity of the seas' fish stocks 
must be taken into account by regulating the fishing effort. 
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Figure 3 
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The danger of overfishing in a free access system stems from the fact that the fishing grounds are 
a common property. If the fish resources were private property (e.g. allocated to a limited group of 
fishermen), this would not happen. Restriction of the access is therefore a prerequisite for achieving 
the optimum level of effort and extracting the largest possible economic rent. The rent is equal to 
the difference between the catch per unit of effort and the cost per unit of effort. This rent also would 
be equal to the price for the exclusive fishing rights if these rights were sold in a market. 
3. The ITO-system in Iceland' 
The collapse of the Norwegian-Icelandic herring stock in 1967-68 alerted Icelanders of the fact that 
the seas resources are not unlimited. In 1976 Icelandic Institute for Marine Research (lIMR) published 
a report on the situation of the cod stock. The Institute warned that the spawning stock of cod was 
dangerously small. 
In the early 1970s there were great investments in fleet capacity. During the previous period there 
had been a lot of investment in vessels suitable for fishing herring, but few vessels were suited for 
fishing groundfish, and there were few trawlers. The new trawlers that were bought during the early 
1970s were able to go out and fish in bad winter weather and secure raw material for the processing 
plants on a more regular basis than had been possible previously. In many villages, especially on 
the northern coast, the trawlers transformed the employment situation, creating relatively stable 
1 For a more comprehensive description of the Icelandic ITO-system see the paper 'The Icelandic Quota Management 
System' by Professor Thorkell Helgason. This paper will be presented atthe third annual meeting of EAFE in Dublin, 
April 1991. 
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employment all year around. The new trawlers and the extension of the Exclusive Fishing Zone to 
50 miles in 1972 and to 200 miles in 1976 led to even bigger catches. But, as it happened, this new 
wave of investment was excessive and led to a considerable overinvestment in fleet capacity. Nearly 
60 new and techically superior trawlers had been coming into the fleet in the period 1970-1976 and 
more were to come. The overcapacity of the fishing fleet became evident and some measures had 
to be taken to reduce effort. 
At first the authorities tried to reduce effort through limiting the time during which gill-netters were 
allowed to fish. The trawlers were not allowed to catch cod at certain times of the year. Compulsory 
stoppages in harbour were prolonged. This method of regulation was in force until 1983, but as a 
method for decreasing the fishing effort it turned out to be ineffective. First, catches continued to 
exceed the TACs. Secondly, it led to a big increase in the effort to fish species other than cod, so 
much that it nearly led to the depletion of some stocks. Thirdly, the system did not make the fisheries 
more efficient. 
The second step in the management olthe Icelandicfisheries was taken in 1984. New laws concerning 
the management of the fisheries were passed during 1983 and implemented the next year. The 
system was to cover the fishing of the most important groundfish species and the fishing of capelin 
and herring. The scheme was in three parts. First there was the system of catch quotas which were 
allocated to individual vessels, secondly there was the system of effort quotas, which allocated the 
number of days that the vessels which opted for the effort quotas, were allowed to fish and thirdly 
there were the small boats where the system of free access continued,(The upper limit defining a 
small boat was set at 10 GRT in 1984, and reduced to 6 GRT in 1988). The new laws also introduced 
a comprehensive ban on entering a new fishing vessel which was bigger than 10 GRT, except when 
a similar vessel had been scrapped or sold abroad. This regulation, which is still in force, seems to 
have been effective. 
The new law allowed fishing vessels 10 GRT or bigger to choose between catch quotas based on 
their catch-record during 1981-83 (or the most recent three-year period), and effort quotas. It also 
permitted trade in catch quotas with certain limitations. A vessel could sell or buy some quota for 
use within the year, i.e. renting quotas within the year was permitted. But as the vessel and its catch 
record was the reference point for the allocation of the catch quotas between the vessels it was not 
possible to rent the quotas permanently or sell them. Only by buying a vessel with quota-rights and 
transfering these quota rights to another vessel, was it possible to transfer quota-rights permanently 
between two vessels. 
In 1990 the Icelandic Parliament passed a new law for managing the fisheries. The main changes 
were the following: 
1. All regulation of the fishing effort should be through a system of catch quotad. This system 
was to cover the most important species and the Minister of Fisheries had the power to 
introduce this system for other species if they were in danger of being overexploited. 
2. The system was to be comprehensive and included all fishing vessels, including the smallest 
boats. 
3. The system was to get a more permanent basis. Therefore the law did not include a clause 
where an expiry date was specified, as previous laws had. The law is to be revised before 
the end of 1992. 
4. The transferability of the quotas was to be increased and for the first time selling quota-
rights was permitted, i.e. the right to get a quota allocation could be sold and bought. The 
renting of quotas during one or more periods, without selling the right to future quota 
allocation, was permitted as before. 
The last two points were intended to make the quota rights into property rights to solve the common 
property problem of the free access fisheries and create ,an efficient market system for this sector 
of the economy. It is though important to note that the law has not taken the full step towards 
introducing property rights for the natural resources which the fishing sector utilizes. The first article 
of the new law stipulates that the resources of the sea are a common property of the Icelandic 
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nation. This property is now being given away to indivdual owners of fishing vessels, who are 
allowed to sell them for their own profit. 
4. The experience of the system 1984-1990 
When the law was first implemented in 1984, most of the vessels chosa the catch quota. One reason 
for this was that the stocks were at a rather low level in 1983-84. In 1985 a majority of the vessels 
again opted for the catch quotas, but in 1986 the vessels operating within the effort quota system 
caught more than 50% of the groundfish species regulated by the quota system. Nevertheless their 
share declined gradually during the period 1986-1988, as Figure 4 shows. 
Figure 4 
Catches of groundfish by vessels choosing different quota-systems 
1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 
It was to be expected that the effort quota system would gradually become less important. In the 
beginning some vessel-owners would find that they could do better than they had done during the 
reference period 1981-83 and opt for the effort quota system. But after having had their ability to 
fish re-evaluated through the effort quota system, it was rational for them to go over to the catch 
quota system where they were allowed to fish their quotas with the minimum cost. New boats 
would be tried out in the effort quota system and then return to the catch quota system. 
It is very difficult to implement the rule that a new fishing vessel should be allowed to enter the 
system only if a comparable vessel has been scrapped or sold abroad. It is therefore to be expected 
that some vessel-owners would be able to get a new and better vessel into the system, increase its 
quota share in the effort quota system and then return to the catch quota system with an increased 
share. This was bound to lead to discontent among the majority offishermen, who easily understood 
that their quotas were decreasing because bigger quotas were allocated to the vessels which 
successfully utilised the effort quota system. A vessel which permanently stayed in the catch quota 
system saw its share of the catch actually decline. This loophole in the system did not lead to big 
transfers of quotas from the vessels which stayed in the catch quota system, but it caused to a lot 
of dissatisfaction among the fishermen. 
In Iceland, the experts tend to prefer the catch quota system to the effort quota system. In the former, 
the cost of catching is minimized and the possibility of planning the fishing activity is greater. It is 
also believed that the side effects of the catch quota system are relatively unimportant. Unreported 
landings are practically impossible and 'throwing' at sea is believed to be relatively little. 
The system from 1983 was effective in halting the increase in the number of fishing vessels in the 
system. In 1984 there were 681 fishing vessel which operated in the quota system, but in 1990 there 
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were 629. At the same time, the number of small boats, i.e. boats of under 10 GRT, which were not 
included in the quota system increased from 1128 in 1984 to 2023 in 1990. As can be seen from 
Figure 4 the small boats increased their share of the catch of groundfish which was regulated by the 
quotas only marginally, or from 7.7% in 1986 to 9.3% in 1990. This was a loophole in the system 
which the fishermen on the bigger vessels did not like. 
Even if the system from 1983 was effective in halting the increase in the number of bigger fishing 
vessels, it did not stop the growth in the size of the fleet in terms of GRT or in terms of engine power. 
Figure 5 shows this. 
Figure 5 
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It is worth stressing that Figure 5 shows the size of the registered fleet, not the size of the fleet that 
is being operated. In the transferable quota system, a firm with excess capacity does transfer the 
quotas from its least effective vessel to the others and in that way it tries to use its resources more 
effectively. But the firm does not sell or scrap the excess vessel because this vessel has a value as 
a part of the quota system. It can be used to allow a new vessel into the system. It is also worth 
noting that the stocks around Iceland are presently at a rather low level, so it is therefore to be 
expected that in the future (though not the very near future) the catch quotas will be increased. 
There are several known cases where firms have decided to transfer all quotas from one of its 
vessels (even big vessels like trawlers) without actually selling or scrapping it. But, unfortunately, 
th.ere are .no figures which show the extent of this practice. Most often one finds this practice applied 
Within a firm which owns several vessels and can catch its quota with fewer vessels. For the smaller 
firms, the indivisibility of the vessels becomes a problem, especially for those firms that are involved 
in fish processing as well as in the selling of quotas for this can then mean less raw material for the 
processing plant, and less employment in the village. It is interesting to note that there are already 
cases where a firm in Village A with excess fleet capacity has made an agreement with a firm in 
Village B to transfer some quota from the former to the latter in exchange for landing the fish caught 
on the transfered quota plus some additional catch in Village A. In that way, Village A will lose some 
quotas but gain some landings at the expense of Village B, which has gained some quota. 
THE TRADE'IN QUOTAS 
As we mentioned earlier, most vessels opted for the catch quota system in 1984 and 1985 when that 
system started. It is therefore not surprising to find that the volume of quotas traded actually 
2 Traded or transfered. We will include here quotas transfered beween vessels owned by the same firm. Below we 
will show the relative size of the different types of quota transfers. 
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decreased in 1986 when many vessels went over to the effort quota system and when the cod stock 
recovered and quotas for cod were increased. This is shown in figure 6, where the upper line shows 
the ratio of the volume of the groundfish quotas traded each year and the total volume of catch 
quotas for groundfish allocated during that year. The lower line shows the ratio of the volume 
groundfish and shrimp quota traded each year and the total catch of these species during each year. 
In this paper we discuss only trade in groundfish and shrimp quota. Beside these species the capelin, 
herring and the fishing of some crustaceans are managed within an ITQ system. But there have 
been efforts taken to keep the capelin and the herring fishing to certain vessels. This is one of the 
reasons why trading in these quotas is limited. 
Figure 6 
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From 1988, the volume of quotas traded each year has been increasing rapidly and reached 35% of 
the allocated catch quotas in 1990. The cuts in the groundfish quotas each year from 1988-1990 
contributed certainly to this development. When a vessel owner doesn't have enough quotas for his 
vessel he starts to look for the most efficient ways to utilise his resources and not surprisingly he 
often finds that he can improve his efficiency by changing the original allocation of quotas which is 
decided by crude administrative methods. 
A second factor which contributed to this increase in the quota-trade was that the vessel-owners 
began to see the new system as a permanent part of their economic environment and began to 
adjust to it. In the beginning there was a lot of prejudices against trading in quotas. Many fishermen, 
and a lot of others as well, thought that it was immoral to 'sell the fish in the sea before it was 
caught'. There were also those who thought that if they sold some quota and consequently they 
would catch less, then there might come along some Minister of Fisheries which decided on a new 
reference period for the allocation of quotas. Someone who sold part of his quota would be 
suspected of not being able to catch all of it and would therefore not be entitled to it on a permanent 
basis. 
There are obviously many reasons why vessel-owners sell and buy quotas. Some have some quotas 
for a species which it is difficult to catch from the harbour where the vessel is located. In that way a 
vessel-owner on the south who owns some shrimp quota may decide to sell it to the north where 
the vessels are better located for catching shrimp. Some may have such a small quota for some 
species that it does not pay to buy the necessary gear to catch it. In that way the number of vessels 
which caught some shrimp in 1989 was 184 but 251 had some shrimp quota allocated to them. In 
1990 these figures were 175 and 246. 
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It is more difficult to specify the reasons behind the trading in groundfish. Some of it may be because 
catching of different groundfish species has developed differently in different parts of the country. 
Some of it may be because of efforts to rationalise and keep some vessels out of operation for a 
part of the year or for the whole year. Accidents accounts for some, etc. It is also the main argument 
for allowing trading in quotas that it is impossible to foresee all the ways that trading in quotas can 
improve efficiency. 
The Ministry of Fisheries in Iceland classifies the transfers of quotas into four categories. In the first 
category (called A) there are transfers of quotas between vessels which are owned by the same 
firm. In the second category (B) there are transfers of quotas between vessels which are registered 
in the same harbour. In the third category (C) there are transfers of quotas between vessels registered 
in different harbours, but where the trading is based on exchanges of quotas of equal value. In the 
fourth category (D) there are other transfers of quotas between vessels registered in different 
harbours (i.e. other than those in C). Figure 7 shows the relative share of these different categories. 
Figure 7 
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Figure 7 shows that the category D transfers have been on the increase while category B has been 
decreasing. This seems natural development of the quota trade. It takes time for the vessel-owners 
to learn to operate in this new environment and get information about the possiblp. quota deals. 
They naturally start with other vessels in the same harbour and then gradually learn about other 
possibilities. As transfers of type D are the ones which had to be formally approved by the local 
authorities its increase reflects probably also that the local authorities were learning about the quota 
system as well. 
The law that was in effect before 1991 stipulated that the local authorities had to approve of all quota 
transfers of category D (except for shrimp, which opened up certain possibilities, which suprisingly 
few utilised). It seems that the local authorities have in most cases approved the quota transfers. 
The new law stipulated that local authorities have to be informed about quotas sold to someone in 
other municipalities, and that the local authorities have the first option to buy a fishing vessel which 
is to be sold to someone in another municipality. 
It is to be expected that transfers of category A are preferred by the vessel-owners. It is though 
difficult to tell what should be the share of this type of transfers when the trading is optimal. As 
many firms in Iceland own more than one vessel there is considerable scope for transfers between 
vessels owned by the same firm. During 1989 and 1990 the vessels owned by firms that owned 
more than one vessel had 40% of the catch quota for groundfish and shrimp. 
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ABSTRACT 
This paper evaluates role of the Fisheries Cofradias (guilds) in the management and control of the 
littoral fisheries in the Mediterranean and the potential cost that the loss of some of their role and 
skills could have, in view of the establishment of Producers Organisations. 
1. Introduction 
In this paper we shall emphasize the difference between the fishing structures of the Mediterranean 
and the Atlantic. This distinction is not based on technological backwardness or on a lack of 
investment, but on the different use of resources: a greater variety of species: more widely dispersed 
and with greater market value. Because of this divergence, it seems logical to deduce that the 
European Community needs to apply different policies to different fishing grounds. We shall d~al 
specifically with the conflicts which can arise as a result of exporting to the Mediterranean a policy 
of fishery organisation designed for the Atlantic. 
One of the most important effects of the fishing association is its capacity to regulate the exploitation 
of fishing resources. The stronger the association, the closer the similarity between the behaviour 
of the fishing communities and the theoretical behaviour of the sale propietor of the resources and 
the weaker the association, the closer the similarity in behaviour to explOitation by free access. 
When the level of technology creates over·fishing through free access, this aspect becomes crucial 
for any rational operation. All the indications are that this is what is taking place in the Mediterranean. 
If we apply the methodology introduced in our study' commissioned by the EC, ",!e can conclude 
that the net income of the fishing companies on the Catalonian coast IS now practically eqUivalent 
to the subsidy they receive allotted to fuel stands out at 65% of the total subsidy. This does not 
include the various items of credit which the sector receives at very favourable rates, and does not 
take into account the public cost of surveillance, or the cost of the institutions that carry out of 
fishing policy in the regions, the state and the European Community. A similar situation exists in 
the rest of the Spanish Mediterranean, but reliable data are available only for Catalonia. 
The subsidies came about in the 1960's as a result of pressure from the fishing sector, which in the 
short term benefited since this reduced their costs. In those years the fishing policies for the Atlantic 
were extended to the Mediterranean. The subsidies, which were given to deep-sea fishermen to 
assist their access to international waters also became a general practice in coastal fishing. Since 
then, the problem of over-investment in these fishing grounds has worsened. Practically all the 
fishing grounds in the Mediterranean are coastal and it is here, that the worst problems have 
occurred. 
1 R. Franquesa and R. Lostado "Estudio Economic? de la pes9ueria d~ C~taluna y Valencia", V?I. II, Cap. 11, en J. 
Lleonart (director), 1990, La pesqueria de Gata/una y ValenCia: desenpelOn global y planteamlento de bases para 
su seguimiento, Reference CSIS No. 279, financed by DG XIV of the EEC. 
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TABLE 1 
Profits and aid in Catalonia for 1989 ( millions of pesetas) 
(A) Production accounts 
Gross Income for sales 
Salaries, Fuel, Victualling 
Gross Exploitation Margin 
Gross exploitation margin 
Maintenance Cost 
Estimated net Profitability 
(B) Administrative supports 
Fuel Subsidy 
Salary for Guild (Cofradias) staff 
Direct aid DGP 
ECC: Port structure 
Financing of computerisation 
Ship building EEC/MAPA 
Ship Modernisation EEC/MAPA 
Total Administrative financing 
(C) Real Profitability 
Estimated net Profitability 
Administrative financing 
Real net Profitability 
(D) Other Supports 
Preference Credits ICCA 
18,009 
-12,254 
5,755 
5,755 
-2,820 
2,935 
1,850 
200 
240 
437 
30u 
33 
41 
2,831 
2,935 
2,831 
104 
1,613 
The figures for profitability and subsidies provide us with information on three of the crucial issues 
in the present situation in the Spanish Mediterranean. 
Firstly, the administration creates incentives for investment, specifically for the type of investment 
that encourages technology with high fuel consuption (trawling), this leads to the deregulation of 
the operation and encourages its expansion in an over-fishing situation. 
Secondly, the administration is heavily conditioned, from the social point of view, to manage things 
for the short term. It would be difficult to make quick changes because the fishing sector is now 
dependent for its survival on subsidies. 
Thirdly, the current amount spent on aid suggests that itwould not be rational to increase expenditure 
in at this sector; neither does it seem prudent to direct significant funds to the establishment of a 
solid policing body if the cost overrides the potential profit. 
We find ourselves in a situation where one end of the sector on the one hand is trying to regulate 
itself in order to rationalise the operation (bans on fishing, port controls, and so on), but on the other 
hand is receiving signals from the market, based on the existence of large government subsidies, 
which incourages it to increase the efforts. This is the delicate state of affairs in which the Spanish 
Mediterranean fisheries currently find themselves. We shall now analyse each aspect of this 
situation. 
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2. Surveillance versus self-regulation in the fishing sector 
We shall consider two ways of managing and controlling the fisheries: in the first place, the 
regulation offishing activities by bodies external to the sector' (the navy, regional surveillance units) 
Masipcosin, 1987; secondly, the system that controls the sector by self-regulation, with the possibility 
of resorting to the administration to ensure a common framework of reference. External regulation 
is established through a surveillance system by which the administration (through means, staff 
sanctions, statistics and so on) controls the implementation of its own rules. 
As a result of this distinction, there is a dilemma: whether the sector should be regulated by the 
administration or whether it should regulate itself. The first system would entail the additional 
expense of surveillance, which would have to be justified by, and proportional to, the sector's 
profitability. The second case would mean that, in the last resort, the administration would hand 
over the management of state property to the fishing sector. 
In considering the case for self-regulation, we must first consider whether there exist forms of 
independent organisation within the fishing sector capable of rationally controlling operations. 
Therefore, in order to examine up to what point self-regulation could substitute or complement the 
administrative surveillance, we must start by looking at the organisational forms adopted by the 
sector. 
3. Self-Organising Structures in the Fishing Sector 
Both public and private organising bodies work within the same fishing sector. Different types of 
associations (guilds, - cofradias -, co-operatives, trade unions and producers organisations) have 
emerged in the Spanish fishing sector to cope with the mounting degree of specialisation among 
the various fleets and ways of fishing, or in response to changes in the law. 
We shall now examine the guilds (cofradias) and producers' organisations, because within their 
constitutional objectives, both of the organisations aim to regulate the explotation of natural fishing 
resources. 
3. (a) The fishing guilds (Cofradias) 
Guilds came about at the end of the eleventh century to provide cooperation and mutual assistance 
for their members.3 Nowadays membership is limited to owners and fishermen of fishing vessels 
of less than 150 Gross Registered Tonnes (GRT), which mostly engage in coastal fishing. 
The Guilds' legal status4 is that of a public corporation which can operate as a consulting body and 
collaborate with the fishing administration. Guilds are free to organise their own constitution and 
membership. The cost of their activities is covered by membership fees and by the payment of a 
percentage of all the fish sold on the fish market. 
The basic characteristics of the guilds are as follows: 
• Family ownership or joint ownership of property. 
• The distribution of income is carried out 'by shares'. That is the vessel owner first deducts 
the fixed cost of operating the fishing boat and then distributes the net profit in proportional 
'shares' which make up a 'salary'. 
• Fishing is carried out in fairly stable fishing grounds, managed by the respective guilds. 
• The guild port is the usual workplace for the guild's members, and members usually sell their 
fresh produce there. 
2 J. Masip Cosin, 1987, "La vigilancia es una inversion. Un ejemplo practico", Investigaciones Pesqueras num 51, 
Sup!. 2: pp. 55·64. 
3 F. Galindo and F. Lozano, 1988, "Estructuras organizativas del sector pesquero espanal", Informacion Camercial 
Espanola, nurn. 653-654, pag. 55. 
4 Real Decreta 670/1978 de 11 de marzo. Anon. 1978 Royal Decree 670/1978 of 11th March. 
141 
Irish Fisheries Investigations Series B, No. 42 (1994) 
• The complex fiscal laws operating in any modern economy, the low cultural level of the 
fishermen and the limited size of family operations enable the guilds to take over the 
administration and management of its members' affairs. 
These characteristics have arisen mostly because the guilds oversee coastal fishing. This is the only 
type of fishing carried out in the North-West Mediterranean (Valencia and Catalonia), it is regulated 
by 22 guilds in Valencia and 29 in Catalonia. Timetables in this area established by the respective 
guilds, in blocks of 12 hours a day, from Monday to Friday. 
3_ (b) Producers'Organisations 
The roots of the producers' organisations are in the EC organisations, set up within the framework 
of the Common Agricultural Policy for the agricultural product that are the hardest to sell. The 
extension of price policies to the fishing sector, invloved the standardisation of products and the 
creation of organisational structures for which producers made themselves became responsible. 
These structures became the producers' organisations. 
They were set up in 1970' to rationalise the fishing industry. They are empowered to establish plans 
for fish catching, to centralise sales offer, to apply a pricing system (basically, by withdrawing excess 
produce at a guaranteed price) and to improve selling conditions. 
These organisations must be recognised by the administration' and must be set up on the producer's 
own initiative. However, the concept of a 'producer' has not been clearly defined. In practice, the 
'producer' is someone who earns an income from the capture and sale of fish. In the case of coastal 
fishing, where the crew and the vessel owner share the produce, either could be considered to be 
the producer. However, officially, the EC considers that producers' organisations should be made 
up solely of vessel owners. 
Membership of a producer's organisation means that members must sell all their produce through 
the organisation and must accept the established rules of sale and production. 
3. (c) The setting up of producer's organisations in Spain 
As a member state of the EC, Spain has had to alter its structures quickly. This process has resulted 
in some contradictions between the traditional guilds and the new producers' organisations. 
In the North-West Mediterranean the producers' organisations have been created in the bosoms of 
the guilds. They have had to adapt their constitutions in order to comply with Community norms. 
They are exist as institutions in order to benefit from the Common Fishing Policy. In reality, the 
producer's organisations are a mere faQade. They have administrative powers but are in fact, 
controlled by the Guilds. Once again, pragmatism has imposed itself on the Administration's 
bureaucratic directives. 
The fishing guilds have dodged the official obstacles inherited from their status as public bodies. 
We can therefore assert that the Spanish coastal fishing producer's organisations are being built on 
the foundations of the guilds and, specifically with reference to the Mediterranean, on the provincial 
federations of these guilds. 
The fact that the guilds and the pas have similar powers and objectives should not obscure their 
differences: 
(a) While all fishermen are grouped together under the guilds, the pas only bring together the 
vessel-owners. However, the profitability of coastal fishing is due to the direct participation 
of owners and employees, a situation which makes a system of salaries' unfeasible. It is 
5 Reglamento CEE 2142/70. Afterthis the proposed characteristics remained constant throughout the base regulations 
published in 1976 (Reglamento GEE 100176) and in 1981 (Reglamento GEE 2796/81). Anon .. 1979. 
6 Reglamento GEE 2062/80. Anon., 1980. 
7 R. Franquesa, 1987, Teories sobre l'explotaci6 dels recursos naturals renovables. Una aplicatio 81 cas de fa pesea 
a Catalunva, Doctoral Thesis, Universitat de Barcelona, Vol. I, pag. 134-136. 
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hard to imagine that the fishermen will accept any association which does not recognise the 
right to participate in the working out of self-regulating norms. Self-regulation is based on 
the effectiveness of the agreements, signed by all those who take part in the operation. 
Given the characteristics of coastal fishing, it is hard to imagine that any agreement could 
be viable without the participation of all the fishermen. 
(b) The guilds control the entire production all species in a given geographical area. The 
organisational structure of the pas exploits a particular type of fishing ground, a fact that 
gives rise to a potential disagreement; if the various arts of fishing come into conflict, the 
pas would become platforms representing each art. In contrast to the guilds the pas do not 
permit compensation for such a conflict, which is certainly frequent in Mediterranean coastal 
fishing. 
(c) The size of the guilds' ports are adequate for the fisherman, who are never out more than 
6 hours sailing time away from their base. The pas cover a much greater area (province), 
there being only 6 producers' organisations, compared to 51 Guilds in the Spanish north-
West Mediterranean. Real control among the fishermen is much more effective if the 
regulated area is of similar size to the work area of those who regulate themselves. 
(d) The guilds control and manage the markets where the produce is sold. The pas should alter 
or set up new commercial stages in order to centralise the existing landing system in fresh 
fish ports within their provincial jurisdiction). This would affect the quality of the produce 
and the systems of work. 
In the meantime, any possible problems have been avoided by matching the spirit to the law; 
officially, coastal fishing is carried out within the Community frameworks, but in practice is it the 
guild frameworks which are adhered to. The fact that this has not resulted in conflict is linked to the 
fact that Mediterranean coastal fishermen can obtain a much higher price on the market than the 
guaranteed price. Therefore the pas have lost one oftheir basic functions: to control the guaranteed 
prices established by the EC. 
The effect of the EC norms has been to create fictitious institutions so that the real situation could 
be fitted into frameworks worked out by Community bodies. But the problem is not only official. 
This fiction which has so far proved to be innocuous, has opened up the possibility of deregulating 
the coastal fishing sector. However the cost and consequences of this situation have not yet been 
estimated. 
4_ The Specific Case of North-Western Mediterranean Fishing: Coastal Fishing 
Whatever changes are made in the organanization of the fishing sector, they must take into account 
the implications that stem from effective resource control. Experience shows, that in the region 
under observation, effective economic surveillance is in the hands of the guilds i.e. the fishermen. 
A group of administrative regulations exist which has little chance of being put into practice because 
the fishermen have refused to accept them. On the other hand, once the fishermen, through their 
guild, establish a norm (timetable, nets, and so on etc), it is followed very strictly, even though it 
has not been legally established. 
The guilds have to hand very powerful self-regulation mechanisms, in the respect that they have a 
massive potential which is far more effective economically in controlling the home market than 
administrative sanctions. This has its advantages and disadvantages. The main advantage is obvious, 
the low cost and the effectiveness of a surveillance system. The disadvantages stem from the fact 
that the administration is forced to convince the sector of some of its measures, which can at times 
delay or limit its capacity for action. Within this context, whatever the control system used, it 
must be a compromise. The administration can look for methods of control by using political-
administrative measures which will not be laughed at by the fishing sector (the price of fuel, 
permission to moor boats in ports, aid, etc.) but at the same time, it does not make economic sense 
to reject a control system which, in spite of its limitations, is very cheap, and which has managed to 
maintain a satisfactory equilibrium. 
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It sh~uld also be noted that in the Spanish fishing grounds controlled by the guilds, overfishing and 
verl~vestment have never caused a breakdown of the operations, whereas this has happened in 
certain deep-sea fishing grounds which have not been controlled by the guilds. 
It is necessary at this stage to emphasize that the poor efficiency of administrative surveillance can 
be explained by the Inadequate level offunds given to this sector. Once beyond the guidelines 
directly. established by the guilds, surveillance seems to be ineffective and very costly. For this 
reason It may be danger~s to reduce the true capacity of the guilds, by applying to the letter the 
formulas used by the EC In the AtlantiC (producers' organisations). The truth is that these days, 
effective surveillance '~ the Mediterranean is in the hands of the guilds (or with similar organisations 
In France and Italy). Glve~ this risk, one must consider what price one would be prepared to pay in 
order to change the tradltl~al system of control. That is why it would be interesting to recall what 
the net Income from fishing IS: 2,935 million pesetas in 1989 within Catalonia. 
If we consider that in rde~ to be certain of adequate surveillance of this zone, at a minimum it 
reqUires some 15 patr?ls, with 75 crews, a body of land based inspectors that will include the 29 fish 
markets, then even with very low estimates, we are already talking about an initial investment on 
b~ats of between 1.000 a.nd 1.200 millions and an annual cost of between approximately 300-500 
million pesetas, all of thiS In order to obtain a result which is probably inferior to that already 
obtained by the gUilds. 
So the question is: does it make sense to increase the administration's expenses with respect to 
surveillance groups? 
In our view, a rational solution to the problem would be restrict the expansion of the forces in order 
to avord the over dimensionalisation of the over financed sector. However, once admi~istrative 
incentives for over-Investment have ceased, the priority should be to limit the regulations as little 
as pOSSible and to. allow the GUilds, under strict supervision by the administration, to adapt their 
efforts to their environment. 
One potential problem, is the following: 
• If the fishing. sector should directly confront the consequences of joining the European 
Community, In a process which undoubtedly brings with it irregularities and unpredicted 
tension; 
• If excessive investment would lead to a policy to reduce the European fleet by 40%. 
• If up until now the administration has been incapable of effectively controlling the fishin 
sector; g 
• If it is implausible to think about a substantial increase in surveillance, because in net income, 
the fishing sector now receives more money than it generates; 
• If this at the same time leads to an associative structure, which among other thing duplicates 
the functions of self-regulation. ' 
Then there is obviously a clear risk in ending traditional self-regulation systems by legally dis-
mantaling the guild~, and substituting new regulatory systems, when the new pr~ducers' organ-
IZations lack the SOCial basIs necessary to Impose their regulation. 
The danger of this situation is the fact that, legally, the self-regulation of the exploitation of the 
present fishing. resource IS assigned to two fishing associations. If it is clear that a duplication of this 
kind '~ Imposslbleto maintain without causing conflicts in the short term, for example, in the face 
of a rigorous administrative reduction of effort, one must begin to evaluate how to overcome this 
duplication: that IS to say, what ought to be taken away in order to define clearly, who, among the 
fishermen, IS responsible for the management of the natural resources. 
The system, which now has its own control mechanism, can undo its own structure by witholding 
authorisation of some of the guilds' basic responsibilities. The sad thing is about this situation would 
be about thiS IS that only under these circumstances would the authorities give warning of their 
unWillingness to pay for a new, effective surveillance system because of its high cost. 
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The administration (at all levels - from Community to regional) should be extremely careful notto 
destroy management methods that have, proved their worth within the highly complicated frame-
work of coastal fishing. On the other hand, it does not seem to be the best moment to introduce 
ambiguity into the traditional system of self-regulation, when it is on the point of an important 
reconversion which is aimed at reducing the forces. 
Before trying to apply uniform models (at the EC level). to operations that are very different from 
those being analysed, it is important to consider the possible consequences of such an action, and 
also to consider using something that already exists (guilds) for the type of management that the 
administration proposed. 
5. Some recommendations about the future common fishing policy of mediterranean 
fishing 
Traditionally the guilds which have regulated coastal fishing and the conflicts that occur in the 
Spanish North-West Mediterranean. These conflicts arise because of an activity which exploits a 
freely accessible, renewable natural resource. In practice, the guilds have come to occupy the role 
of quasi proprietor in this situation, acting as a collective, rationalising proprietor of a freely 
accessible and renewable resource. 
In order to fulfil this role, the guilds have supplied a series of mechanisms (timetable control, 
supervision of the art of fishing, size control) which have been perfected by everyday practice. This 
allows the objective of the rational use of resources to be fullfilled at the lowest possible cost. The 
guilds have often applied regulating measures in their zones which are much stricter than those 
legally established by the administration. The mere fact that it has survived historically should be 
enough to draw one's attention. 
The peculiarity of coastal fishing is not based on the subjective will for survival of certain institutions 
but rather on the objective diversity of the species and the proceeds of capture, the relatively small 
scale of these captures, and the need to resort to small-scale methods of fishing. All this creates an 
enviroment in which the models of work based on a certain level of business concentration are not 
viable. This is characteristic of fishing grounds such as the Atlantic which generate a product of 
quantitative importance but qualitatively of limited diversification. It is not possible to alter this 
enviroment, at least not with the presently available techonolgy. 
Given this situation, it could prove to be both costly and inefficient to introduce management 
methods that have been established legally in other parts of the EC. It is not the right moment to 
force the administration to convert its legal powers of surveillance and control into purely fictional 
operations, when in fact these have developed from the guilds, because the truth is, that the situation 
in the Mediterranean is quite different from that in the Atlantic whare the EC Common Fisheries 
Policy has been developed. There are many more managers and types of activity and there is much 
more decentralization of production. 
This does not mean that the administration should relinquish its control, or that it should leave the 
management of political fishing grounds exclusively to the Guilds. The administration will continue 
to concede certain aspects of control to the fishing associations, prefering to manage directly those 
measures that it can adopt efficiently and simply-subsidies, the cost of fuel, the quality control of 
the markets, operation permits, capacity control, etc. 
It is useless to imagine for example, that the administration should control the timetable of every 
port, because itwould be counterproductive to have civil servants enforcing rules when the fishermen 
effectively enforce these very same rules at zero cost. Even more counterproductive would be to have 
civile servants trying to regularise the force by establishing reduced timetables while maintaining 
investment subsidies and fuel. This would only imply an increase in public spending with no result. 
It is clear that the potential return in no way justifies such an expense and that the traditional systems 
of self-regulation can work at a very low cost, as long as it is clearly indicated who is in charge. 
Faced with such a situation, it is worthwhile economic asking which economic policies can the EC 
establish to improve the situation. An important aspect of this question is the need to facilitate an 
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agreement between the different levels of the administration regional government member states 
and the EC, in relation to the specific policy of the Mediterranean coastal fishing grounds. Without 
a basic agreement on the fundamental issues, it is going to be even more difficult to avoid 
contradictions and the co-operative use by some groups of fishermen of certain aspects of the 
regulations against others. Some of the possible elements necessary to form the basis of this 
fundamental agreement could include the following: 
The first step should be to establish a differential management regime for Mediterranean coastal 
fishing, separating it from that which has evolved for the Atlantic fishing grounds8 
This implies a concerted effort by all parties: 
la) First the EEC should abandon uniformity, because the true situation is not like this. The fact 
that they are all fishermen does not mean that the productive, biological, technological and 
organisational frameworks are alike. It is clearly an effort for the EC to renounce the 
uniformity in the associative structure of the fishing sector, but it ought to realise that it is 
not dealing with peculiarities derived from state frameworks, but with different forms of 
production associated with diverse geographical frameworks. The associative unification 
ought to be based on the uniformity of the whole of the Mediterranean community and 
coastal fishing, which has the same peculiarity lor dissimilarity from the Atlantic) in the 
French, Italian or Greek Mediterranean. 
(b) The member states should stop forcing the extension of Community measures directed 
towards the Atlantic with the aim of maximising the level of aid obtained. Both Spain and 
France should divide their fishing activities, which would require a geographical dif-
ferentiation between the Atlantic and the Mediterranean. Moreover, regional governments 
with jurisdiction in the region of Mediterranean coastal fishing should establish a relationship 
between their own states and the EC, by looking for a common policy for the areas which 
practice coastal fishing, and should give up trying to compare their grievances with those 
experience in the Atlantic fishing grounds. 
After this principal agreement, the second stage could be seen as the development of a fishing 
policy being designed to suit the needs and potential of Mediterranean coastal fishing: policies that 
can be directed not only to the rational development or its potential with regard to self-regulation 
but used to improving the quality and commercialisation of the operation, abandoning worn out 
policies directed towards developing the fishing effort in the obviously limited grounds of the 
Mediterranean. 
In practice, this differential treatment means rejecting the implantation policy being enforced by the 
producers' organisations and fitting into the Community plan, and other countries corresponding 
organisations such as the Proudhomeries (France), Co-operatives (italy) etc., making norms and 
names uniform if this so desired, but maintaining the commun organisational form of these 
institutionsLe management of all fishing resources based on a specific geographical area of the 
fishing coast, strictly outlining management areas within the work zone and the comercialisation of 
each fishing community, active participation by all fishermen (owners and employees) in the 
democratic management of their associations, etc. 
The coming into force of the norm which regulates the Community fishing policy implies a reduction 
in the powers ofthe state and of regional governments. This is nothing more than the firm application 
of a basic Community principle which makes possible the ideal of a united Europe. However, one 
should not conclude that Community norms can be established with uniformity ans still be com-
patible with the different truths that shape the different parts of this Community. 
After an exhaustive study of the fishing industry in the North-West Spanish Mediterranean, and 
considering the situation of Spanish coastal fishing in the rest of the Mediterranean, we contend 
that the difficulties in adopting determined associative forms do not stem from supposed national 
differences Ithe longest tradition of the Spanish fishing sector), but rather from structural differences 
8 R. Lostado, 1991, Analisi economica del sector productiu pesca 81 Pais Valencia en eJ marc de la adhesi6 d'Espanva 
a /a GEE, Thesis Doctoral. Universitat Autonomaa de Barcelona, Vol. I. cap. V, pag. 140~153. 
146 
R. Franquesa and R. Lostado: Producer's Organizations & Autoregulation Prob. in Med. Litt. Fish. 
in fishing operations (between the Atlantic and the Mediterranean, between coastal fishing and 
deep-sea fishing) which should treated differently by Community law. 
These difficulties and conflicts stem from the fact that we are dealing with different types of 
fish rather than with different countries. The solution probably lies in establishing different legal 
frameworks for each type of fish, with one framework for each country. The potential loss of 
uniformity would be compensated for by a greater realism in the legal aspects of the subject and 
consequently by more efficient Community policies. 
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The Deterioration of the Environment, Flexibility of 
Reaction, and Rent: The Case of a Lagoon Area 
1. Introduction 
by 
MICHEL GARRABE and MARIE-HELENE DABAT 
Centre d'Etudes des Projects (CEP), Montpelier, France 
The object of this study is to examine the integration of recognition of the increasing environmental 
risks into shellfish-breeding activities in the Thau Lagoon in Languedoc-Rousillon and the con-
sequences of the deterioration of the environment in terms of variations in the financial income and 
the rent of these producers, defining 'rent' as payment made to a means of mproduction over and 
above its opportunity cost. TheThau lagoon is a salt-water lagoon of 7,500 hectares, 19.5 km long 
with a capacity of 300m3 It is the second largest lagoon in France, with 700 shellfish farms and 850 
concessions (1987). Its production in 1987 was 17,000 tonnes of oysters and 8,000 tonnes of mussels, 
with a n added value for the complete production line of 163,000 million francs. 
This report follows three previous ones by the Centre d'Etudes de Projets which were; 
1. A report on the flexibility in fisheries activities (Garrabe, Dabat and Rey, 1990) for the second 
European Association of Fisheries Economists meeting dealing with distinctive features in the 
capacity and adaptability of aquatic farmers in relation to the changes in their environment. 
(Garrabe, Dabat and Rey, 1990). Examples taken from the four sub-divisions of traditional 
aquaculture, the new aquaculture, non-industrial fishing, trawler and tuna fishing allow us 
to observe the mechanisms of emergence and of inhibition of flexibility in production 
units. 
2. A report on systems of shellfish-breeding exploitation's in the Thau Lagoon (Garrabe, Daures, 
Antona and Rey, 1988), which shows how the existence of secondary activities by the shellfish 
breeder or of outside family income can lead to specific strategies in marine cultivation. The 
analysis is done on the basis of an investigation of shellfish-breeding in the Thau lagoon 
which allows for the setting up of typology of firms with different strategies concerning 
parameters of size and reproduction. 
3. A publication on the evaluation of the effects of an event damaging the Thau Lagoon 
(Garrabe, 1990), describing the emergence, during the summer of 1987, of a lagoon pollution 
of the "malaigue" type in the Thau Lagoon which resulted in direct and indirect losses. The 
object of the study is to propose an evaluation of the measurable costs by using various 
successive approaches, as will as identifying the costs which cannot be counted. 
This study will include three specific ecological risks; dynophyisis, the "malaigue" and salmonella. 
The first two risks appear locally in a recurrent fashion, whereas the last has appeared only once on 
the Mediterranean coast. The first risk concerns the Thau producers indirectly, whereas the last two 
have directly concerned the lagoon production. 
2. Risks and Production 
2.1 - The operational typology of risks 
The functioning of an activity in a given environment is susceptible to four types of risk (Favereau, 
1989); 
(i) external recurrent risk. 
(ii) external non-recurrent risk. 
(iii) internal recurrent risk. 
(iv) internal non-recurrent risk. 
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The first concerns a type of normal risk such as the fluctuation of prices or market variables or even 
a frequent risk such as a bacteriological accident. The second represents an exceptional risk, not 
necessarily a major one, but of rather less interest; as in the previous case, the producer has no 
control over this risk. The third concerns a type of risk which the environment must support due to 
the activity, but which, because of the insertion of the one in the other, affects it directly and 
continually. The last type of risk has the same characteristics as the preceding one except that it is 
non-repetitive. The classes of risks proposed can be combined in certain cases and may lead to 
irreversible conditions. They determine, however, specific flexibilities of reactions. 
2.2 - A recurrent internal-external risk: the "malaigue" 
This is a phenomenon which chronically affects the lagoons of Languedoc-Roussillon. During the 
"malaigue" which principally comes during calm weather in the summer, the lagoon waters become 
cloudy and change colour (becoming reddish or whitish, and sometimes brownish), This modification 
is accompanied by a release of foul-smelling hydrogen sulphide in the water which thus becomes 
dangerous for most aquatic organisms. This leads to the death of thousands of fish, crustaceans 
and molluscs. When the winds return, the waters clear and the biological cycles recommence. Such 
dystrophic crises occured in the Thau Lagoon in 1975, 1982, 1983 and 1987. The shellfish production 
lost due to the malaige in 1987 was estimated to be between 19 and 43 million francs (at 1987 prices) 
according to the sources (Affaires Maritimes Conchyliculteurs, Centre D' Etudes de Projects). 
2.3 - A non-recurrent external risk: salmonella 
Salmonella is a bacteria capable of rendering oysters and other shellfish toxic but which does not 
lead to any mortality in the biomass, unlike the preceeding phenomenon. It gives rise to serious 
cases of gastro-enteritis in consumers of infected shellfish and can sometimes be deadly. The 
prohibition on shellfish from the Thau Lagoon for a month and a half (from the beginning of 
December 1989 to mid·January 1990) because of salmonella resulted in a serious economic setback 
for the local shellfish-breeding industry, to the sum of 56 million francs in 1990, corresponding to 
4500 t of oysters and 1000 t of mussels because the producers generally sell a high percentage of 
their oysters during the Christmas season. This value is probably overestimated because there is 
no production loss, although there is a delay in sales. These effects certainly exist, though without 
a direct relationship with the quoted figures. 
2.4 - A recurrent external risk: dynophysis 
This phytoplanktonic organism, composed of unicellular algae, secretes a diarrhoetic toxin known 
as the DSP toxin, which can be dangerous for the consumer when there is a certain concentration 
in the mollusca (a gasto-intestinal type of toxicity). The infestation period is usually from April to 
September, and the vehicles of disease are principally mussels and certain other shellfish (filtering 
molluscs): pullet shells, sunset shells, and olive shells, Oyster, sea urchins and violet shells do not 
become toxic (there is only slight contamination). Dynophysis does not develop in lagoons since 
the biological conditions are very different from those of the sea. 
2.5 - Causative factors of occurrence of the risks 
Malaigue 
The factors leading to the malaigue are essentially climatic: very hot weather, an absence of wind 
for several days making the water stagnant, the presence of a slight north wind, which is favourable 
to the upwelling of deep water, and a very sunny period all explain the triggering and the propagation 
of the dystrophic process between June and September. 
However, the underlying causes of the analogue are the accumulation of organic matter in the 
lagoon: natural bio-deposition, the natural macrophytic development of the border zones, shellfish 
bio-deposition, (20 tonnes of dry waste per trestle per year or 400 kg per m3), the waste from 
detachment of oysters at harvest (estimated annual production for the lagoon reaches 10,000 tonnes 
of waste for 20,000 tonnes of shellfish produced (CEPRALMAR < 1988) giving about 9,000-13,000 
tonnes of waste annually (Hamon, 1991)). urban, agricultural and industrial effluents, and the recent 
development of the Sargasso alga. 
The type of management favoured by the breeders seems to playa role in the accumulation of 
organic matter: an increase in the density of shellfish stocking increases the bio-deposition in 
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proportion, and the decrease in light penetration due to this increase in density limits even more 
the consumption of hydrogen sulphide .. The absence of controls for waste deposition of organisms 
on the breeding structures is another aggravating factor. 
Salmonella 
The sources of pollution which can have an effect on the development of salmonella in the Thau 
Lagoon are: the overflow of used water in the municipalities of Bouzigues and Marseillan (bordering 
the lagoon) which happens regularly during heavy rain; the illegal dumping lots in the countryside 
behind the sea which pollute the underground springs; the lagoon-filtering station at Meze which 
discharges salmonella into the lagoon; The sewage disposal station of Mourre Blanc, which is badly 
equipped with sanitary equipment; the water purification stations in the municipalities of Pinet and 
Pomerols which are contaminated by waste from the wine co-operatives; and two areas of the town 
of Sete with 6000 inhabitatants) which are not connected to the purifying station, according to a 
report by P. Deltour, DDASS. These different sources of pollution do not account for the same level 
of pollution nor the same frequency of contamination. The overflow of waste water is limited to 
periods of heavy rain, and the pollution from the wine co-operatives occurs only at a certain period 
of the year. All these factors certainly converged in November and December 1989. 
2.6 - Classification of the causes of risk 
The causes of malaigue and salmonella are attributable to three factors: natural factors, factors 
related specifically to the shellfish-breeding activity, and factors external to shellfish breeding. The 
following table proposes a classification of the causes of risks. 
Types of Causes 
Natural Factors 
Internal shellfish - breeding activity 
factors 
Factors external to shellfish breeding 
F 
TABLE 1 
Causes of Risk 
Causes 
- Natural bio-deposition 
- Natural macrophytic development in 
the border zones 
- The recent development of the 
Sargasso alga 
Shellfish breeding bio-
deposition 
Oyster detaching waste 
Insufficient cleaning of waste 
deposts on the structures 
Bad sanitary equipment at Mourre 
Blanc 
Urban, agricultural and industrial 
effluents 
- The overflow of waste water 
- Forbidden dumping lots in the 
country behind the sea 
- The lagoon filtering station at Meze 
- Wine co-operative wastes 
- Areas of Sete not connected to the 
water treatment station 
Risk 
Malaigue 
Malaigueu 
Malagiue 
Malaigue 
Malaigue 
Malaigue 
Salmonella 
Salmonella 
Salmonella 
Salmonella 
Salmonella 
Salmonella 
Salmonella 
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The ecological risks presented by the Malaigue, Salmonella and Dynophsis seem to be increasingly 
important. 
An investigation conducted among the producers (CEPRALMAR) tends to show that the cases of 
malaigue are no more numerous than in the past, but those observed during the last few years have 
become larger in scale (more extensive damage, larger areas being affects). Before the beginning 
of the 1970's the malaigue occurred essentially in bordering zones, with its extension limited in size 
(a few hectares) as well as in time (a few days a week). It was exceedingly rare that the same zone 
would be affected several times in a season. A natural phenomenon, the malaigue was even 
considered to be an advantage, leading to purification ofthe environment and more plentiful fishing. 
Beginning in 1970-71, the cases of malaigue became larger in size, not being limited to the edges of 
the lagoon, and having the tendency to persist for a long time. In 1975, the shellfish mortality 
attained 100% of the stock in the deep part of the shellfish zone A in the east of the basin. In July 
1982,200 tables in zone 'B' were completely polluted and even more in November of the same year. 
In July 1987, the malaigue extended into zones 'B' and 'C', avoiding only the zones further out and 
ruining 10.5 tonnes of shellfish (Affaires Maritimes). 
The absence of recurrence in Salmonella prevents one from assuming any increase in its risk of 
occurrence. The reinforcement of controls by scientific authorities heightens the probability of 
detection of this bacteria. According to professional workers, no gastro-enteritis occured in 1989 (it 
had been particularly numerous in 1987), but consumers expect the risk to increase. 
Cases of the concentration of dynophis in sea mussels are becoming more and more frequent on 
the Mediterranean coast. 
3. Reactions and Flexibility 
3.1 Types of identified reactions 
Certain activities of shellfish breeders have the effect of increasing the biomass in suspension in the 
Thau lagoon (essentially the first three of the following): 
154 
1. A tendency to resoak the sea mussels in the lagoon. The producers tend to resoak the 
mussels, either to avoid dynophysis (the transfer at the beginning of the summer of con-
taminated shellfish to dynophysis-free water for the required one month's decontamination; 
- the risk of contaminating a healthy sector of the lagoon by such transfers being minimal), 
or because all the mussels which has been detached and prepared out of water have not 
reached a commercial size (these soakings are done all year round and enable the producers 
to avoid the cost of returning small mussels to the lines as well as to dispose of nearby 
stock). Regarding dynophysis, whereas a resoaking of 30 days was sufficient in 1987, as well 
as for those from the beginning of June to the end of July; where six weeks of decon-
tamination were necessary. 
2. A growing tendency to keep shellfish on the trestles all the year round. Until 1982 or 19983, 
it could be estimated that the oyster-breeding biomass was close to the annual commercial 
production. The oysters were laid for breeding in February or March and sold mainly during 
the Christmas season. In the meantime profitability was sustained by mussel sales. As 
mussels are being more and more replaced by oysters, the producers in order to guarantee 
a profit are now obliged to raise and sell oysters all the year round. Thus, from 1980 to 1896, 
the oyster-breeding biomass was almost zero in January and February, and reached 35,000 
tonnes in November and December. In 1987 and after the observations of 1988, it appeared 
that the lagoon supported a biomass approaching 25,000 tonnes during the whole year. 
3. The breeding of large mussels. More and more farmers are allocating large mussels (4 cm. 
half-size) to the breeding stock. They spend only part of the year in the lagoonand are 
immediately replaced after sale. It is therefore possible to have two or three rotations in a 
year and the tables are almost permanently full. This method, however, has only limited 
impact because of the reduction in the overall number of mussels in the lagoon. 
4. Irresponsible attitudes towards the lagoon. The shellfish farmers, in spite of some improve-
ments, still retain irresponsible attitudes, which are harmful to the environment, detrimental 
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for the growth of shellfish and liable to increase the risks of maligue and salmonella: these 
include jettisoning of waste from the detaching process back into the lagoon or near it, the 
inadequate cleaning of the waste deposits on the structures, non-collection of waste deposits 
accumulated under the tables, and insufficient sanitary equipment in certain farmhouses. 
3.2 Types of Corresponding flexibility 
The resoaking of the mussels from the lines in the lagoon and the increase of the rotation of stock 
of mussels and oysters indicate a certain flexibility in production units (Garrabe et al. 1990), as 
indicated by the following flexibilities: 
1. External (or decisional) flexibility of initiative: in the case of resoaking the sea mussels in the 
lagoon vis a vis dynophysis: an attitude of strategic inclusion of the information received 
with regard to modification called for by the external environment. 
2. Internal (or productive) technical flexibility: in the case of the reimmersion of the sea mussels 
in the lagoon and dynophysis and fallback in the lagoon) this flexibility measures the space 
of the production in the choice of process as well as in their internal development. 
3. Internal (or productive) organisation flexibility; in the case of the modification of the pro-
ducers' strategy: the capacity for external development in the production-distribution process 
which is exercised under technical constraints. 
The shellfish farmers' approach to exploitation of the resoource, however, is marked by an absence 
of flexibility. 
4. Rent, Production Cycles, and the overloading of the lagoon: the T box 
The identification of reactions in the face of risk can lead to a certain number of short term and 
medium term consequences: 
4.1 Overloading and production cycles 
In the short term, the main consequence is apparently (1) an excessive increase in the biomass of 
the tables in the lagoon, which results in a longer maturation cycle for the shellfish, and (2) it is also 
possible that the mussels could become rarer in the short term in zones Band C, while (3) In the 
medium term the lengthening of the cycle and the mono-production could lead to vanishing of the 
weaker rents of the lagoon and the disappearance of the less favoured zones. 
4.1.1. Increase in the loading of the trestles 
It is generally accepted that, in order to obtain a satisfactory growth and size for the shellfish, a 
trestle should not support more than thousand cords, these being the main feature of a specialised 
local technique used here for raising mussels Furthermore, from 1980 to 1987, on 70% of the trestles 
in the lagoon, the number of cords per pole (with 51 poles per trestle) varied form 9 to 14. This 
number went up to 21 for a minority of very heavily loaded trestles (2-3%). indicating the likelihood 
of the overloading of some exploitation's which could be harmful to the surrounding trestles. In 
addition, between 1980 and 1987, the number of trestles rose from 2,058 to 2,548 (2,816 planned) in 
the lagoon The average number of cords per trestle increased during the same period from 867 to 
998.9 (from 841.4 to 1061 for Zone A. from 844 to 894.8 for Zone B, and from 918 to 1,041 from zone 
C). with zone A having the greatest increase in loading. 
4.1.2 The increase of the biomass in the lagoon 
The increase of the biomass in the Thau lagoon between 1980 and 1987 was clearly shown by the 
IFREMER scientists who observed an increase of 5,000 T or 14%. The biomass in oysters and mussels 
was 30,397 t in 1980 (calculated by counting the cords and by sample diving during the tourist 
period); it rose to 35,501 tin 1986. The figures for 1987 (25,389 t) are not indicative (one single year, 
a large proportion of mussel broods lost, the year of the malaigue) but it can be assumed that the 
production has gone from a model of a "growing load" during the year in order in reach a maximum 
of 350,000 t in November and December, to a lower "model with a constant load" of approximately 
25,000 T, but now permanently in the lagoon, since the shellfish farmers now breed during the 
whole year (a spreading of the load with an increase of the total load per time unit. 
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4.1.3. The resoaking of the line mussels in the lagoon 
The estimate of the production of mussels from the lines is problematical (between 50000 and 9000 
t for 1990, according to the source). All the licence holders do not give figures, and those who do 
generally supply incomplete figures. Scientists have difficulty distinguishing mussels from the lines 
from other mussels, and since flows occur between the sea and the lagoon all year long, it is difficult 
to follow them. 
4.1.4. The lengthening of the shellfish maturation cvcle 
The IFREMER biologist carefully assume that the oyster cycle could now be from 12 to 24 months 
for glued oysters, compared to the cycle of 12 to 14 months at the beginning of the 1980s. Certain 
shellfish farmers even speak of a 3-year cycle for the oyster. This long-term lengthening of the cycle 
however is not demonstrated since it is related to the short-term enrichment of the plankton in the 
lagoon (the biomass load is not the factor for the lengthening of the cycle, other factors such as 
sunlight and rainfall also have important effects), e.g., the producers currently report good growth 
of shellfish (1991). 
4.1.5. Impact of the change in biomass on the environment (Biological limit of the T. box) 
The knowledge acquired concerning the relation between the biomass and the environment (esti-
mation of the number of shellfish in breeding made from the estimated tonnage, and by the quantity 
of filtered water and this indirectly of the ingestion of nourishing particles) and the theoretical work 
done by IFREMER on the parameters of the Thau lagoon, tend to indicate that the lagoon has a 
sufficient trophic capacity to assure a steady growth of shellfish (the equivalent of the total capacity 
of the lagoon was filtered in 2.81 days in 1986, and the quantities of plankton taken off by the 
shellfish were reconstituted in 24 hours). However, the quantities of plankton consumed by the 
shellfish were replaced in 24 hours). However, the quantities of plankton were calculated as if the 
mollusca were spread out over the 7500 hectares of the lagoon. In addition, only breeding molluscs 
were taken into consideration, whereas rivals such as the ascidian (tunicate - large quantities 
during certain parts of the year) and the various other naturally occuring organisms also exploit the 
plankton. 
4.2. Flexibility and Rent 
Two significant types of rent are generally distinguished by whether they use non-renewable 
resources or renewable resources with an excessive depletion; Malthusian rent and Ricardian rent. 
Malthusian rent measures the advantages of present opportunities for the users who now have a 
resource whereas Ricardian rent measures the advantages of disposing at the beginlling of exploi-
tation conditions with growing incomes. 
In the case of the Thau Lagoon, reserves in nutrients, even though variable, would be stable for the 
short-term. In contrast, the biological mass in suspension increases, and thus the annual exploitation 
production decreases. This is the opposite situation to that pertaining in agriculture where the fall 
of fertility is stopped by an increase in entrants, which diminishes production and where production 
per unit period is maintained by increasing the costs of production. In shellfish farming in the Thau 
Lagoon, periodicity cannot be maintained (it would be necessary to spread the nutrients, which 
would transform the traditional aquaculture into intensive aquaculture); on the contrary the annual 
coasts are maintained but with a decrease of annual production because of lower production 
corresponding to these costs. This means that for the same quantity of production the annual cost 
rises. 
The rent we are discussing here is the Ricardian rent. This model is appreciated in time and space. 
In the Thau Lagoon, there are differentiated three geographical zones (A,B, and C) and seven 
productivity zones, 
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General Representation 
Figure 1 Figure 2 
quantity price and cost 
zone A 
zone B zone C 
p 
zone A 
p 
o 12 18 24 time o q quantity 
In space, the rent can be measured: the rent from zone C (the least favourable) is probably near zero 
for many exploitation's. In this zone, secondary activities express (and mask) the reality of condition, 
from the profitability. The rent of C is lost when the price falls from p to p. For a price p, the rents 
from the zones are graded. 
Thus for quantity G, given for each of the zones, the respective rents are: 
R(A) = op x oq - f~cmA (q) dq 
R(B) = op x oq - f~cmB (q) dq 
R(C) = op x oq - f~cmc (q) dq 
Hence: 
R(A) > R(B) > R(C) 
If 
f~cmdq)dq > HcmB(q)dq > f~cmA(q)dq 
'The lengthening of the production cycle 
We introduce the variable income (RI. mussel-broods (or half mussels or oyster) (N), production 
costs (CP), as well as the result (RBE). 
- With a 2-year cycle 
t=O 
R, = NH + L CP, + RBE, 
t""-2 
t""O 
R, - RBE, = NH + L CP, 
t=-2 
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- With a 3-year cycle 
1=0 
R, - RBE, = NH + :l: cp, 
1=-3 
cost of the lengthening of the cycle: 
1=0 1=0 
K = (N'-3 + :l: CP,) - (NH + :l: CP,) 
1=-3 1=-3 
'Lengthening of the cycle with reproduction expenses (DR) 
- With a 2-year cycle 
1=0 
-:l: DRi 
1=-2 
- With a 3-year cycle 
1=0 
-:l: DRl 
1=-3 
Rent for a single exploitation before the lengthening of the production cycle 
/', Rente = RNi - RNi 
'Lengthening of production cycles with expenditures of reproduction and the increase in the 
loads of the cords 
1=0 
-:l: DRi 
1=-3 
'the t. box 
The observations carried out in the Thau lagoon show that there is a relationship between the initial 
biological load and the length of the maturation cycle. (In the future the biologists must spell out 
this relationship). The change of method by the producers, who now exclusively use half-products, 
could result in the lengthening ofthe traditional cycle, in addition to purely economic considerations., 
To maintain the length of the production cycle under these new conditions will confirm the growth 
of production costs. 
This relationship between the biological load and the length of the cycle, however, implies two 
limits, one biological, the other economic: 
158 
M. Garrabe & Marie Helene Dabat: Deterioration of the Environment, Flexibility of Reaction and Rent 
Quantity of 
larvae 
o 
Figure 3 
M 
B 
A 
Duration of cycle 
T 
Limit A represents the biological limit for the quantity of shellfish in the lagoon, considering their 
nutritional needs and other biological and economic constraints. 
Limit B representss the economical limits ofthe length of the production cycle, This is a limit beyond 
which the farmers would partially or totally abandon their shellfish breeding activities. 
Two types of flexibility can correspond to this limit. 
A flexibility for a large exploitation (zone A): 
Figure 4 
AR ! 
Frontier B 
IR 
o F Duration of cycle 
The lengthening of the cycle will result in a decrease of the annual TRI by one marginal unit of 
investment. The economic limit marking the maximum length of the production cycle appears when 
the rate of profitability of opportunity balances the falling TRI. The expected net rent is in the filled-
in area. 
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A flexibility specifically for smaller exploitations (Zone C) 
revenue 
A 
B 
N1 
Figure 5 
F 
-
N2 
DR1 
DR2 
Duration of cycle 
The annual income decreases when the productive cycle lengthens, with the result that when the 
decrease reaches the level DR1, for a time period of Nl, the farmer,s stock is not able to cover his 
breeding requirements and he must partially abandon his exploitation. Nl thus defines the length 
of the cycle which corresponds to the appearance of secondary activities for a zone and for given 
exploitation. Secondary activities allow for the placing of the level DRl and DR2 and thus the 
acceptance of a new deterioration of his situation (indicated in this case by an increase in the length 
of the of the exploitation cycle). 
5. Consequence and Solutions 
Three types of consequences can result from a decrease in the rent: (i) reduction in the number of 
shellfish farmers in the lagoon, (ii) deterioration of the production zones, with the disappearance of 
the least productive, and (iii) loss of value added in the local production line. 
Reduction in the number of shellfish farmers: This occurs, with a given cycle length, either by the 
disappearance of large enterprises, having obtained a TRI inferior to the alternative production rate 
(Figure 4), or by the disappearance of smaller units, where the secondary activities are not sufficient 
to fill the divergence between the expenses of total reproduction and shellfish income (Figure 5). 
With a rising cycle length, it occurs due to the aggravation of the previous effects (disappearance of 
the more resistant units) due to the continual lengthening of the cycle. 
Deterioration of zones with disappearance of the poorest ones: Since the enterprises in the Thau 
Lagoon are not in equally productive zones, we can expect that the present profitability of the most 
productive tables (zone A. with the most rapid growth rate) could become a profitability of the type 
of zone B, which would in turn become a zone C type profitability, with the tables the least productive 
zone in the lagoon (zone C) disappearing because the economic limit in the T. Box has been 
exceeded. 
Loss of the value added in the production line: The decrease in shellfish-breeding activity because 
of the disappearance of a certain number of producers would have effects on the firms working 
upstream and downstream in the production sector, particularly at the local level: 163000 MF of 
value added (production sector 143,000 upstream sector 17,000 and the downstream sector 3000) 
and 875 jobs in the production line in 1986 (Garrabe and Rey, 1987). 
Solutions are to be recommended (or are being applied) to clean up the Thau Lagoon in order to 
limit the ecological risk and to limit the decrease of the rent by restructuring the Thau Lagoon 
exploitation. These include the Bay Contract, and the Shellfish Breeding Scheme: 
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Bay Contract ("Contrat de Baie"): 
The knowledge and awareness necessary for purification of the lagoon has been realised by the 
"Contrat de Baie" (1990-1995) of a total cost of 188 MF (principally financed by the EC, the basin 
agencies, and the local municipalities); its aims are 
(i) the improvement of the knowledge of the eco-system of the lagoon: the contribution of the 
hillside basin, water sediment echanges, exchanges between the sea and the lagoon, and 
the technological and scientific supervision of the basin, 
(ii) the improvement of the quality of the water: the treatment of all the effluents from the 
communitieson the sloping sides of the basin, the treatment of oyster detachment waste, 
the channelling of rivers and retaining basins, and the treatment of waste water from 
industrial firms. 
(iii) the modernisation of shellfish-breeding production lines (collective work ofthe improvement 
of the shellfish zones and hydraulic work: water taps, input or evacuation piping and the 
modernisation of the production and loading buildings). 
Shellfish breeding scheme ("schema conchylicole") 
This scheme, at the present only on the drawing board, aims to reorganise the tables in the Thau 
Lagoon from a spatial point of view. A different spatial installation, with the installations farther out 
and the improved spacing of the tables and the cords on the tables, should allow the product to 
grow more rapidly. 
Conclusions 
The relations between the economical, biological and ecological parameters considered here and 
the decrease in rent can be sysnthesized in the scheme illustrated in Figure 6, below: 
Figure 6 
Relationship between Parameters 
Reduction in 
number of shellfish 
farmers 
Deterioration 
of zones 
of productivity 
t 
Loss of added value 
in the sector 
t t 
Risks r 
Reduction in returns 
Reductirn in rent 
verification 
Dinophysis --.Increase in biomass (summer)rr 
* T.Box Increase in duration 
. alaigue .. Increase ,n b,omass t* t 
"'S I II (over thE: year) 
l * *: ti,,,,,,", of ''0''''''" *: of ,,0,"""" ,,,,, 
a m~ne.e. 1* l~ 1* Harvest Other factors (m tlvatlo /rlsk) by producers iml?inging in the 
Returning mussels durat,on of the cycle 
Relaying to the water. Replacement of 
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(Economic motivation) 
* Behaviour 
'* Relationships to clarify - Hypothesis 
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Relations are to be as indicated in the previous model: 
(i) as the supposed connection between the increase of the risk and the method of spreading 
of the shellfish breeder's production, 
(ii) the interactions between the increase in the loading of the basin and the lengthening of the 
cycle of the exploitation of shellfish (limit of overloading). 
Observations on the shellfish biomass in the Thau lagoon were carried out by IFREMER until 1987 
(Hamon and Tournier, op.cit.) when they were interrupted. Continuation of the observations on the 
biomass atthe appropriate standard of sampling programme design (sampling system to be random, 
several measuring during the year), given the modification of the exploitation strategy by the 
shellfish farmers, is indispensable to the continuation of this analysis. 
We emphasise here that the rarefaction of the mussels in the Thau lagoon (mono production) may 
result in a certain rigidity of the shellfish exploitation. 
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1. Introduction 
In 1990 the European Association of Fisheries Economists (EAFE) was asked by the Commission of 
the European Communities, Directorate XIV Fisheries to carry out "An Evaluation of the Effectiveness 
of the Aquaculture Support policies of the Commission with Special Reference to Regulation 
4028186. "This was the first study carried out by the new association and it is appropriate for EAFE 
to review the procedures and processes which were used as a guideline for future studies. In a wider 
context, with the enhancement of the role of the European Commission such studies will be 
increasingly necessary and will require methodologies similar to those adopted on this occasion. 
This paper may therefore offer some guidelines that will be of general value to those conducting 
studies in a variety of sectors on an EC-wide basis. First, the main characteristics of the study are 
described, followed by a description of methodologies. An evaluation of the methodologies follows, 
together with suggested guidelines for future research of this type. 
2. The Study 
First, the study required a report on the state of aquaculture by species in the countries of the 
European Community, with details of current production levels, production systems and business 
structures and expected future developments. Secondly it involved an evaluation of the effectiveness 
of both national and European aquaculture support policies by investigation of a sample of recipients 
of aid and by interviews with industry experts. Finally, on the basis ofthe findings, recommendations 
were made for future support policies. The study was formally commissioned in April 1990 and the 
report containing findings and recommendations was submitted to the Commission at the end of 
September 1990. 
The distinguishing feature of this study was the extensive delegation of parts of the study to 
researchers in each of the Member States in the Community. The two conveners of the study were 
responsible for the co-ordination of the study, for aggregation of findings into a single master report 
and for the provision of recommendations for the future on the basis of collective findings. The two 
conveners worked as a team (although in separate locations). Responsibility for the provision of a 
report relating to each Member State was delegated. In total 11 researchers (all EAFE members) 
from 11 different institutions were responsibility for the various sections of the study. Considerably 
more researchers were in total involved, working under the direction of the 11 principal researchers. 
An alternative method of managing the study would have been the use of a much smaller team of 
researchers from a single institution, carrying out all parts ofthe study in the Community themselves. 
This is probably a more typical approach to project management. Both approaches have advantages 
and disadvantages. A smaller team with less delegation would have made it possible to use more 
flexible and less structured approaches. A smaller team, because of its common view of research 
would probably have collected data which were more easily comparable across countries and certain 
the costs of project co-ordination would have been much lower. However, a larger team offered the 
benefit of more detailed individual country knowledge and better local contacts. 
*See Appendix for present address. 
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There are two main reasons why on balance the consortium multi-participant approach was chosen 
for this study: 
(i) Experts based in each Member State could produce a greater depth of analysis within the 
budget available than would have been possible if fewer researchers had been used because 
of their core knowledge of each country and the reduction in travelling costs. 
(ii) Given the tight deadlines for the study, it would have been very difficult to complete the 
study on time using fewer researchers. 
An additional benefit, although it did not influence choice was that this method provided an 
opportunity to improve the cohesiveness of EAFE and demonstrate its effectiveness as a European 
Association. 
3. Project Organisation and Methodology 
EAFE wished to produce a report that would meet the requirements of the Commission in terms of 
coverage and quality of analysis, on time and in a cost effective manner. The way in which this was 
achieved is described as a series of stages: planning, implementation, quality control and delivery. 
The data requirements, methodologies and timing of the project were listed and planned by the 
conveners in early April 1990. It was decided that, with so many participants, the key to success lay 
in ensuring that data were produced on as consistent a basis as possible across countries and that 
the same procedures were followed by each researcher. Therefore, a manual was designed which 
gave data requirements and the methodologies to be used in each Member State. Where it was 
possible to quantify, the manual contained forms to be completed by each participant. For more 
qualitative data, a questionnaire approach was adopted. Examples can be seen in Figures 1 and 2. 
In addition researchers were encouraged to explain with additional text the reasons for their findings. 
One major part of the study involved an analysis of a sample of Commission supported projects. It 
was anticipated that the ease of access of researchers to details on supported projects from Member 
State authorities would vary. Therefore the Commission gave permission for a team of researchers 
led by the conveners to extract details of a sample of supported projects from Commission files in 
order to analyse their characteristics. For a further sub-sample permission was given to attach 
names to files on a confidential basis. The basis of sampling was a combination of project size, date 
of support, geographical region and type of project. Unfortunately, details of projects by species 
were not available so this was not used as a sampling frame. Details were given to researchers in 
Member States who were then required to report to us on the current status of each of the identified 
projects within their country. 
To give an overall evaluation of the effectiveness of support policies, researchers in each Member 
State were also required to contact experts within the industry itself, advisers to the industry and 
government officials, using a structured questionnaire. 
Researchers in Member States were not required to produce policy recommendations as a com-
ponent of the national reports. If they had views on these issues they were encouraged to give 
them, but in a separate document. Since the Commission required a single consistent set of 
recommendations it was appropriate for the conveners to provide this themselves on the basis of 
the aggregate findings across Member States. Researchers were asked to participate in the study 
during March. The Commission gave an informal go-ahead during early April and research started 
in May, although we were not in a position to issue formal contracts until June. Researchers were 
asked to submit country reports to the conveners by 23 July 1990. 
The implementation of the project was achieved by: 
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(i) setting severe cost penalties for failure to deliver a report by the agreed date. It was agreed 
that no researchers would be paid until EAFE was itself paid by the Commission i.e. the risk 
bearing was mutual and not that of the conveners alone, 
(ii) making sure that as far as possible the conveners Were easily and quickly available to answer 
queries, 
Susan A. Shaw and Denis Bailly: New Methodology for European Aquaculture Research 
(iii) informal and frequent checks by conveners on the progress of each participant. 
The project was submitted on time. The completed report comprised a main report of around 50,000 
words plus extensive tables. In addition the twelve separate country reports were submitted which 
gave more detailed findings for each Member State. 
In December 1990, having reviewed the report and in discussion with the conveners, the Commission 
requested additional details and clarification of data from some countries. None of these require-
ments were substantial or affected major findings and interpretations, although they did involve 
some extensive and time-consuming searches for supplementary data. A revised report was sub-
mitted to the Commission in early January 1991 and this has now been accepted by the Commission. 
4. Evaluation of Effectiveness of the Approach 
4.1 Background 
This is a preliminary report based on the experiences of the conveners and from that viewpoint is 
somewhat limited. The views of other participants are being sought as are those of the Commission 
and these will be incorporated in a subsequent version of this paper. In general, the conveners 
consider that the report met its objectives since it was acceptable to those who commissioned it. At 
the same time, a number of issues relevant to that success arose during the execution of the study 
and are considered here. They are discussed under two headings: quantity and quality of available 
data, organisation of the project. 
4.2 Quantity of Data 
In general most necessary data were obtained. The manual played a major role in this because it 
had specified requirements in detail. However there were problems in some areas. Areas where 
particular problems exist are: 
(i) Employment and Numbers of Businesses 
Statistics relating to employment and number of businesses in aquaculture are poor for most 
Member States. This was a particular problem in Portugal (although major changes are now believed 
to be underway here), Italy and Germany. There were variations by sector within countries (e.g. 
good finfish data but poor shellfish data in the UK). As a consequence statistics available are 
considered to be a considerable underestimate of actual numbers of employees and businesses 
(Figure 3) and in some cases may be unreliable. 
(ii) Production 
The identification of species on a common basis across the Community caused problems despite 
the availability of mUlti-language manuals for this purpose and especially for minor species. This 
was primarily because of some use of local names rather than strict adherence to the use of scientific 
names. The quality of production figures from official sources is variable. Statistics are poor for 
species with low production levels. This created problems particularly where a species was important 
in one country (for which data were available) but relatively unimportant in other countries. As a 
consequence it was difficult to build a European-wide picture of the importance of that species. 
Examples are of mullet, carp and other fish produced in extensive systems. The report as a 
consequence underestimates total production levels. 
(iii) Business Structures, Costs and Profitability 
Data on business structures is also limited and in many member states this information is not 
collected by official sources. Proper surveys of costs and profitability were rarely available, leaving 
the researchers with almost complete reliance on an engineering approach to the estimation of 
costs, with all its limitations. Most estimates of costs and profitability were based on application of 
ex farm prices to production models and are estimates of "average" performance. As a picture of 
the range of actual costs within an industry they are only an approximation to actual figures. This 
contrasts with most agriculture sectors and the fisheries sector where more extensive data are 
available. 
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(iv) Response to Surveys 
All researchers followed up individual cases of support and interviewed a sample of industry experts. 
In general, across all countries the levels of co-operation given were high and all researchers were 
able to answer the questions posed. This is a helpful finding because without the willingness of 
members of the industry to provide data good policy making is difficult. Researchers were able to 
provide representative samples of respondents and experts using the criteria established by the 
conveners. 
(v) Quality Variations in Secondary Data 
The variations in the quantity of data available from sector to sector were linked to variations in 
quality. This led to considerable problems in aggregating data for the Community as a whole. Very 
accurate figures for one country had to be combined with figures for other countries which were 
often only informed guesses with no real indications of the size of errors around the figure. European 
data sets combine data of different quality, leading to some considerable caution in using aggregate 
European data in time series analyses. 
4.3 Organisation of Project: Quality of Material 
Given the time and financial constraints of this study, the conveners were not able to check data 
submitted systematically. They relied on their own knowledge which between them covered all 
European countries and some independent evaluations both by members of the Commission and 
by other experts. This process suggested that on the whole data submitted were the best available, 
although some anomalies within country reports were identified. The following points are pertinent: 
(0 Time and Aggregation Problems 
There were considerable problems for the conveners in combining the information provided. 
Although common formats had been requested, data was not always provided in this form. A great 
deal of time was spend chasing data which from the individual researcher's point of view had been 
seen as unimportant, but which assumed a much greater level of importance at the aggregate level. 
The classic example of this can be drawn from attempts to assemble production figures and 
forecasts. If data for one country was missing for one species for one year, this may rightly be 
considered by that researcher as not limiting understanding of the development of aquaculture in 
that country in any way. However, at the aggregate level this makes it impossible to compile a valid 
total picture for that year. It took about two weeks for a research assistant to compile one table on 
European production because of the large amount of double checking and "gap" filling that had to 
be carried out in conjunction with Member State researchers. The same is true offorecasts. Forecasts 
were requested for 1990,1992 and 1995. In some cases researchers provided forecasts for different 
years. Naive extrapolation by the conveners would have been dangerous given the cycle of aqua-
culture activities. Again considerable checking with researchers was necessary. These are just two 
examples but this problem occurred in most areas of the study and failure to get it right first time 
greatly increased the costs of carrying out the study, particularly for the conveners. 
(ii) Comparability of Research 
Wherever they could do so, researchers supplied the data required and answered the questions 
posed. There was however considerable variation in the quantity of data supplied depending on the 
attitudes adopted by researchers towards the report. These ranged from researchers who regarded 
our formal data requirements as a minimum and supplied large quantities of data in addition to this 
- in some case far more data than either the Commission or the Conveners could reasonably have 
expected - to those who interpreted our requests as maxima. This applied particularly to requests 
for policy suggestions from respondents. As indicated earlier we asked for this not to be incorporated 
into the report but supplied separately. In retrospect this was not sufficiently specific and it would 
have been preferable to have also organised this section of the study in the form of a questionnaire. 
(ii) The Perceptions of Researchers 
Because of data gaps, the report relies to a considerable extent on the judgements of researchers, 
particularly for forecasts. The forecasts produced are we hope as valid as those produced by other 
sources but they leave much to be desired. There are few models available or suitable time series 
for species so that it is difficult for forecasting to be based on anything other than the judgement of 
researchers and the judgements of experts consulted. This was a problem for both short and 
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medium term forecasts. Short term forecasts were probably more reliable for species and countries 
where accurate information on capacity and stocking plans was known (eg salmon) but was difficult 
where such information was not readily available (most species in Portugal). All long term forecasts 
were judgemental. 
(iii) The Perceptions of Respondents 
A related issue arose in respect of the qualitative aspects of this study. By insisting on the use of a 
standardised questionnaire, we ensured that the same questions were asked in all Member States. 
A concern however is that respondents in different countries may use different evaluative criteria 
so that the answers are not really comparable. This can be illustrated by means of the example 
relating to the views of experts on the effectiveness of government support policies. Experts were 
asked to judge the effectiveness of national administrations on various dimensions on a scale (1) 
very efficient to (5) least efficient (Figure 4). All experts answered this question, apparently without 
difficulty. However, supplementary investigation suggested that "efficiency" may be judged by 
different criteria in different countries. In countries used to high standards of public administration, 
"efficiency" may be judged on a different scale to those where public administration in general 
operates to lower standards of efficiency. We suspect that those most critical of the current system 
come from countries with well developed systems of public administration with which aquaculture 
support was compared sometimes unfavourably and vice versa. This problem of the meaning of 
words is likely to occur in any cross European study with qualitative elements. 
4.4 Organisation of Project: Scheduling 
All Member State reports were received in time to meet the final deadlines imposed by the 
Commission. Most researchers met the deadlines imposed by the conveners. This was very credi-
table since due to delays in the formal commissioning of the project, everyone worked without even 
a portion of payment in advance and in the knowledge that payment might be slow. It is a tribute to 
the professionalism and goodwill of most researchers that we were able to achieve this. However 
not all researchers met deadlines, causing major scheduling problems. Some researchers failed to 
meet deadlines for their reports which in turn complicated the schedules of the conveners and 
created a crisis for them as far as the production of the main report was concerned. The most severe 
problem has subsequently been caused by the failure of one researcher to provide supplementary 
information demanded, although this information was eventually received. It can be argued that 
one failure out of eleven researchers is not a bad rate. However any failure of this type is serious 
because it has implications for all researchers and not just the conveners. This delayed acceptance 
by the Commission of the final report by over two months with consequent problems for all the 
other researchers. 
5. Future Guidelines for Multi-Country European Aquaculture Studies 
5.1 Introduction 
The initial premise of this paper was that the need for studies embracing all Member States within 
the European community is likely to grow. The experiences described in previous sections have 
suggested a number of guidelines to be followed in future studies. These are discussed under the 
following headings: selection of researchers, contracts and timetables and research methodology. 
5.2 Selection of Researchers 
The success of the study was due to the competence of the researchers selected and their com-
mitment to the study, in the face of what were often quite trying conditions. Researchers were 
selected, in this early stage of the existence of EAFE, largely on the basis of personal knowledge of 
their work or on the basis of recommendations. It must also be admitted that friendships and 
goodwill played a considerable role in meeting our objectives and it is perhaps significant (although 
statistically unproven) that the greatest difficulty was experienced where this link was weakest. We 
also attempted to select people who had strong motivation for being involved in the study and to 
complete it successfully. AS EAFE develops, the process of evaluation can become more formal, 
but similar criteria should still be used: 
-past work undertaken and level of responsibility held in previous studies 
-record for completing contracts to schedule 
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-references from contractors 
-current commitments and evidence that the researcher has sufficient time to complete work 
-evidence of commitment and interest in work 
-where relevant indications of support from parent organisation 
-sufficient preliminary contact between team leaders and researchers to establish that a viable 
working relationship is possible. 
The nature of the organisation to be selected has not been listed. In this study we used researchers 
from large organisations and at the other extreme people working largely alone. Contracting with a 
large organisation helps to reduce risks because it suggests the availability of a pool of researchers, 
not just the named individual. At the same time, it was not critical in the success of this particular 
study with the standard of work from individuals often just as good as that coming from larger 
organisations. The key factor was the competence and the commitment of the individual. 
A further key element is the choice of conveners. They must meet the requirements above and 
in addition where possible have had experience in organising projects involving considerable 
coordination of activities across a number of countries. It is necessary that they have sufficient 
knowledge of the topic under investigation on a Europe-wide basis for it to be possible for them to 
evaluate the data produced by others and in the event of failure, remedy deficiencies themselves. 
For these reasons, it is likely to be helpful to have two conveners who can between them provide 
the necessary spread of experience and expertise. Experience with this project suggests that 
provided that they can contact each other easily and meet reasonably frequently, they need not be 
based in the same location. As a sine qua non, between them they should be fluent in English and 
French with at least some competence in German, Italian and Spanish (even if the report is only 
being produced in English or French). 
5.3 Contracts and Timetables 
In addition to the formal contract between the commissioner of the study and EAFE, sub-contacts 
should be issued to other researchers by EAFE. These must contain: 
-clear specification of responsibilities 
-unambiguous deadlines and heavy penalty clauses for failure to produce the appropriate 
quality of work by the deadlines. While it is helpful and reasonable for researchers to expect 
some payment at the start of the contract for expenses etc, most money should come on 
completion of work. 
But contracts must be supported by other action. The first requirement is a determination by the 
conveners to hold participants to deadlines. Obviously, inflexibility has its costs and the conveners 
have also to be sympathetic to unanticipated problems experienced by researchers. However if 
conveners do not insist and enforce their terms the project will not succeed. The costs of one default 
on a multi-participant study are high and conveners must make it very clear that because of this 
contracts will be enforced. 
Timetables require careful planning. In particular, the time for co-ordination and checking when 
work is received should not be underestimated. It is essential that the gap between the deadlines 
imposed by the conveners and the deadlines imposed by the project sponsors should be large 
enough to allow conveners to undertake a proper analysis of data so that they are able to produce 
sensible recommendations. The recommendations are a key part of any project and failure to allow 
enough time for this jeopardises the whole exercise. It is tempting to allow longer for fieldwork on 
the assumption that time can be made up during analysis and forming recommendations but this is 
an illusion. Secondly, time must allowed for emergencies. The most obvious emergency is the 
failure of individual participants to produce work or to produce work of the required quality. Early 
warning of such problems can help here. While it is undesirable to add unnecessarily to the workload, 
brief interim reports at several stages during the project are necessary. Where possible a meeting 
of participants should be included in the budget. This is possibly of most value not at the time of 
commissioning of the project, when researchers have not yet experienced the problems of actually 
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carrying out the work, but when the work has commenced and feedback on aspects of the study is 
available. Conveners have a responsibility to keep other researchers informed of current progress 
on the project, to clarify any issues which emerge and to check informally on progress. This helps 
to build a common sense of purpose amongst researchers in very different locations and thus to 
ensure the success of the project. Discussions with those commissioning the study should ensure 
that everyone has a clear idea of what is involved and that realistic timetables are set in the light of 
the resources available for the study. A final mundane point but of considerable importance is that 
all participants have ready access to telephone and telefax facilities. This caused us some difficulties 
when this was not the case and communications were delayed. 
5.4 Research Methodology 
As far as the environment for research is concerned, European aquaculture research would clearly 
be more effective were better secondary databases available. 
There may be a case for EAFE to act as a pressure group to achieve this. 
From the point of view of project organisation, we are convinced of the necessity of providing 
extremely detailed manuals for study participants in any exercise of this nature. In other studies 
involving a team of researchers based in a single location who work together throughout the project, 
ideas are exchanged frequently and informally and to some extent methodologies can be defined 
as the study proceeds. This is very difficult to achieve with many researchers in different locations. 
As a consequence, the level of detail to be specified at the start of the study is substantial. 
Time spent by conveners in drawing up very explicit documentation at this stage is rewarded 
by better subsequent information from researchers. In particular the following guidelines are 
suggested: 
-all species should be described using scientific names as listed in the Multilingual Dictionary 
of Fish and Fish Products(OECD) 
-time periods for which data are required should be specified precisely and it should be made 
clear that researchers MUST adhere to them 
-if data are not available to answer a question, reasons must be identified and wherever 
possible estimates substituted 
-all data sources should be specified precisely and the method of collection given (eg 100% 
survey, 10% sample) and a statement made about the reliability of data 
-the sources of all forecasts should be specified and the forecasting method made clear 
-researchers should be given explicit questions to answer rather than general guidelines. 
Conveners must always assume that the manual defines the maximum that they will receive 
in some cases and for this reason it should be as detailed as possible 
-because of different environments in different countries with consequent difficulties in com-
bining qualitative answers across countries, where possible qualitative material should be 
supported byfactual evidence. 11th is is not possible statements about operating environments 
should be made by researchers to help conveners to interpret findings 
-wherever possible the selection of a sample should not be left to the researcher but supplied 
by the convener to ensure the selection of comparable data across countries. When following 
up recipients of EC support the provision of data directly from Commission files is very 
helpful. 
6. Summary and Conclusions 
This paper has reviewed some of the issues involved in the management of the first project carried 
out by the European Association of Fisheries Economists. The project was successfully completed 
and the Association proved its ability to organise and carry out a complex study. The conveners of 
the study are very grateful to everyone who participated. In the process we have learned a great 
deal which will help in the organisation of subsequent projects. A first major finding of the study is 
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of the inadequacy of the secondary database for aquaculture research in Europe. A second finding 
is olthe need in such projects for the provision of very detailed guidelines to be given to researchers, 
coupled with the implementation of effective deadlines through strong contractual arrangements. 
REFERENCES 
European Association of Fisheries Economists, Study of the Effectiveness of European Commission 
Support Policies for Aquaculture, commissioned by the European Commission DGXIV 
-Main Report (unpublished) 
-Work Manual for Study Participants (unpublished). 
DECO/Fishing News Books (1990) Multilingual Dictionary of Fish and Fish Products. 
Figure 1 
The Implications of Varying Levels of Delegation in European Research 
Methodology 
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Figure 2 
EAFElEC STUDY FORM 2A PRODUCTION, CAPACITY, NUMBER OF PRODUCERS AND 
NUMBER OF SITES 
Species 
Year 
Actual 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
Forecast 
1990 
1995 
Production 
(tonnes*) 
*Whole live weight equivalent 
Capacity 
(actual/ 
Planned) 
No producers No sites 
171 
Irish Fisheries Investigations Series B, No. 42 (1994) 
Figure 3 
FORM 4A PRODUCTION SYSTEMS 
1. DESCRIPTION 
SPECIES 
Hatchery open system 
Hatchery closed system 
On growing intensive off shore 
on shore 
cages 
Semi-intensive 
Extensive (specify type of system) 
2. COSTS PER KG 
TYPE OF COST 
Eggs/fry/smolts 
Feed 
Labour 
Energy 
Other general expenses 
Depreciation 
Interest 
TOTAL COSTS PER KG 
EX FARM PRICE PER KG 
NET PROFIT/LOSS PER KG 
INTERNAL RATE OF RETURN 
PAYBACK PERIOD (years) 
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Assumptions: 
food conversion ratio 
average weight of fish at harvest 
mortality rate % 
stocking density (kg cu m) 
employment full time 
How have you calculated depreciation? 
How have the costs of operations changed over time? 
How has the structure of these costs changed over time? 
3. What data sources have you used? 
4. Comment on the range of error whoch you believe to be associated with the figures above 
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Figure 4 
European Aquaculture Statistics: Employment, Business Structures 
Employment Business 
Belgium 
France (recent years only) 
Denmark (recent years only) 
Germany 
Greece 
Ireland (recent years only) nla 
Italy (recent years, incomplete) (incomplete) 
Netherlands (incomplete) (incomplete) 
Portugal Not available (subject to error) 
Spain 
UK (poor for shellfish (poor for shellfish 
sector, subject to sector) 
error) 
174 
Susan A. Shaw and Denis Bailly: New M"thd~I~)I1}";'~~l,~~ 
9. General opinions on the administration of EC support 
(give a value from 1 very efficient to 5 least efficient) 
Speed of administration 
Ease of application 
Availability of advice 
and support systems 
Coordination of national 
bodies and the Commission 
Coordination of regional 
and national bodies 
Ability of administration 
to evaluate proposal correctly 
Date requirements 
2 3 4 5 
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ABSTRACT 
Rapid growth of aquaculture in numerous countries has focused attention on wider questions of 
resource conflicts in the coastal zone. This paper examines the development of aquaculture in the 
UK, Canada and the USA, countries where the industry is seen as a means of alleviating pressure 
on wild stocks and of providing employment in marginal regions. Despite the economic significance 
of aquaculture, however, serious concerns have been expressed over potential adverse environ-
mental and social impacts. The management implications of these impacts are addressed in terms 
of the differing arrangements for coastal zone management in the three countries. In particular, the 
paper addresses the question of whether intensification of coastal resource conflicts necessitates a 
Coastal Zone Management Act, as in the USA, or whether existing institutional structures are 
adequate for conflict resolution. Recommendations, concerning both future research and future 
policy, are also discussed. 
KeyWords: 
Aquaculture; Coastal Zone Management; Resource usage conflicts; Conflict resolution; UK (Scot-
land); USA; Canada. 
INTRODUCTION 
The management of coastal areas throughout the world is complicated by a wide variety of issues 
and considerations, not least of these being the difficulties of reconciling economic development 
and environmental protection objectives. As environmental issues have become firmly established 
on the political agendas of many countries and as public expectations about preserving the quality 
of the natural environment have increased, coastal managers have been faced with very difficult 
resource allocation decisions. 
Although concern over coastal management is not new, the recent intensification of some coastal 
activities have added new environmental and socio-economic dimensions to coastal management. 
The phenomenal growth of coastal tourism, for instance, has raised questions about the possible 
detrimental impact of tourism on coastal ecosystems (Miller and Auyong, 1991). The burgeoning 
aquaculture industry has also added a new sense of urgency to the debate over how coastal 
management should best proceed. Aquaculture has some obvious advantages, notably the allevi-
ation of pressure on wild stocks and providing employment in remote and marginal economies. 
Nevertheless, serious concerns have been expressed in many countries over the adverse environ-
mental, economic and social impacts of the industry. 
This paper briefly discusses the aquaculture industry in a number of countries and considers 
aquaculture policy and management as a subset of general coastal and marine policy and man-
agement. It is suggested that the growth of aquaculture has focused attention on wider questions 
of resource conflicts in the coastal zone and on mechanisms that have been developed to resolve 
these conflicts. The countries considered are the UK, Canada and the USA, nations which share 
Irish Fisheries Investigations Series B (Marine), No. 42 (1994) 
G 
177 
• ___ d_ rl 
Irish Fisheries Investigations Series B, No. 42 (1994) 
common coastal problems within a similar economic context, and where there is a high level of 
awareness of the finite and fragile nature of coastal ecosystems. These similarities notwithstanding, 
the countries exhibit markedly different approaches to coastal management. Comparisons of these 
approaches should facilitate an evaluation of whether specific coastal legislation (as is found in the 
USA) is necessary or whether existing arrangements are adequate to resolve conflicts and to 
promote efficient use of coastal resources. 
AQUACULTURE PRODUCTION: STATUS AND PROSPECTS 
Levels of aquaculture production in the three countries (UK, Canada and the USA) are summarized 
in Table 1, based on OECD statistics (OECD, 1989). Aquaculture production in the USA is currently 
estimated to be around 300,000 t/yr, equivalent to US $500,000, first sale value. This production 
value represents 18 per cent of the value of total national fisheries production. An estimated 50 per 
cent of aquaculture production by value (US $250,000) results from the farming of freshwater catfish 
in the southern part of the country. The catfish farming industry has undergone rapid development 
in the last decade but now faces problems associated with overproduction and a lack of market 
development (Barrett, 1990). 
Other significant species produced in freshwater are the crayfish and rainbow trout: annual pro-
duction is estimated to be worth over US $50,000 for each. The remainder of aquaculture production 
in the USA is made up by salmon and various shellfish, especially oysters. In general, marine 
farming is limited by a lack of suitable sites and restrictions on development from competing users 
concerned about externalities such as pollution. Despite such constraints, there are many regions 
with recognizable potential for aquaculture development, and a key factor here is the continuing 
expansion of the domestic seafood market. In states such as Hawaii and California, considerable 
achievements have been made in developing aquaculture policy and new technology, as described 
by Corbin and Young (1988). 
In comparison to the USA, aquaculture production in Canada is significantly smaller. Annual 
production is currently estimated to be 14,000 tonnes, valued at US $150,000. Over 90 per cent of 
this production is accounted for by the production of salmonids (trout, Pacific and Atlantic salmon), 
associated with both freshwater and coastal areas. Aquaculture represents a mere 2 per cent of 
total Canadian fisheries by value. Although it is generally recognized that the industry has good 
developmental potential for both finfish and shellfish in coastal areas, expansion of the industry has 
been relatively slow in comparison to international competitors such as Norway and the UK. A 
significant factor here is thought to be inadequate support from government in such areas as the 
provision of infrastructure and financial assistance (Neiland, 1990). However, it is anticipated that 
governments will address this problem in the near future and expansion of the industry is expected 
to follow in key areas such as British Columbia on the Pacific coast (Nowell, 1990). 
In the case of the UK, and especially for the Scottish regional economy, the development of a 
significant aquaculture industry in the last decade has been a major success story. Current annual 
production is estimated to be 50,000 tonnes worth US $400,000. More than 80 per cent of production 
comes from coastal areas of Western Scotland where Atlantic salmon and shellfish such as mussels 
are the major species produced, and where the industry has created a significant number of jobs in 
an area characterized by poor employment opportunities. Freshwater production of trout is also 
important in southern England. Aquaculture production now represents over 18 per cent of total UK 
fish landings by value. 
Despite the rapid development which has occurred over the last ten years, however, expansion of 
the UK aquaculture industry, and especially salmon farming, is now subject to certain constraints, 
and the rate of increase has slowed. A number of important factors may be identified. The general 
overproduction of salmon worldwide has lowered market prices and reduced profitability causing 
some farms to close. In addition, the industry now faces various technical problems such as disease 
control as well as a limited number of suitable sites for further expansion. Most significantly, there 
now exists widespread public concern over the environmental impact of fish farming which may 
well result in tighter regulation of future developments and the rationalization of existing ones. A 
more detailed discussion of current issues in the UK aquaculture industry can be found in Neiland 
(1991a, 1991b). 
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TABLE 1 
Aquaculture Production in the USA, Canada and the UK (OECD, 1989) 
U.S.A. CANADA U.K. 
AQUACULTURE PRODUCTION • 300,DOOt/yr (33%. marine) • 14,OOOt/yr (90% marine) • 50,OOOt/yr (80% marine) 
Status '" US$ 500,000 (50% marine) '" U5$15Q,QOO (90% marina) = U5$ 400,000 (80% marine) 
Prospectus 18% Total Fish landings 2% Total Fish Landings 18% Total Fish Landings 
• Uncertain future (limited sites) • Good future prospects • Industry hoping to consolidate 
• High technology developments • Slow development so far its recent rapid development 
• 'Hot spots' ego Hawaii, California • Increasing Government interest • Environmental/Fi nancia I constrai nts 
Centre(s); British Columbia • Centre: Scotland 
COASTAL ZONE • Very busy coastal zone • Diverse coastal zone • Very busy coastal zone: 
Characteristics 
• MUltiple uses, few wilderness areas ego British Columbia: 75% pop. live industrialisation, urbanisation, 
• 50% national population live on coast 
and work close to sea recreation, waste disposal, fishing, 
and % increasing each year • Importance of traditional resource 
shipping etc. 
• Marine aquaculture in decline in many 
extraction activities & non-consumptive • Aquaculture concentrated in isolated 
areas (pollution) 
uses ego tourism areas of high water quality 
• Aquaculture close to urban centres in 
British Columbia 
RESOURCE USAGE CONFLICTS ego Washington State/Oregon State ego British Columbia ego Scotland 
Aquaculture and other users 
some major issues COMMERCIAL FISHING ego Access, Markets FORESTRY 
ego Logging 
RECREATIONAL BOATING 
ego Navigation 
ENVIRONMENTAL CONSERVATION 
ego Pollution, Wildlife, Tourism 
• Economic, social & environmental impact of aquaculture development? 
• Cost-benefit analysis of aquaculture development? 
• Economic efficiency of resource allocation? 
MANAGEMENT OF COASTAL • Coastal Zone Management Act (1 972) • Complex set of institutional arrangements: • Plethora of agencies involved in CZ 
AQUACULTURE DEVELOPMENT Aquaculture Act (1980) Constitution Act management (especially advisory stages), 
Status 
Major criticisms • Role of State Government in management? • plethora of single resource agencies 
piecemeal planning lack of national policy 
Evidence of inhibition • Enlightened management in certain states 
pursuing individual resource development • Role of CEC (landlord and regulator)? 
ego California - good planning & goals • System has not hindered aquaculture, 
coordination • Complex aquaculture leasing process regulations be tightened in the futUre 
• Over-regulation has inhibited aquaculture causing inhibition in aquaculture 
• Need for Aquaculture Policy/Act 
CROWN ADMINISTRATION 
SUMMARY 1 Leader in CZM, but reduced Federal Govt. 1 Even with a vast, sparsely populated 1 Vibrant industry can bring benefit to 
role since 1980 (decentralization) coast, conflict seems inevitable local economy (quantity?) 
2 Over-regulation can be a serious problem 2 Jurisdictional complexity 2 Underregulation also creates problems 
(aquaculture mis-understood?) 3 Gov!. support and policy needed for 3 Information shortage for planning 
3 Property rights key in the future of aquaCUlture, location not enough 
aquaculture? 4 Need for integrated coastal management 
4 Good industry PR dialogue necessary 
4 Development of consensual resolution strategy, present system biased for 
of conflicts (Washington State) certain users 
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COASTAL ZONE CHARACTERISTICS 
. .. be ond the sco e of this paper to provide a full discussion of the nature of the coastal :~~: :~ ~~e t~ree cuntrie~, it is important to highlight some of the salient features as a background 
to the discussion of aquaculture policy. 
The attractiveness of the coast for human settlement and the multiple uses ccurrt~ i~~~ast~ 
nes have been well documented (see, for example, COCCOSSIS, 1985). The coasts 0 t e . an ~~e UK in particular have experienced significant urbanization and industrializatIon. It IS estImated, 
f 'I that in 'the USA well over 50 per cent of the population live on the coast. The majority ~r t~:a~~,:, major conurbations are estuary-based. Even in British Columbia in Canada, where ~Pulatin density is lower than in the other study areas, over 75 per cent of the total populatIon of 
around three million live and work close to the sea. 
Traditional coastal industries such as shipping and fishing play important roles in :he/~;cti~;~~~ ~~ 
all three coastal zones. The British Columbian economy, perhaps to a greater ex en an 
the UK and the USA remains heavily dependent upon coastal resources. In that province, the fre~~ 
industry which originated in the coastal lowlands around Vancouver, VIctoria and Nan~l~, st~ 
dominates. The processing sector of the industry remains concentrated In the StraIt 0 . eorgla 
re ion The most noticeable manifestation of this is a complex system of log transportatIon and st~ra ~ in coastal waters. Alongside such traditional resource ex:ractlon actIvItIes, however, ar~ 
g m tive uses of a British Columbian coastline whIch IS hIghly valued for ItS natura ~l~-~~~~~ a~d abundant marine and terrestrial wildlife. Amongst othe: activities, the thrlt~9 
r::arine mammal-watching industry around Vancouver Island is now a SIgnifIcant component 0 t e 
Province's tourist sector. 
Increased pressure on the coastline of the USA have long been recognized. Aldo Leopold (1949, 
266-67) wrote: 
"One of the fastest shrinking categories of wilderness is coastlines. Cottages. and turi~t roads 
have all but annihilated wild coasts on both oceans. No single kind of ~llderness IS ,~re 
intimately interwoven with history and more nearer the point of complete dIsappearance . 
S·nce then the coastal zone of the USA has encountered increasing populations and c~cm~tant 
d~vel m~nt pressures. Many of the concerns over this relentless push for d.evelopment ave een 
p db Hind Zinn (1985). An early recognition of the need for Increased protectIon of 
documente Y ea Y a . n coastline led to the enactment of the Coastal Zone Man-bIOPhYS~C~c;~~~~;;s ;;:h~~9~~~~~a of the details of this legislation will be discussed later in this 
~~~:~~ is importan; to mention at this stage that, if anythin.g, the threats to the USA coastline have 
increased in magnitude since the passage of the Act (ChaSSIS, 1980). 
The ressures exerted on the coastline of the UK are similar to those experienced in the USA and Briti~h Columbia. The multiple uses of the coast are documented elsewhere (see, for example, ~rk, 
1987) The point to be emphasized here is the continuing trend towards urban develpme~t. s~' 
. ddition to those people living permanently on the coast, are the greater nu~bers 0 peop e ~~~:;~~~ ~~:~~~:t:~;~:~~~~~a~i~~~e~;:~i~;~~:O~~:~g;~~e;;~t:~~C:a~t~~u~;:;~i:;s; ~~~hl:~ifl~~~ 
. . . e lar e amounts of cooling water. Some of the other coasta Issues In ~::II~~~ ;~I:~:~~~ent gof tidal barrages, which, despite being sources of renewable energy, do 
create environmental impacts, and major new oil and gas terminal and pIpeline projects. 
RESOURCE USAGE CONFLICTS 
It is a ainst this background of competing and conflicting claims that marine aquaculture develop-
ment ~as taken place. Table 1 illustrates some ofthe major resource conflicts involving aquaculture 
in the three countries. 
With reference to marine salmon farming specifically, one of ;h~ ma~n s~r~:: ~~~p~~:i~~~nt~h: 
growing aquaculture industry, particularly on the west coasts 0 ana a an , 
180 
A. E. Neiland and D. E. Nowell: Aquaculture Development and Coastal Zone Management Strategies 
commercial fisheries sector. Although Anderson (1985) and others suggest that interactions between 
the two industries can playa valuable role in controlling over-exploitation of wild stocks, commercial 
fishermen are concerned about the impact of farmed salmon on the market price of wild fish. 
Some economists have predicted escalating competition between the two sectors with an eventual 
reduction in the price of salmon. 
A problem which is particularly evident in British Columbia is spatial conflict with forestry and other 
resource extraction activities. The site requirements for successful aquaculture (sheltered, unpolluted 
waters) have meant that development occurs in areas valued by other interests. In the case of 
forestry, 95 per cent of all wood cut in coastal logging divisions enters the sea on its journey to the 
mills. Bays and inlets provide forestry companies with sheltered locations to dump, sort, boom and 
store the logs. It is often these same locations which attract fish farmers and oyster growers, and 
protracted legal battles. Carr (1988), for example, has documented the conflict between one of the 
Province's premier forest companies and an oyster company on Vancouver Island. Although sharing 
bays with the forest industry is possible, there are risks for the fish farmer in that some log storage 
activities can be harmful to the organisms being cultured. These include low dissolved oxygen levels 
caused by bark decomposition and direct toxicity of wood leachates. 
Another source of contention in British Columbia and in parts olthe US is physical obstruction caused 
by aquaculture facilities to fisheries and navigation, and loss of anchorage sites for recreational boats. 
The waters between British Columbia and Washington State, for example, constitute one of the 
most popular boating areas in the world and yachting enthusiasts have reported blocked access to 
favourite bays and public beaches (Gillespie, 1986). 
A resource conflict common to all three countries has been the one between the aquaculture industry 
and environmental conservation organizations. This conflict has been particularly well documented 
on the west coast of Scotland where conservation groups have highlighted the potential pollution 
problems caused by fish-farming operations. In a 1990 report, the Scottish Wildlife and Countryside 
Link, an association of Scottish conservation bodies, highlights the potentially detrimental impacts 
of aquaculture on water quality, wild fish stocks, landscape aesthetics and tourism. The report 
concludes that a short-term economic perspective has enabled the industry to expand in Scotland 
at the expense of coastal ecosystems. Prominent among a number of recommendations was that a 
marine conservation strategy, which identifies areas which should be protected from all fish-farming 
development, was required for Scotland. This approach can be compared to the very positive view 
of the economic contribution offish farming taken by the Highlands and Islands Development Board 
(HIDB). McCunn (1988) notes that the HIDB was established to assist the people of the Highlands 
and Islands improve their social and economic condition and to enable the region to playa more 
effective role in the economic and social development of the nation. By assisting the development 
of aquaculture, he suggests, the HIDB can attain this objective. 
The emergence of large-scale aquaculture on the coasts of all three countries, then, has served to 
intensify conflicts between different users and uses. Doubts about the environmental sensitivity and 
economic viability of the industry has prompted calls for research on the long-term effects of fish-
farming. It has been widely recommended that cost-benefit and impact studies be undertaken to 
assess the environmental, social and economic implications of aquaculture development. 
Few such studies have been attempted to date. A clarification of the economic benefits is certainly 
needed and would enable evaluation of whether aquaculture is an economically efficient use of 
coastal resources. Clearly, aquaculture is seen by governments as a means of providing tangible 
short-term economic benefits such as employment in depressed rural areas. However, such obvious 
benefits have yet to be rationalized. Economic analysis has an important role to play here (Edwards, 
1987): 
"Economic analysis broadly constrained can playa valuable role in this decision-making process 
by illuminating trade-offs among conflicting allocations of some coastal resources. Essential to 
this is the need to assess the outcomes and impacts of allocating resources among market and 
non-market forces". 
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COASTAL ZONE MANAGEMENT STRATEGIES 
In terms of the three countries considered in this paper, two broad categories of approaches to 
coastal management can be identified - integrated (US) and fragmented (Canada and the UK). 
The institutional and administrative arrangements for coastal management in Canada and the UK 
are diverse and divided. Management is characterized by single resource agencies pursuing indi-
vidual goals for each resource. In Canada, the Constitution Act (1982) provides the basic allocation 
of rights between federal and provincial governments. The federal government is concerned mainly 
with fishery management and navigable waters and the provincial government with allocation of 
land resources, leasing of the foreshore, economic development and waste management. Nowhere, 
however, in the coastal zone is there a clear, undisputed basis for one government to be the sole 
authority (Dorcey, 1986). 
The regulation of the aquaculture industry in British Columbia provides a good example of this 
complexity. Although one provincial government agency has been designated as the lead agency, 
numerous other departments from both levels of government are involved in coastal management 
in the province. The resources of the coast have, to a large extent, remained in public ownership 
and the provincial crown is the predominant owner at the land-water interface. A substantial 
proportion of the coast has been allocated to specific provincial resource agencies. 
Applications for aquaculture licences are made to the provincial Ministry of Crown Lands operating 
under the authority of the Land Act. Because of the overlapping jurisdiction of other ministries to 
control certain aspects of aquaculture, the Ministry of Crown Lands utilizes a referral process by 
which details of proposed fish-farming operations are relayed to other ministries and levels of 
government. The provincial Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries has been formally designated lead 
ministry and has responsibility for reviewing and approving fish-farm developments. 
The development of aquaculture in British Columbia has been far from smooth. Amongst the 
problems encountered is the lengthy and complicated permit and licence structure for finfish 
aquaculture which imposes a time and financial cost on potential entrants to the industry. Questions 
have also been raised regarding the dual role of the Ministry of Crown Lands. One role is to facilitate 
the wise use of provincial resources. However, the Ministry also has a role to play in maximizing 
returns from Crown-owned resources. It has been suggested that these disparate objectives can 
place the government in positions of conflict of interest. 
Because of concerns about negative environmental and social impacts, a moratorium was placed 
on the issuing of licences for finfish operations in late 1986. A Government Commission of Inquiry 
(Gillespie 1986) was established shortly thereafter and its final report contained a number of key 
recommendations, some of which have since been implemented. These included the lifting of the 
moratorium, the development of an aquaculture policy to clarify the roles of different government 
agencies and interest groups, the establishment of an aquaculture advisory council and increased 
government support for research into long-term impacts of the industry. 
As in Canada, coastal management responsibilities in the UK are divided between a multitude of 
agencies. Recent studies have identified anywhere between 20 and 33 government agencies involved 
in managing the British coast. This plethora of agencies is reflected in a vast array of legislation 
applicable to the coastal zone. Various critics have argued that a combination of institutional 
fragmentation, the lack of a national policy and piecemeal planning has meant that the inter-
dependence of coastal ecosystems has been ignored. Halliday (1988, 212), for example, states that 
"the coastline continues to be seen as a boundary, with administrative responsibilities directed 
either side rather than across the divide between land and sea". 
As with most coastal activities in the UK, there are no national planning guidelines for fish-farming. 
As the territorial seabed and most of the foreshore between high and low water mark belongs to 
the Crown, the pivotal role of the Crown Estate Commissioners (CEC) is central to any discussion of 
UK aquaculture. In order to attach farm cages to the seabed, a lease from the CEC must be obtained. 
Usual local authority planning controls do not apply. 
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The dual role of the CEC has led to the body being criticized along the same lines as the Ministry of 
Crown Lands in British Columbia. Section 1(3) of the 1961 Crown Estate Act, states that "it is the 
general duty of the Commissioners to maintain and enhance the value of the Crown Estate and the 
return obtained from it, but with due regard to the requirements of good management". Various 
conservation groups (for example, Scottish Wildlife and Countryside Link, 1990) have questioned 
the neutrality, competence, accountability of the CEC and criticized the situation whereby the CEC 
are a major financial beneficiary of decisions where it is acting as an arbiter of the public interest. 
The CEC attempted to counter such criticisms with the publication of aquaculture development 
guidelines in 1989. The need for a complete re-examination of the regulatory framework of the 
Industry, however, resulted in a report by the House of Commons Agriculture Committee (1990). 
The major emphasis of this report was on planning arrangements for fish-farming and, while the 
Committee was satisfied that commercial profit was not an overriding factor in motivating CEC in 
ludging lease applications, it felt that the CEC was not the ideal body to supervise fish-farming. The 
Committee recommended that local authorities be given a more significant planning role and that 
other interested parties, such as nature conservation groups, be given the right to be consulted on 
proposed new developments. 
Just as it has in British Columbia, the growth of aquaculture in the UK has focused attention on 
wider issues in coastal management. The school of thought which advocates a national framework 
for coastal policy, or even a Department of Coastal Zone Management, has been gaining impetus. 
Included in a recent Countryside Commission document, for instance, is the suggestion that, at the 
very least, co-ordination between organizations with coastal responsibilities requires improvement 
and that a coherent approach to the planning and management of Britain's coastline is 'necessary 
(Countryside Commission, 1991). 
In contrast to the two countries already considered, the USA has attempted to introduce an integrated 
approach to coastal management. In 1972, the US congress enacted the Coastal Zone Management 
Act (CZMA) which established a coastal management framework that encouraged states to address 
the aims of a national program. The overall aim of the Act was to preserve, protect, develop and 
restore coastal resources, and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration was charged 
with managing the program to ensure that state coastal plans conform with criteria prescribed in 
the Act. Details of the Act are well covered elsewhere (see, for example, Chasis (1985). Spradley 
(1979)). 
In rd~r to qualify for federal funding, states were required to accomplish a number of objectives 
including the protection of fish, wildlife and wetlands and the encouragement of public and local 
government involved in coastal management decision-making. Of particular relevance to this paper 
was the requirement to establish comprehensive management plans for the siting of aquaculture 
facilities. 
Rather than entering into a lengthy discussion of aquaculture, only a few recent developments will 
be highlighted. Tiddens (1990) discusses the gradual recognition by the federal government of the 
benefits of aquaculture and ofthe need for a National Aquaculture Act, passed in 1980. Nevertheless, 
Tiddens points out that federal involvement in aquaculture has produced mixed results, largely due 
to budgetary constraints, and that the promotion of the industry was left to individual states. 
Hawaii was the first state to carry out comprehensive resource planning for aquaculture. 
P.ursuant to this, a national resources assessment had provided detailed data on potentially suitable 
s.tes. These efforts, together with high levels of state funding and strong support from the governor's 
office confirmed that aquaculture is seen as an integral part of Hawaii's future (Tiddens, 1990). 
While all of Hawaii's aquaculture is land-based, states such as Washington have had to deal with 
the challenge of ocean leasing. Washington was the first state to receive approval for funding under 
the CZMA. The State Department of Ecology was designated as responsible for implementing the 
coastal program in order to allocate the state's shore resources in a manner which was defensible 
on social, economic and environmental grounds (Hildreth and Johnson, 1985). Another important 
aspect of the Washington program, particularly as applied to aquaculture, was the use of coastal 
inventories which documented present uses and biophysical capabilities and enabled zoning for 
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future uses. As in British Columbia, Washington has an aquaculture permit procedure. A key 
difference, however, is that all decisions are reviewed by the Department of Ecology to ensure that 
requirements of the state master plan for the coast are met. 
The Washington aquaculture planning process has generally been regarded as a success because of 
its integrated and coherent approach. Responsible bureaucrats and politicians attempt to implement 
established goals and policies. This results in the permit approval system being predictable, a crucial 
factor for those considering long-term investment in aquaculture. Despite the CZMA, however, 
coastal management in the US has not been without problems or controversy. Chasis (1980) argues 
that the Act is not living up to its promise as a result of weaknesses in the statute itself and problems 
with federal implementation. The coastal programme came under even greater scrutiny and pressure 
during the 1980s as the Reagan Administration proposed removal of federal support. 
Nevertheless, the CZMA has had many practical successes and is often put forward as a model for 
other countries to emulate. The US has also made more progress in the use of non-traditional 
mechanisms in order to resolve environmental conflicts. A good example is the recent Timber, Fish 
and Wildlife Agreement in Washington. After years of litigious struggle among forest companies, 
Indian tribes, natural resource management agencies and environmental groups, the 1987 TFW 
commits the parties to attempt to achieve the goals of all cooperating parties. These goals include 
wildlife and habitat preservation, and protection of fish populations and water supplies as well as 
the continued growth of the State's forest products industry (Halbert and Lee 1990). 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The recent and rapid development of aquaculture in many coastal areas, and the resultant resource 
usage conflicts have served to highlight the problems faced by many countries in attempting to 
design and implement integrated coastal zone management plans. In an attempt to undertake a 
preliminary investigation of the leading issues in Western countries, this study has compared the 
situations in the UK, Canada and the USA, countries with a recent history of aquaculture development 
of a similar nature under comparable economic conditions but with divergent policy and man-
agement schemes for the coastal areas. A number of important conclusions and recommendations 
have emerged from this study: 
A. Aquaculture-related conflicts in the coastal zone 
(i) The number of conflicts (negative interactions) are increasing as aquaculture develops 
(competition for space, externalities). 
(ii) This can be partially attributable to inadequate government planning and coordination. 
(iii) Few nations have a well-defined policy on aquaculture development. 
(iv) Few environmental impact studies or economic cost-benefit analyses have been completed 
so precise impacts of aquaculture are not known. Although the limitations of cost-benefit 
analysis are well known, the technique does at least encourage the listing of all gains and 
losses associated with new developments and an evaluation of their relative importance. 
(v) Potential impacts may include inefficient allocation of resources and loss of benefits to 
society. Environmental effects may include long run deleterious externalities such as alter-
ation of the biophysical resource base. 
B. Recommendations 
(i) Countries should attempt to increase the aquaculture information base through the use of 
coastal inventories, environmental impact assessments and economic cost-benefit analyses. 
(ii) Coastal zone management strategies should be designed using a sustainable development 
framework to facilitate both environmental protection and promotion of economic growth. 
(iii) Countries should learn from the experiences of others, recognise the potential of aquaculture 
in the coastal zone economy, promote dialogue between interest groups, and encourage 
locally-based negotiations. 
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Economic Rationality and Variability: Some Milestones for 
an Approach to the Strategies of Artisanal Fishing Units 
by 
HELENE REY 
ORSTROM, Bamako, Malawi' 
ABSTRACT 
Fisheries economists must discuss the notion of economic rationality for the fisheries. The high 
degree of variability, in parameters such as resource abundance or climate, forces us to analyse the 
dynamic of the industry from a permanent disequilibrium perspective. Our hypothesis is that this 
variability helps to sharpen the rationality of decisions and behaviour. In trying to understand major 
differences in rationalities, there is scope for a more diversified design of regulation needs and 
means. The results of an economic survey was conducted by the Centre d'Etudes de Projets based 
on a sample of artisanal fishing units in the Mediterranean are presented here: 
Three aspects relate to the limits of what are generally considered to be the economic rationality of 
the theory. 
1. The interviews show that the fishermen make decisions according to a multi-objective 
function in which the maximization of profit is often secondary. 
2. Confusion between the production unit management and the domestic unit decision often 
leads to the lack of a well identified, centralised decision centre. 
3. Production externalities and difficulties in accessing information contribute to an inability to 
anticipate future events. 
We can identify major fields in which it is possible to be more adaptable: 
1. A multi-specific and multi-gear operation that often goes with high specialisation in the 
fishing area and marketing choices. 
2.The fishing units have sources of income other than fishing. 
3. Because of its family nature, the labour management shows the capacity to be flexible. 
4. Flexibility based more on gear and technical reserves than on monetary reserves. 
5. Short-term adaptation by a complete change of word for short periods of time, but long-term 
fidelity to one set of fishing techniques. 
We can say that flexibility is more technical than economic. These results were obtained from a 
micro-economic survey. They should be extended in a global economic study that will examine the 
articulation among all forms of individual flexibility and test ifthe aggregation function offlexibilities 
leads to a global flexibility or rigidity. 
INTRODUCTION 
An economic analysis of fishing units cannot be conducted independently of a study of the dynamics 
and the access to the resource, which leads to a consideration of the method of production. In effect, 
the constraint of the availability of the resource added to its natural variability and to its unsuitable 
nature, determines how the production unit functions. The fishing unit therefore faces one specific 
source of uncertainty, in addition to the ones common to any economic activity (pathological, 
climatological, market and credit risks, and the availability of migrant workers in the labour force in 
the enclave areas). More generally, the instability and volatility of the demand function (Coriat and 
Boyer, 19B9) and the shortening of economic trends, - while by contrast the length of production 
decision reversibility time has increased (Bruno, 19B9), - are finding expression through an 
*See Appendix for present address. 
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intensification of the uncertainty to which the enterprises are adapting themselves by showing more 
flexibility. 
I. Individual Rationalities and Strategies of Fishing Units 
The strategies that are pursued must be examined in the light of the particular existing objectives 
and constraints. The reasoning generally refers to the notion of opportunity cost, taking into account 
the objectives, and constraints, and the cost of discarding other options. The strategy must be 
cconsidered with regard to the desired objectives, forcing us then to state the problem of the 
fishermen's rationality. Allais (1953) defines the rational man as the one "who pursues objectives 
coherent with themselves and uses means suited to the objectives pursued". The notion of rational 
action comes in for a lot of criticism when the central hypothesis is examined; this concerns the 
maximization of the utility function under constraint, as well as to the aptitude to treat and evaluate 
the information for individuals. The complexity and uncertainty led to the notion of limited rationality 
(Lesourne, 1991) which springs from a procedural rationality, where the information acquired in 
making a choice is progressively integrated in order to obtain a solution which is among the best 
possible ones, but which is no longer necessarily the optimum solution in regard to the "real" 
rationality (Brochier, 1980). 
The strategies adopted by the artisanal fishing units are directly influenced by their family nature 
and by their place in an uncertain environment (Rey, 1991). Their study musttherefore be approached 
within the context of the problem of adjustment to the variability which defines the flexibility as an 
active strategy of adaptability to the uncertainty. The study of strategies presupposes that one 
knows the nature of the decision-maker, the types of arbitration that take place and the factors which 
this influence arbitration. The flexibility can be approached at the decision-making level: it is 
assimilable to the concept of the reversibility of the decisions. It can also be apprehended according 
to the degree of specialization or adaptability of the production mode. A preceding study (Garrabe 
and a/., 1990), analysed the flexibility of fishing and aquafarming units according to the question of 
internal or external flexibility. Here we shall take up only the general factors which affect the 
flexibility of the units. 
Figure 1 
Presentation of determining factors to the productive flexibility of units 
the unit ,""h •• ~ Sbo 0' - Rigidity of I the regulations Environemental I heaviness I Marketing , 
Inovational r--
Degree 
Setting of Degree of \seasonal Regularity I 
objectives autonomy of the activity ISectorial I-
~ I 
Mobility 
Variabili ty of ~FLEXIBILITY 
j the Envirnment~ ~I "'t.-I" inanc~al r-- Access to Access to papacity Distribution Information .... Channels 
Level of .,. Patrimonia I, 
Information Context Self-financing I 
Capacity 
1,rainingl i IAge I ... 
iPersonal Characteristics~ ·Ioersonal i tyl 
188 
Helene Rey: Milestones for an Approach to the Strategies of Artisanal Fishing Units 
The concept of rational artisanal fishing faces many specific restraints because of (i) the family 
nature of the units, (ii) the diverse objectives and (iii) the particular form of the information. 
(i) The micro-economic approach to the rationality question taking the individual as an object of 
study, and looking at the problem of coordinating the decisions and the rationalities, is really set 
only in macro-economic level. This situation may seem paradoxical if one notices that the smallest 
national accounting reference level is the household. Studies are trying to bring to the fore the 
functions offamily utility more or less related to the functions olthe individual utility olthe household 
members (Bourguignon, 1984). At the level of the productive functioning, the family nature also 
introduces a further complexity owing to its subdivision into two interdependent subsystems: the 
system of production and the family group. In consequence, this has some special effects on decision 
making. The main question then is the degree of dependency between the unit of production, the 
residence, the consumption, and the accumulation. The family chief holding generally holds the 
decision-making power in the production unit, but one frequently notices a confusion between the 
objectives of the family and those of the production unit. In extreme cases the production unit is 
justified only as a means permitting the family reproduction. 
(ii) The artisanal fishing unit pursues a range of objectives which are not always apprehended when 
it comes to optimality. The operator can be more sensitive to security than to rentability. In 
developing countries, the security objective is often related to food but it can be extended either to 
the accounts, implying strategies to minimize expenditure, or to marketing when the productive 
choices are influenced by the degree to which the marketing channels are mastered. The security 
can finally mean a patrimonial means of keeping some property or usage rights. The artisanal 
fisherman pursues different objectives among which the main ones are': 
-To enhance his social status in the fishing community to which he belongs, this enhancement 
being carried out according to parameters characteristic to the environment. Among these, 
are the expertise, the equipment level (which implies minetic behaviours), but also a multitude 
of subjective criteria which cannot be limited to the concept of economic profit. 
-The search for autonomy, associated with freedom with regard to the socio-economic context; 
the constraints of the natural conditions even though very important do not present the same 
liberty-depriving characteristic as the economic or institutional constraint does. This search 
for autonomy can lead to tax evasion, but can also be the origin of particular technical or 
commercial choices, or explain some strategies of integration upstream or below. 
-The minimization of labour time (which is closely akin to the symbols of liberty previously 
evoked) in connection with the definition of a sufficient revenue level in regard to his needs. 
-The desire for status in the community and place of origin can make activity continue at the 
break-even point. In effect, during stagnation or in a period of restrictive regulation of the 
market, the pursuit of the activity, or even in the long run, remonstrations by the family may 
constitute the only way of preserving the productive capital. 
(iii) The non-appropriation of the resource is externality producing. No single operator has direct 
control over his own level of production. The average production of each operator is determined by 
the interaction between the size of stocks and the aggregation of individual decisions (Gilly, 1989). 
These factors reinforce the difficulties for the fishermen to anticipate, all the more so since, for the 
artisanal fishing, the arbitration between the gears can be daily ones and that many gears do not 
have a specific vocation. The dissemination of the information is proof of the transparency degrees 
of different sectors. This differentiated access to information is the result of the non-appropriation 
and the determining factor of the know-how which is the main condition of access to the resource 
from a technical as well from a social point of view. The key concept of the balancing of fisheries (in 
Perroux's traditional meaning) which explains some intergroup or even intragroup behaviours is 
therefore the informational assymmetry. 
II. Artisanal Fishing units have strategies directed at short-term flexibility 
We shall not tackle the different finalities which intervene in an interdependent way into "the 
functions of objectives" of the units. Nor shall we take into account the strategies of "status quo" 
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which characterize notably the units of restricted production. We shall limit our inquiry to the 
inventory of adaptation forms, put into use in the case of the artisanal fishing in order to test the 
hypothesis of the existence of a flexibility strategy, and try to assess the degree of flexibility of the 
units. 
The observations are based on the results of a study conducted by the Centre d'Etudes de Projets 
on the small-scale fisheries in Languedoc-Roussillon', and on our knowledge of artisanal fishing in 
the Mediterranean. 
The flexibility will be considered in connection with the intra- or inter-annual fluctuations of the 
resource. Other factors of uncertainty, notably price variations - will not be examined here. The 
results olthe survey confirm the importance of the variability with which these units are confronted: 
at the intra-annual level, two-thirds of the fishermen mention a seasonal concentration of very 
important catches while 75% notice very strong inter-annual variations in the volume oltheir catches. 
Diversification, the recourse to family labour and overinvestment are the most noticeable forms of 
flexibility. 
(i) Diversification and multiple activities are traditionally some of the privileged forms of adaptation 
and risk reduction. Thus, the multifunctional nature of the artisanal fishing unit enables it to adapt 
to the varied conditions of the environment (Laloe and Samba, 1990). In the Mediterranean area, 
the small scale fishing units practice several kinds of fishing during the year (an average of three 
and in extreme cases fifteen). Only 13% of units are specialized (restricted to a single method of 
fishing). The correlation between the positive growth of the level of income and the number of 
fishing techniques testifies to the stabilizing role of non-specialization strategies. 
(ii) Diversification extends to include some non-fishing activities for 39% of the units. Only 25% of 
the fishermen's wives have an activity outside the unit. The multiple activities of the operator may 
constitute a counter-risk currency stock and/or an income contribution which increases the unit's 
financial capacity. Thus, at the level of Mediterranean small scale fisheries for example, the incidence 
of fishermen's wives undertaking an external activity is dependent on the size of the unit and on the 
recourse to borrowing. We can conclude that the external income either helps to finance investments 
or serves as a guarantee for a loan3 . 
(iii) The family nature of the labour force is a flexibility factor' because it offers a perfect divisibility 
which enables an adaptation tothe variations olthe activity. Furthermore Platteau (1989), considering 
the irregular nature of the activity, minimizes the risks of under-use of the equipment, the recruiting 
inside the family ensuring their availability due to the privileged relation which connects them to 
the unit. Only 20% of the Mediterranean small-scale fisheries employ outside labour'. In all the 
cases, the units employing crewmen do not have recourse to family labour, a fact having the 
tendency to indicate an opposition of strategies at the level of the labour force. Only 15% of the 
units are characterized by a stable family association (usually father and son). In other cases, the 
contribution of family labour is of a more desultory nature inherent in the flexibility of the unit; 
wives participate in fishing activity in 57% of the units whilst in 28% other members of the family 
do so as well. The contribution of family labour is slightly more important for the units that make 
direct sales. However, it remains of secondary importance, in 70% of cases never exceeding eight 
hours a week. 
(iv) The availability of equipment of which the volume is largely surplus to current needs does not 
result only from constraints of the turnover of the equipment. It seems that there may be a voluntary 
strategy of stocking designed to seize possible opportunities. In this way, the artisanal fishermen in 
the Mediteranean utilise their gear an average of only 27% of the time in the case of meshed fishing 
nets, 32% with trammel nets, and 27% with capechades. 
III. Constraints inducing a rigidity 
The stability olthe means of production, its dependency on the physical context, the lack offinancial 
capacity and the specialization of commercial channels restrict the units flexibility. 
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(i) The flexibility of the units seems very weak in the medium-term. In effect, 76% of the fishermen 
never changed their type of fishing and 72% never moved from their fishing grounds during their 
career. One finds some periods of discontinuity in the activity' which tend to show that the adapation 
could have been achieved by a change in type of activity, the fishermen switching themselves over 
to another activity (18% of the population) or re-embarking as crewmen for a period of time (29%).' 
The hereditary nature of the sector finds expression in weak sectorial mobility: only 35% of the 
fishermen have had another job before becoming fishermen, and only 12% have been bosses 
outside the context of small scale fisheries. 
(ii) A relative specialization of the fishing areas' which restricts the units' flexibility is apparent, 58% 
being specialized as regards the type of fishing grounds exploited (exclusively sea-fishing or lagoon-
fishing), while the fishermen who undertake mixed fishing (lagoon and sea) generally have a 
dominant area and a distribution of activity between the areas which remain stable from one year 
to another (63%). 
Several things explain the absence of geographical mobility. There is a close correlation between 
know-how and the area fished due to the importance of knowledge related to environmental data. 
Apart from the vessels fishing at the edge of the continental plateau, the low power of the engines 
(65 horsepower in average) limits fishing to the nearest fishing grounds (only 16% olthe fishermen 
go further than six miles). Hence the need to reach the fishing grounds quickly is cited by one-third 
of the fishermen as the determining factor in the choice of their engine's horsepower. Moreover, 
their mobility is limited because they cannot fish in a different jurisdiction. Fishermen can gain 
access to fishing grounds that are not under the control of their own jurisdisction only with the other 
jurisdiction's authorization. This constraint is very restrictive in the case of lagoon-fishing, and the 
access to natural beds of wild shellfish, and is often the cause of major conflicts. Thus, 54% of the 
fishermen have never crossed over the territorial boundaries of their jurisdiction during their whole 
career. Furthermore 80% of the fishermen actually live in the same town in which they were born 
or in a town less than 20 km from their birthplace. 
(iii) Intra-annual fluctuations are shown by some shortages of funds for 62% at the level of the 
fishermen. There seems to be no specific answer at the production level but rather the family needs 
to adapt to the unit's cycle of activity. In effect, most of the fishermen say that they defer their 
expenses and make informal provision when they collect their receipts. The practice of a comp-
lementary activity, or of an external activity on the part of the wife, are also cited, while the most 
current short-term method of adaptation is to suspend the payment of social insurance which is 
seen to be the unit's main burden. Thus, 25% of the fishermen declare that they do not systematically 
'disembark' when they do not sail out, while their movements as they have been registered by 
Maritime Affairs show that on average the maximum length of embarkation without discontinuity 
is fou r months. 
In the same way three quarter's of the fishermen face major fluctuations in their catches from one 
year to the next. Only one-third anticipate these fluctuations by building up currency stocks. The 
survey did not test whether the absence of stocks is because thay are unable to accrue this revenue 
or from alternative allotments. While fishermen most often mention difficulties resulting from the 
fact that their level of revenue is only enough to maintain the current functioning of the unit, the 
observed practices tend to suggest the existence of alternative allotments. 
Only half of the fishermen have recourse to loans. The weak level of investment (for 52% of the 
fishermen, the total of their gross assets - boat, engine, sailing material - is less than 50,000 
francs). the wish for autonomy and the absence of development projects explain the importance of 
self-financing. The level olthe initial capital is dependent on the individual family. Family loans play 
a small role as an alternative to institutional financing. The recourse to family loans affects only 10% 
of the fishermen. 
(iv) The study of commercial practices seems to show a lack of flexibility. Only 27% of the fishermen 
take advantage of the competition between wholesalers while 70% of the fishermen have only one 
channel and only 9% do not have a dominant channel. The share in direct marketing is globally very 
weak since it affects only 30% of the units. One notices a correlation between the types of fishing 
indicating that direct sales are mainly carried out by the maritime units that specialize in the catching 
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of fish. This situation can be explained in the case of the fishery examined here by the importance 
of species like congers and clams which are the concern of specific specialized channels and which 
enjoy remunerative prices. The studies conducted by biologists (Farrugio and Le Corre, 1985) confirm 
the importance of the wholesalers for lagoon fishings since they sell 73% of the catches. 
CONCLUSION: FLEXIBILITY OF FISHERIES 
The equilibrium concept at fishery level presupposes a general cohesion of action in time and space 
which sets the problem of analysing the objectives, means and agents 9 of the regulation. The 
flexibility of the fisheries as a whole should be analysed. Attempts to model the fisheries come up 
against problem of coordination and mutual compatibility of the operators' activities which guaran-
tees the activities' collective coherence. The bio-economic models depend on postulating a single 
centre of decision controlling all the decisions of the fishery (Weber and Meuriot, 1984). Here one 
finds the limits of the concept of collective anticipation, and moreso since the unsuitable nature of 
the resource leads to a situation of non-cooperation which refers back to the economic problems of 
multiple equilibrium (Mongin, 1984). The question of flexibility must be considered at a macro-
economic level since some studies (Bruno, 1989) reveal that the aggregation of individual flexibilities 
leads to rigidity in the global situation. All the same, at the inshore marine level, Allen and 
McGlade(1986) show that individual responses can intensify the fluctuations of the recruitment. 
NOTES 
1. These objectives are not listed in order of their importance. 
2. This study was conducted by the Centre d'Etudes de Projets acting on a request from the 
Ministry of the Sea (Rey, 1989). It concerned a representative sample of 198 fishermen on a 
stratified polling basis according to the geographic locality, the rate of embarkation and 
membership of the co-operative of the "cinq ports" for the fishermen of Thau lagoon. The 
following people took part in this study: M. H. Dabat, N. Daures, N. Gaudin, M. Garrabe, B. 
Heyer, D. Houdayer and L. Pons. 
3. The contribution of external revenue also makes it possible to get round the rentability and in 
this way to introduce criteria of choice going beyond the purely economic aspects. 
4. Conversely the family nature can be a rigidity factor when the development of the business is 
dependent on the size of the labour force. The growth of the labour force according to the age 
of the family members sometimes explains the succession of the phases of growth and decline 
of a business (Jorion and Delbos, 1984). When the labour force is made up of crewmen, it can 
become a permanent cost since the subsistence of the family members/must be ensured 
(Badouin, 1987). 
5. Actually 49% of the units employ crewmen, but in 40% of the cases it is a fictitious embarkation, 
enabling the seaman (sometimes a member of the family) to undertake the 36 months of 
mandatory sailing in order to get himself registered as a skipper. 
6. We have assumed that there was a discontinuity when the fishing ceased for 6 months. 
7. In some ports, notably those where tuna boats are present, this strategy of skipper 
alternating/crewman is practiced according to the cycle of the activity of tuna boats. 
8. It would be proper to distinguish the fishing area, which corresponds to a type of environment, 
from the fishing grounds, which represent the precise location where the fishing takes place. 
Apart from those with fixed gears or in the case of some natural beds of wild shellfish, the 
units did not frequent special fishing grounds. 
9. Besides the customary forms of regulation, which come under the institutions of "prud'homies" 
jurisdictions, Mediterranean artisanal fishing is self-regulated. Professionals often initiate the 
measures taken by the administration (Meuriot and Dreumiere, 1986) and some spontaneous 
initiatives have been noticed between fishermen sharing the same gear. 
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